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ABSTRACT 
 
Imagery, Affect and the Embodied Mind: Implications for Reading and Responding to 
Literature.  (December 2004) 
Karen A. Krasny, B.Ed., University of Manitoba; 
M.Ed., University of Manitoba 
Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee:  Dr. G. Patrick Slattery 
                      Dr. Mark Sadoski 
 
 
Since Plato first banished poets from his Republic, the relationship between the 
aesthetic and moral value of literature has been subject to philosophical, critical, and 
pedagogical debate.  In this philosophical investigation, I sought to explain how the 
evocation of the senses during literary transactions shapes the phenomenal experience of 
the reader.  Recent developments in neuroscience (Damasio, 1999, 2003; Edelman, 1992) 
provide strong evidence in support of embodied theories of cognition in which imagery 
and affect play a central role.  The purposes of this philosophical investigation were to 
describe the structure and function of imagery and affect in the cognitive act of reading, 
to provide a detailed account of how we exercise our capacity for imaginative thought in 
order to achieve literal, inferential, and critical comprehension, and to explore the 
implications of an embodied mind for reading and responding to literary texts.  The 
investigation yielded a critical review of contemporary theories of reading (Kintsch, 
1998; Rumelhart, 1977; Sadoski & Paivio, 2001) to examine their ability to explain the 
phenomena associated with the literary experience.  Dual coding theory (Sadoski & 
Paivio, 2001) which maintains an empirical and embodied view of the mind was shown 
to have considerable theoretical advantages over rationalist computational theories of 
 iv
cognition in explaining phenomena associated with reading and responding to literary 
texts.  A neurobiological account of consciousness provides support for the idea that 
literature can engage readers imaginatively in the process moral deliberation (Dewey, 
1932/1985).  In addition, I concluded that considerable evidence exists to suggest that 
somatic and visceral changes experienced as a result of undergoing the text can 
potentially incite individual and social change.      
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE AESTHETIC AND 
MORAL VALUE OF LITERATURE  
If I am to believe literature—the best and the worst too—no voice can 
compete with the voice of the senses.  What is one to believe?   
-Colette, The Vagabond 
Since Plato first banished poets from his Republic, the relationship between the 
aesthetic and moral value of literature has been subject to philosophical, critical, and 
pedagogical debate.  Was Plato correct in assuming that the literary experience could 
evoke the persuasive power of the senses and alter the moral values of individuals and 
society?  What exactly is the structure and function of imagery and affect in literary 
response?  In this investigation, I look for answers to these centuries-old questions in 
light of what we are presently learning about imagery and affect as manifestations of an 
embodied mind and the biological basis for moral and ethical conduct.   
During the sixteenth century, Sidney championed poetry on the grounds that it 
reflected the human potential for allegorical imagination (Bogdan, 1992).  The idea of 
poetry as allegory implied that author and reader share a mutual understanding of poetry 
as a verbal representation of reality.  Contrary to Plato’s recognition that poetry can both 
reinforce and subvert prevailing moral values, Sidney upheld the Renaissance belief that 
virtue is the ultimate end of all knowledge.  Accordingly, Sidney claimed that poetry 
naturally rallied human emotion and imagination in the pursuit of good.  Two centuries 
later, Shelley in Defence of Poetry (1821/1965) rejected the justification of poetry as 
_______________ 
This dissertation follows the style and format of Reading Research Quarterly. 
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allegory in favor of poetry’s capacity to engage the metaphorical imagination (Bogdan, 
1992).  In his view, poetry cannot mirror reality and this is precisely why it is of moral 
value. Anticipating the meliorism in Dewey’s aesthetics and the claim made by 
contemporary educational philosopher Maxine Greene (1978) that the arts have the 
power to transform through “wide-awakeness” (p. 43), Shelley (1821/1965) writes that 
poetry “awakens and enlarges the mind itself by rendering the receptacle of a thousand 
unapprehended combinations of thought” (pp. 39-40).  Although Shelley saw Plato’s 
prototype as “the Poet’s idealized beloved” (O’Connor, 2002, p. xxii), he justifies poetry 
on the same basis that Plato grew wary of it—the recognition that poetry could both 
reinforce social values and incite social change.  Regardless of the ideological viewpoint 
held by philosopher, critic, or pedagogue, any discussion of the moral value of literature 
appears to be foregrounded in the human capacity to imagine. 
Imagery, Affect, and the Embodied Mind 
Sadoski (1992) defines imagination as the “normal, essentially human, mindful 
activity that we engage in from moment to moment” as “we manipulate parts of existing 
images into new combinations and/or when we enrich images with affective associations” 
(p. 266).  Similarly, Dewey (1934/1987) describes imagination as “the gateway through 
which these meanings [derived from past experience] can find their way into a present 
interaction or rather…the conscious adjustment of the new and the old…” (p. 276).  A 
traditional Romantic view of imagination as ‘flights of fancy’ ensured that imagination 
has been seen as purely subjective and therefore having little or no direct relevance to the 
human capacity for reason (Fesmire, 1999).  Yet as Dewey (1916/1980) contends, “The 
imagination is as much a normal and integral part of human activity as is muscular 
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movement” (p. 245).  According to Dewey (1934/1987) “all conscious experience has of 
necessity some degree of imaginative quality” (p. 276).  Arguably, from a pragmatist 
perspective, the most important function of imagination is that it allows us to internalize a 
situation according to past experiences and act in the present in anticipation of future 
possibilities.   
Experience in Dewey’s (1934/1987) view is also emotional and emotions are not 
private but “are attached to events and objects in their movement” (p. 48).  He claims that 
emotions are qualities of an experience and are not separate from the experience itself.  
They emerge in the relationship between organism and object as in the intimate 
relationship between reader and text.  As Dewey (1934/1987) explains: 
The intimate nature of emotion is manifested in the experience of one watching a 
play on a stage or reading a novel.  It attends the development of a plot; and a plot 
requires a stage, a space wherein to develop and time in which to unfold.  
Experience is emotional but there are no separate things called emotions in it.”  
(p. 48)   
Recent developments in cognitive science provide us with a neurobiological 
account of an embodied mind that supports the intentionality in Dewey’s emotionally 
wrought experience.  Damasio (1999, 2003) describes how emotions play out in the 
theatre of the body as reactions to momentary structural changes. The brain constructs 
maps of these changes to record sensory images that are necessary to human survival.  At 
the most basic level, emotions serve a regulatory function to maintain the health of the 
organism.  One touches a hot iron by accident and one quickly jerks away one’s hand to 
avoid pain.  In situations demanding a more complex appraisal, emotions include drives 
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and motivations that give rise to feelings and the formation of images.  Damasio (2003) 
makes a functional distinction between emotions and feelings but qualifies this 
distinction by asserting that emotions and feelings are so intimately related in the 
continuous process of affect that we tend to think of them as a single mental event.  In 
Damasio’s account of body and emotion, feelings are hidden images, the mental 
representation of emotional responses that become the experiential source of our 
imagination.   
Mental imagery is the cornerstone of Paivio’s (1986, 1991) dual coding theory.  
Overwhelming neurobiological evidence supports the contention in dual coding theory 
that the brain maintains functionally independent verbal- and nonverbal-representational 
and processing systems.  In other words, different parts of the brain are specialized for 
processing stimulus information verbally and nonverbally.  Whereas, Damasio (2003) 
posits that feelings are mental images of emotions, dual coding theory maintains that the 
nonverbal cognitive reactions of imagery and affect are correlated, that is to say that they 
are related but nevertheless, two distinctly separate phenomena.  According to Paivio 
(1986, 1991), affective and emotional reactions would be expected to accompany other 
nonverbal cognitive reactions such as imagery.  What emotions are theorized to be is 
controversial in psychology.  Defining the biological relationship between affect and 
cognition is central to establishing a theory of reader response based on the embodiment 
of the mind and to understanding how the arousal of images and emotions during the act 
of reading might contribute to complex systems of ethical behaviors.  In this regard, 
understanding the structure and function of imagery and affect in psychological and 
philosophical conceptualizations of the mind allows us to explore in greater detail the 
 5
extent to which literature might prove a “gateway” to imagination.  In Deweyan terms, 
we may come to understand how literature provides us with “a stage, a space wherein to 
develop and time in which to unfold” (Dewey, 1934/1987, p. 48) in order to integrate 
life’s drama and envision enriched possibilities.  
To Dewey, thinking is imagining and imagination is the source of moral conduct.  
In Defence of Poetry, Percy Bysshe Shelley (1821/1965) writes, “A man1 to be greatly 
good, must imagine intensely and comprehensively; he must put himself in the place of 
another and of many others; the pains and pleasures of his species must become his own.  
The great instrument of moral good is the imagination…” (p. 40).  In his discussion of 
novelistic discourse, Bakhtin (1981) details the ability of readers and writers to 
imaginatively project themselves into the role of the other to establish the acts of reading 
and writing as intersubjective collaborations.  The interlocutory relationship among 
readers, writers, and texts underlies the current social epistemic movement in language 
and literacy scholarship (Bizzell, 1986; Clark, 1990; LeFevre, 1987).  In other words, as 
writers compose, they are able to assume the role of an imagined audience, and 
conversely, during the act of reading, readers are imaginatively engaged in writing their 
own subtext. Reading in this sense becomes an act of aesthetic intersubjectivity that 
depends on “the cognitive processes by which images, feelings, and motives are 
converted to language by an author and back into images, feelings, and motives 
by…readers” (Sadoski, 1992, p. 273).  In sum, imagination establishes the literary text as 
both the object of the reader’s emotional intentionality and the formal structure to convey 
the writer’s expressive content. 
                                                 
  1 When citing the works of others, I will maintain the gender bias language used in the original. 
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Neural modeling (Damasio, 1999, 2003; Edelman, 1992; Narayanan, N., 1993, 
Narayanan, S., 1997) and theories of cognition (Barsalou, 1999; Johnson, 1993; Kosslyn, 
1980, 1994; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Paivio, 1971, 1986, 1991) that emphasize 
embodied experience as the basis for knowledge and reason are useful in explaining the 
pervasive presence of imagination in both thought and language.  Cognition is central to 
all forms of human activity and therefore it can be argued that any theory of reading not 
grounded in a general theory of cognition will eventually perish.  Advances in 
neuroscience that help elucidate the cognitive role of images and emotions suggest that 
the separations of emotional and critical responses to literature implicit in Frye’s (1963) 
educated imagination and the polarity defining Rosenblatt’s (1978) aesthetic and efferent 
continuum are no longer tenable.  It is my intention to establish imagination as the critical 
point at which various perspectives from philosophy, cognitive science, literary theory, 
and reader response converge to mend the Cartesian split between the cognitive and the 
affective domains of reading.  The act of reading literary texts amounts to nothing less 
than “what happens when varied materials of sense quality, emotion, and meaning come 
together in a union that marks a new birth in the world” (Dewey, 1934/1987, p. 272). 
Statement of the Problem 
Eagleton (1990) claims, “Aesthetics is born as a discourse of the body” (p. 13).  
Presently, we are witnessing a renewed interest in the empirical and physiological basis 
for rational thought (Damasio, 1994, 1999, 2003; Johnson, 1993; Lakoff & Johnson, 
1999; Nussbaum, 2001; Paivio, 1971, 1986, 1991).  Within the field of reading, this has 
resulted in the challenge to explore how human perception and sensation provide the 
experiential stuff used to imaginatively respond to and make meaning from literary texts 
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(Bogdan, 1992; Eagleton, 1990; Nussbaum, 2001; Sadoski & Paivio, 2001; Turner, 
1996).  From such a perspective, the dichotomies of mind and body and of self and world 
so entrenched in Western philosophical thought are seen as limitations toward developing 
a more comprehensive understanding of the mental processes used in transactions with 
literary texts.  A renewed emphasis on perceptual experience foregrounds the possibility 
that language evolved in the service of mental imagery.   How does imagination function 
in ways to organize and make meaning of external stimuli as humans interact within their 
environment and as members of a society? Consequently, what role does this imaginative 
capacity to reconfigure and transform biophysical events play as humans interact with 
literary texts?   
The dominance of behaviorist psychology during the first half of the twentieth 
century served to devalue mental imagery as a legitimate research pursuit.  In 1913, 
Watson launched the behaviorist movement in American psychology with a “manifesto” 
that refuted the existence of mental imagery and advanced what continues to be referred 
to as the ‘imageless thought controversy.’  He denounced mental imagery as being 
unscientific and somewhat akin to “medieval” notions of immortality grounded in 
religious beliefs bordering on “old wives tales” (Watson, 1930).  While most behaviorists 
were not as vehement in their denial of the existence of mental imagery, the prevalance of 
the behaviorist view may have contributed to the inherent assumption in several 
interactive theories of reading comprehension (Kintsch, 1988, 1998; Rumelhart, 1977; 
van Dijk and Kintsch, 1983) that abstract propositional representations are antecedent to 
the formation of images, if in fact the formation of images is accounted for at all.  
Furthermore, in a recently published volume of research featuring theoretical models and 
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empirical studies of the construction of mental representations during reading (van 
Oostendorp & Goldman, 1999), the words image, imagery, and imagination are 
conspicuously missing from the subject index.     
Since the Western emergence of Vygotsky’s (1962, 1978) writings, the idea that 
thought is covert speech has sustained the influence of social constructivist theory on 
reading instruction throughout the final decades of the twentieth century (Clay & Cazden, 
1990; Goodman & Goodman, 1990; Moll, 1990).  At first glance, Vygotsky’s (1978) 
contention that everything within the individual’s conceptual horizon appears first on the 
inter-psychological plane before it appears on the intra-psychological plane appears to be 
fairly consistent with the conceptualization of thought as the imaginative reconfiguration 
of our former perceptual experience.  However, the notion that mental representations 
fundamental to thought are restricted to inner speech (a claim that is not entirely 
inconsistent with behaviorism) may have directly or indirectly served to minimize 
attention paid to the critical role of imagination and the formation of nonverbal mental 
imagery in reading research.   
Significance of the Study 
Informed by recent theories of embodied cognition, this study is intended to 
respond to the question of whether imagery and affect evoked during the act of reading 
can shape the moral and ethical conduct of readers.  Advances in neuroscience and the 
new field of consciousness studies have made it possible to posit a relationship between 
the inner psychological processes of making meaning from literary texts and the 
phenomenal experience of the reader.  The significance of the study lies in its potential to 
extend the implications of the psychological link between images and emotions to 
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reading and responding to literary texts.  I argue that any attempt to gain a comprehensive 
understanding of reader’s responses to literature might begin with an examination of the 
cognitive structure of emotions and images to advance a theory of reader response 
founded on the embodied mind.  An integration of recent developments in cognitive 
science and a historical and philosophical review of the role of imagination can provide 
us with new insights into how readers enter into the intersubjective and collaborative 
production of meaning from literary texts and a chance to reevaluate several prevailing 
theoretical models of reading and reader response.   
Research Questions 
 The purpose of my research is to respond to the following questions: 
1. What is the central role of imagery and affect in the cognitive act of 
reading literary texts. 
2. How do we exercise our capacity for imaginative thought to achieve 
literal, inferential, and critical comprehension. 
3. In philosophical and psychological terms, what are the implications of the 
embodied mind for reading and responding to literary texts.   
Method 
I have adopted a philosophical approach to studying the structure and function of 
imagery and affect in order to elaborate upon the implications of embodied cognition for 
reading and responding to literary texts.  This method of synthesizing ideas from a 
variety of theoretical perspectives to yield fresh insights has been used to investigate and 
revise our understanding of a wide range of educational phenomena.  For example, recent 
educational dissertations relying on this mode of inquiry include studying the possibility 
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of an eschatological curriculum (Slattery, 1989), teaching and writing as body discourse 
(Fisanick, 2003), and the implications of studying evil in the novel for moral education 
(Fishbeyn, 2003).  My investigation demands a constructive integration of the 
philosophical (Aristotle, 1968; Bakhtin, 1981; Bronowski, 1978; Buber, 1947, 1970; 
Dewey, 1932/1985; 1934/1987; Langer, 1942; Mead, 1934; Merleau-Ponty, 1962; 
Nussbaum, 2001; Plato, 1961/1980; Sartre, 1940/2004), literary (Bakhtin, 1981; Bogdan, 
1992; Coleridge, 1954; Frye, 1963; Eagleton, 1990; Iser, 1978, 1980, 2000; Lodge, 2003; 
Rosenblatt, 1978; Shelley, 1821/1965), psychological (Damasio, 1999, 2003; Edelman, 
1992; James, 1890/1981; Kosslyn, 1980, 1994; Paivio, 1971, 1986, 1991) and psycho-
linguistic (Johnson, 1993; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Turner, 1996) conceptualizations of 
imagination.  In addition, I will be drawing on empirical studies in reading (Gambrell, 
1982; Hidi & Baird, 1988; Krasny & Sadoski, 2004; Pressley, 1976; Sadoski, 1983; 
Sadoski, Goetz, & Kangiser, 1988; Sadoski & Quast, 1990) to support my theoretical 
arguments.  Sadoski and Paivio’s (2001) dual coding theory of reading and writing 
underlines the fundamental premise in my work that mental representations used in 
reading and writing are stored in our memory as a result of direct sensory experience.  In 
order to illustrate how dual coding theory might account for a wider range of text 
processing phenomena used in reading literary texts, I will review and compare it to other 
models of reading (Rumelhart, 1977; Kintsch, 1988, 1998) which invoke both bottom-up 
and top-down processes of reading.   
By way of illustrative examples, I hope to avoid the trap of making this account of 
reading transparent to theory yet opaque to the world of readers.  I have adopted a 
pragmatist orientation to explore the stated purposes of the investigation by presenting 
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readers as active agents in the creative interplay among a number of interrelated acts.  
The aim is not to present an all-encompassing theory of reading but to capture much of 
what it is that readers actually do in transaction with literary texts and to examine how the 
social situatedness and the experiential uniqueness of the reader might make manifest 
certain behaviors.  This investigation also entails an accounting of how the activation of 
verbal or nonverbal representations during reading can evoke affective reactions and 
conversely, how emotions are connected to the concrete picturing of objects and events 
(Damaisio, 1994, 1999, 2003; Edelman, 1992; Krasny & Sadoski, 2004; Nussbaum, 
2001; Paivio, 1971, 1986, 1991; Sadoski, Goetz, & Kangiser, 1988).   
Scope of the Study 
Central to the thesis being presented is the idea that imagination inheres in every 
aspect of the reading process and our ability to access both verbal and nonverbal images 
during reading is what allows us to render literary texts conceptually coherent.  I have 
chosen to explicate the role of imagery and affect as they apply to each of a number of 
interrelated acts.  Understanding reading as an act of cognition demands a theory that 
explains the psychological processes of making meaning from external stimuli.  Mental 
imagery is fundamental to dual coding theory’s capacity to account for the back and forth 
movement between representational, referential, and associative thought processes that 
enable readers to use graphic information and information from the reader’s memory for 
the spreading activation of bottom-up and top-down processing (Sadoski & Paivio, 
2001).  In schema-based models of comprehension (Kintsch, 1988, 1998; Kintsch & van 
Dijk, 1983; Rumelhart, 1977) the construction of mental representations depends upon 
associative networks of abstract propositions.  Comprehension is largely the result of a 
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series of constraints on meaning and can be arrived at computationally.  In this study, I 
briefly describe and compare several prevailing theoretical models of reading to 
determine the extent to which each is consistent with the emerging evidence in 
neuroscience supporting embodied cognition.   
The Latin verb ruminare—to ruminate foregrounds the idea of reading as an 
embodied act.  The medieval practice of ruminative reading was based on mental imagery 
as text was “reheard, reseen, refelt, and reexperienced (Sadoski & Paivio, 2001, p. 19).  
Reading was regarded as a corporeal act—a “murmuring meditation” (p. 19) to 
incorporate the text into the reader’s senses.  The Anglo Saxon rœdan and the German 
rathen further capture the perceptual and empirical dimensions of reading as the act of 
uttering aloud or reciting inaudibly, of taking in the sense of words, and of learning by 
observation.  In postmodernist terms, ruminative reading is described as a 
phenomenological and bodily experience (Grumet, 1988) allowing readers the 
opportunity to “explore the nooks and crannies of their psyche and look forward to the 
journey within” (Slattery, 1995, p. 165).  The written page becomes a source of 
consciousness.  Consciousness for Merleau-Ponty (1962) is located in the body that keeps 
“the visual spectacle constantly alive, it breathes life into it and sustains it inwardly, and 
with it forms a system” (p. 203).  Turner (1996) argues that narrative imagining is 
nothing less than the embodiment of our evolutionary past—a “genetic endowment” (p. 
25) fundamental to the recognition and execution of small spatial stories necessary for 
structuring perceptual and conceptual categories and the projected animation of objects 
and events with a disposition toward survival and a developing human mind.  In order to 
explain the structure and function of imagery and affect, it is necessary to briefly outline 
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the biological evolution of human consciousness thus “[p]utting the mind back into 
nature” (Edelman, 1992, p. 9).   
Neuroscience provides considerable support for the idea that reading is an act of 
emotional intentionality.  Traditionally, the study of consciousness was a primary 
occupation of philosophy and psychoanalysis.  Deemed too elusive for empirical study, 
psychology focused its energies on that which could be measured and observed as input 
and output.  Spurred by such scientific developments as the discovery in quantum physics 
that an event is inseparable from its observation, understanding the specific nature of our 
subjective inner life began to gain importance within the field of cognitive science.  
Damasio (1999, 2003) describes a neurobiology of rationality in which the brain 
maintains a representation of what is going on in the body.  He contends that the brain 
creates associations between body states and emotions and that the brain uses these 
associations to make decisions.   
Nussbaum (2001) claims,“[e]motions shape the landscape of our mental and 
social lives” (p. 1).  Relying on the work of Damasio (1994) and others (Lazarus, 1991; 
Oatley, 1992; Ortony, Clore & Collins, 1988), Nussbaum supports her argument that 
emotions provide us with a sense of how the world relates to our projects and goals.  
Nussbaum’s assessment of emotions is reminiscent of the underlying principle of many 
transactional theories of reader response in which the goals of reading are “internal to 
and generated by the reader” (Bogdan & Straw, 1990, emphasis in the original, p. 3) 
where actualization (Maslow, 1954) that is to say, the fulfillment of a set of needs and 
desires becomes the primary purposes of reading.  Emotions are intentional in that they 
are always about something.  Nussbaum asserts that emotions are value judgments and 
 14
appraisals ascribed to external objects and relate to the salience of those objects to one’s 
important goals and projects.  In reading, the literary text becomes an object of the 
reader’s emotional intentionality.  Certain features of the text involve a more intense 
focusing depending on the reader’s emotional connections.  Empirical studies 
investigating the relationship between mental imagery and affect in reading have 
demonstrated that emotions play a significant role in the concrete picturing of events 
(Krasny & Sadoski, 2004; Sadoski, Goetz, & Kangiser, 1988; Sadoski & Quast, 1990). 
Imagination and dialogue also establish reading as an act of aesthetic 
intersubjectivity.  The word ‘aesthetics’ is derived from the Greek aethetes meaning ‘that 
which perceives’ and as the etymology suggests refers to the realm of human perception 
and sensation.  This is important in establishing that aesthetics is not an essential quality 
of the artifact being perceived but emerges in the act of perceiving.  Dewey (1934/1987) 
summarized this idea as follows:  
A work of art no matter how old and classic is actually, not just potentially, a 
work of art only when it lives in some individualized experience.  As a piece of 
parchment, of marble, of canvas, it remains…self-identical throughout the ages.  
But as a work of art, it is recreated every time it is esthetically experienced (p. 
117).   
In reading, aesthetics emerges in the relation between author and text, text and 
reader, and author and reader.  Bakhtin writing under the name of Volosinov (1929/1973) 
explains how “[e]ach person’s inner world and thought has its stabilized social audience 
that comprises the environment in which reasons, motives, values, and so on are 
fashioned” (p. 86). Similarly, Mead (1934) describes how the direct experience of 
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playing a succession of roles eventually leads to the imaginative formation of the 
“generalized other…[t]he organized community or social group which gives to the 
individual his unity of self” (p. 154).  Accordingly, “out of this process thought arises, 
i.e., conversation with one’s self, in the role of the specific other and then in the role of 
the generalized other” (pp. 312-314).   In a similar fashion, engagement with literary texts 
provides the means of projecting oneself into “alternate ways of being and thinking about 
the world” (Greene, 1995, p. 90).  Reading in an intersubjective sense can be described as 
the imagined completion of the act.  The ethical aspect of literary engagement “is 
characterized by its participants’ consciousness of each other” (Clark, 1990, p. xvi).  
Spencer (2002) citing Eagleton (2000) asserts, “For children, reading is a dialogue with 
their future; their anticipations of ‘what will happen next?’ and ‘shall I be able to cope 
with it?’” (p. 548). 
Reading as an act of moral imagination is grounded in the sense of community 
that emerges as individuals are given the opportunity to imaginatively take on the 
attitudes of others through engagement with literary texts.  A neurobiology of rationality 
(Damasio, 1999, 2003) in which emotions are shown to be an integral part of cognition 
supports the idea that images generated during literary engagement are involved in 
emotional responses and critical judgments.  The idea of reading as an act of moral 
imagination can be traced to Plato’s recognition of poetry as a rhetorically potent force in 
education and a perceived threat to rational thought.  In the Phaedrus, Plato denounces 
writing as a violation of the soul—a forcible intrusion from without (Derrida, 1974).  
Paradoxically, where writing as mere image or representation led to the banishment of 
reading poetry and a deliberate censorship of curriculum in Plato’s (1961/1980) Republic, 
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the recognition that writing is never innocent and can subvert as well as inculcate cultural 
values is the very reason advanced in this thesis that engagement with a variety of literary 
works is necessary to a recognition of moral ambiguity (de Beauvoir, 1948; Moffett, 
1988).  Plato’s concern about the psychological and epistemological consequences of 
poetry foregrounds contemporary critical problems related to censorship, justification, 
and response (Bogdan, 1992).  For example, what is it that we want students to take away 
from the literary experience, and just as important, what do we think that they are taking 
away?  Can reading Colette actually lead to promiscuity, F. Scott Fitzgerald to adultery, 
or Nabokov to pedophilia?  Or are we to believe that the rhetorical power of literature 
extends only to advancing humanist ideals?  Does censorship of literary works endorse 
Plato’s assumption that literature is not for the uneducated?  While reading can be an 
intensely personal and phenomenal experience, the individual and collective images and 
emotional responses generated by readers subject literature to social and cultural critique.   
Limitations of the Study 
 In terms of accounting for the cognitive processes responsible for a range of 
reading phenomena, the study depends on the findings from a number of empirical 
studies investigating the construction of mental imagery and readers’ responses to literary 
texts.  This study is limited insofar as it is theoretically based.  I do feel, however, that a 
synthesis of the ideas and the findings from the various works cited present sufficient 
cause to pursue empirical investigations of the theoretical claims advanced in this 
dissertation. This study also relies on the convergence of evidence within the field of 
cognitive science.  To date, much of human consciousness remains inaccessible to 
empirical study.  Nevertheless, neuroscience continues to investigate the plausibility of a 
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number of theoretical models to describe how neurobiology is linked to cognition.  A 
number of these theoretical models provide the basis for several of the assertions made in 
this study. 
 I have limited this investigation to focusing on reading and responding to literary 
texts.  By extending the “act of reading” to include the social and ethical functions of the 
literature, I have in mind an “implied reader” (Iser, 1978, p. 35).   In this case, the 
“implied reader” described in the act of reading is one who has mastered the basics of 
decoding and comprehension and demonstrates the ability to think critically.       
Definition of Terms 
Aesthetics:  That which relates to the realm of human perception and sensation.  The 
Greek aisthesis suggests that aesthetics is concerned with our sensate life together 
and is located in the relation between sensation and ideas (Eagleton, 1990).    
Affect: The psychological domain of emotional activity (Harris & Hodges, 1995).   .     
Cognition: The psychological domain of intellectual activity (Harris & Hodges, 1995). 
Dialogue:  The conversation between two or more persons implying a reciprocal 
exchange between a speaking subject and an addressee.   
Ethics:  A branch of philosophy concerned with systems of moral behavior to evaluate 
right and wrong.   
Imagination: The act of recombining and rearranging parts of existing mental images 
reproduced from sensory and perceptual experiences to generate enriched 
possibilities (Sadoski, 1992).   
Intentionality:  German philosopher Franz Bretano referred to the notion that awareness 
is always awareness of something as intentionality.  Intentionality is considered an 
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essential property of the mind insofar as “beings with minds can refer to other 
beings or things; things without minds do not refer to beings or other things” 
(Edelman, 1992).  The philosophical assumption is that thought is always about 
something.  This something is referred to as the “intentional object.” 
Intersubjectivity:  The exchange of dialogic positions between speaker and addressee 
among interlocutors.  According to Bakhtin (1981), the nature of language is 
intersubjective and meaning “lies between oneself and the other” (p. 293).  The 
intersubjective utterance is shaped by the imagined response of the other resulting 
in what Bakhtin termed double-voiced discourse.  
Mental imagery:  Concrete representations of perceptual experiences stored in memory.  
Often referred to as “visualization,” or “seeing in the mind’s eye,” mental imagery 
is not a purely visual phenomenon.  It includes mental representations associated 
with all sensory modalities—the visual, auditory, haptic, gustatory, and olfactory 
(Sadoski & Paivio, 2001).  Mental imagery retains some of the properties of 
perceptual experience but as a form of experience itself it is never identical to the 
original.   
Neuroscience: The field of science related to the study of the brain and its functions. 
Perception: Sensations perceived in the body.   
Phenomenology: A philosophical movement using pure description of perceptual 
experience as it presents itself to consciousness.  The German philosopher, 
Edmund Husserl introduced the term “phenomenology” in 1913.   
Pragmatism:  First introduced to the world in 1898 by William James, pragmatism refers 
to a movement in American philosophy that rejected fundamental dualisms (e. g., 
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mind/matter, intellect/emotion, self/others) of modern philosophy in favor of an 
empirical and radical view of experience.  Other dominant features of pragmatism 
include (Stuhr, 2000): fallibilism, as it relates to the tentative nature of 
knowledge; pluralism, in its view of reality and human values; experimental 
inquiry, as a means of linking science and philosophy; meliorism, “the view that 
human action can improve the human condition” (p. 6); and the social 
constitution of the self.  Pragmatism is closely associated with the thought of 
William James, Charles Sanders Pierce, Oliver Wendell Holmes, John Dewey, 
Jane Addams, and George Herbert Mead.  Contemporary pragmatists include 
Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam (Menand, 1997).   
Reading: “[A] process of translating signs and symbols into meanings and incorporating 
the new information into existing cognitive and affective structures” (Robeck & 
Wallace, 1990 cited in Harris & Hodges, 1995).    
Reader response: Theories of reading that focus on the active role of the reader in 
constructing meaning from texts.  While there appears to be no single reader-
response theory, it is generally agreed upon by reader-response theorists that the 
goals of reading are “internal to and generated by the reader” (Bogdan & Straw, 
1990, emphasis in the original, p. 3). 
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CHAPTER II 
A REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Introduction 
Philosophy is a graveyard of ‘isms.’   
-Edelman, Bright Air, Brilliant Fire 
A growing body of research explores the relationship between imagery and affect 
as readers respond to literary texts.  Theoretical advances in neuroscience are coming 
closer to explaining the cognitive role of imagery and affect and Damasio (1999, 2003) 
goes so far as to suggest that the intimate connection between images and emotions is 
responsible for human consciousness and a developing sense of self.  Throughout history, 
mental imagery and verbal processes have often been at odds in philosophy, psychology, 
rhetoric, and education (Sadoski & Paivio, 2001).  It could be said that the 
epistemological and ontological tension between concrete imagery and abstract 
propositions could originate in the distinction between innate reason in Plato’s idealism 
and the concrete world of experience in Aristotle’s empirical philosophy.  This 
distinction characterizes the literacy field in which competing theoretical models of 
reading attempt to account for how readers make meaning from visual stimuli.  The 
following review of literature begins with a summary of the findings of recent empirical 
studies investigating the role of mental imagery and affect in reading and an introduction 
to current theoretical models of reading.  It is followed by a review of recent works in 
cognitive science that support theories of embodied cognition and challenge the 
metaphysical separation between mind and body.  The philosophical literature dealing 
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with imagination is extensive.  The review concludes with a summary of selected 
classical and recent philosophical works included to provoke a revised understanding of 
the psychological processes that contribute to the phenomenal or lived-through 
experience of the reader.   
Understanding how images are formed and operate within a general theory of 
cognition is essential to developing a detailed account of how imagery and affect figure 
prominently in the reading process and in readers’ responses to literature.  Recent works 
emerging from the field of cognitive science that hold that cognitive processes are 
embodied as the direct result of the body’s interactions with the world are useful in 
explaining how the brain is able to maintain mental representations of sensate data stored 
as memory.  Embodied cognition and the emerging field of consciousness studies prove 
to be the impetus for several new works of literary criticism, philosophy, and ethics 
discussed in this review and give cause to reexamine existing theories of reader response.  
At the same time, we must remember that concrete experience has long been at the heart 
of various philosophical traditions including Aristotle’s psychology of empiricism, 
Spinoza’s notion that “the human mind is an idea of the human body” (cited in Damasio, 
2003, p. 12), Rousseau’s educational philosophy, and British empiricism.  But perhaps 
the idea that concrete experience forms the bedrock of consciousness and our personal 
system of ethics has its greatest elaboration in American pragmatism and therefore I have 
referred to selected writings from William James, Dewey, and Mead.  Finally, any 
philosophical discussion of the embodied mind would be incomplete without 
acknowledging the significant contribution of French philosopher, Merleau-Ponty (1962), 
who in Phenomenology of Perception, examines how the body perceives a world 
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“‘already there’ before reflection begins” (p. vii) and creates a life world through sense-
experience. 
Empirical studies of imagery and affect in reading and responding to literary texts 
 
 A growing number of empirical studies provide evidence that imagery and affect 
are integral to the reading process and contribute to the comprehension, memory, and 
appreciation of literary texts.  Sadoski (1983, 1985) conducted a set of two studies in 
which children in grades three, four, and five read stories from basal readers aloud and 
reported on any mental imagery experienced while reading.  In the earlier of the two 
studies, the text was illustrated, while in the later study it was not.  Sadoski found that 
students who read the illustrated story did not discriminate between the images of 
illustrations and their self-generated images.  Interestingly, students who read the story 
without illustrations reported more images.  The results from both studies demonstrated 
that imagery of an important or climatic event related to recall and critical comprehension 
as in the recognition of the story’s theme.  A study by Long, Winograd, and Bridge 
(1989) investigating imagery reported by fifth graders during and after reading using a 
think-aloud strategy revealed that students reported spontaneous imagery at 60 percent of 
the think-aloud stops.  The study identified text characteristics that appear to evoke 
imagery including sensory descriptions, passages containing figurative language, and key 
(climatic) points in the story. 
 Significant correlations between imagery and emotional response ratings were 
found in several studies (Krasny & Sadoski, 2004; Sadoski, Goetz, & Kangiser, 1988; 
Sadoski & Quast, 1990) using numerical ratings.  In Sadoski, Goetz, and Kangiser 
(1988), undergraduate college students were asked to read the entire text of a short story 
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and then to go back and rate each paragraph for either the degree of imagery evoked, the 
degree of emotional response, or the degree of importance.  The graphic depiction of the 
patterns of response for imagery, emotional response and importance predictably reflect 
the rising action toward a climatic point near the very end of the story, followed by a plot 
twist leading to a surprise conclusion.  A quantitative analysis of the ratings revealed 
moderate to moderately high correlations between imagery and emotional response 
ratings.   
Similarly, Krasny and Sadoski (2004) conducted a study with English/French 
bilingual readers enrolled in a Canadian French immersion high school using two of the 
three short stories used in the Sadoski, Goetz, and Kangiser (1988) study.  In Krasny and 
Sadoski (2004), students read both stories, one in English and the other in French.  
Regardless of whether the students read the text in their first language (English) or their 
second language (French), the patterns of response were similar to those found in 
Sadoski, Goetz, and Kangiser (1988) for the same stories.  The students in both studies 
also responded to a qualitative writing task in which they elaborated on the imagery 
experienced and feelings evoked while reading.  The nature and quality of written 
response was consistent across languages.  The linguistic demands of reading in a second 
language did not appear to prevent students from forming images or emotionally 
responding to the story.  Furthermore, the findings from this study and earlier studies 
investigating the formation of images and evocation of affect in Chinese/English 
bilingual readers (Steffenson, Goetz, & Cheng, 1999) appear to support Cummins’ (1979) 
“linguistic interdependence principle” which accounts for the transfer of cognitive and 
literacy-related skills across languages. 
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Other studies of mental imagery in reading investigate the effects of language 
concreteness and its capacity to evoke mental images.  Recent studies of this type tend to 
focus on readers in transaction with content area materials such as history textbooks and 
news and magazine articles but nevertheless, the findings have important implications for 
literary reading.  Sadoski, Goetz, and Fritz (1993) used historical narratives to investigate 
the effects of language concreteness on the familiarity, comprehensibility, degree of 
interest, and the immediate and delayed recall of sentences and paragraphs.  Concrete and 
abstract passages about historical figures were selected and modified in order to enhance 
this distinction.  The results of the study indicated that with readability controlled, 
concrete text was rated as more comprehensible and interesting than abstract text, but not 
as more familiar.  In addition, concrete texts were better recalled than abstract texts, both 
immediately and after a period of five days.  Despite the growing body of empirical 
evidence, many current models of reading inadequately account for the various 
phenomena related to the formation of imagery and affect evoked during reading.  In 
describing reading as an act of cognition, this study will compare several interactive 
models of reading in order to explore the plausibility of each in light of the convergence 
of evidence linking imagery and affect to cognitive processes.   
Theoretical Models of Reading 
 Reading has been described in terms of bottom-up and top-down processing. 
Bottom-up processes (Gough, 1972; LeBerge & Samuels, 1974) describe the reading 
process as proceeding in linear fashion from letter to sounds, to words, to meaning.  Top-
down processes reject the idea that reading occurs as the direct result of the initial 
perception and identification of discrete elements in a word.  Early work by Kenneth 
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Goodman (1969) and the whole language movement brought to our attention the idea that 
readers possess a prior sense of what could be meaningful in the text based upon their 
knowledge about language and will therefore access the most productive cues necessary 
to make predictions about the words and their meaning. 
In “Toward an Interactive Model of Reading,” Rumelhart (1977) sufficiently 
discounts the potential of explaining reading exclusively in term of bottom-up processing 
to satisfactorily account for various reading phenomena that occur when higher levels of 
analysis partially determine the apprehension of information at lower levels.  Rumelhart 
(1977) and others (Kintsch, 1988, 1998; Sadoski & Paivio, 2002; van Dijk & Kintsch, 
1983) have proposed models of reading which attempt to account for the spreading 
activation of both bottom-up and top-down processes used in reading.  Rumelhart’s 
(1977) model describes reading as a process by which simultaneous or parallel input from 
multiple levels (word level, letter level, phrase level, etc.) are synthesized through a 
message center.  Orthographic knowledge or knowledge of letters and sounds, lexical 
knowledge or knowledge about words, and both syntactic and semantic knowledge 
converge to facilitate word identification.  Rumelhart’s (1977) message center is 
responsible for maintaining a running list of hypotheses about the nature of the 
simultaneous data input, for scanning the message board for the possible appearance of 
hypotheses relevant to knowledge sources including knowledge about features, letters, 
letter-clusters, lexicon, syntax, and semantics, and evaluating the goodness of hypotheses 
according to a priori frequency. 
The van Dijk and Kintsch (1983) theoretical model espoused a triple coding 
system including verbatim text language, a propositional text base and a situation model.  
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This model was subsequently revised by Kintsch (1988, 1998) to resemble a two-stage 
construction-integration model through which prior knowledge is incorporated more 
directly.  In Comprehension: A Paradigm for Cognition, Kintsch (1998) defines the 
construction stage as the bottom-up activation of stronger and weaker associations to, and 
positive and negative interconnections among, a variety of abstract mental propositions.  
During the subsequent integration stage, prior knowledge about words, syntax, and the 
world in general constrain the construction of discourse representations at all levels.  
Contextual priming allows readers to construct a coherent textbase as a result of 
integrating linguistic input with their knowledge base.  While Kintsch’s (1988, 1998) 
model includes nonverbal representations as a feature of episodic memory, both stages of 
the model are schema based, that it to say, they derive from abstract propositions linked 
to a textbase. 
In Imagery and Text: A Dual Coding Theory of Reading and Writing, Sadoski and 
Paivio (2001) propose a unified theory of reading and writing based on dual coding 
theory of general cognition (Paivio, 1971, 1986, 1991).  Dual coding theory provides us 
with an empirical view of reading in which the capacity for forming mental imagery 
derives from direct sensorimotor experience, that is to say, patterns of response to 
external experiences are instantiated as part of our cognitive representations.  This view is 
shown to be consistent in many ways with the philosophical thought expressed in 
Dewey’s aesthetic and moral theory (1916/1980, 1932/1985, 1934/1987), James’ radical 
empiricism (1904/1976), Mead’s (1934) generalized other, Merleau-Ponty’s (1962) 
phenomenology of perception, and Lakoff and Johnson’s (1999) embodied realism.  Dual 
coding theory contends that meaning cannot occur without the activation of mental 
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representations that retain some of the concrete qualities of the external experiences from 
which they are derived.   
According to Sadoski and Paivio (2001), mental representation is organized into 
two separate coding systems.  One system specialized for language consists of basic units 
called logogens.  For example, we develop visual representations for a variety of 
language units including features, letters, words, and even phrases (e.g., hockey stick).  
The other system specialized for nonverbal objects and events is made up of basic units 
called imagens.  These include but are not limited to visual representations of common 
objects (e.g., a player or goalie stick in either wood or graphite) and these objects are 
often nested or contextualized (e.g., a wooden hockey stick held in the glove of the 
goaltender, in front of the net, on an ice rink, against boards bearing advertisements).  It 
is important to note that to fully understand the empirical nature of dual coding theory 
one must recognize that mental imagery is not limited to visual images but includes 
mental representations associated with all sensory modalities—the visual, auditory, 
haptic, gustatory, and olfactory.  Dual coding theory also recognizes emotional feelings 
and reactions as nonverbal representations that perform an important function in the 
construction of meaning. As a theoretical model, dual coding theory is particularly 
insightful in investigating the relationship between the aesthetic and moral value of 
literature because its explanatory potential can be extended beyond recoding and 
comprehension to the construction of mental models and imaginative responses to texts. 
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Philosophical Debate Between Abstract Ideas and Concrete Experience 
 Whereas theoretical models of reading beginning with abstract propositions are 
grounded in Plato’s idealism,2 the idea in dual coding theory that “all mental 
representations retain some of the concrete qualities of the external experience from 
which they derive” (Sadoski & Paivio, 2001, p. 3) has much in common with Aristotle’s 
realism.  As suggested in the introduction, Plato was skeptical of poetic images 
maintaining that images could not accurately represent the reality that inspired them.  
Plato considered poetry a dangerous force among the uneducated, who could be misled 
into thinking that what was being represented was true and real.  In his view, poetry’s 
power to persuade rather than instruct, lay in its potential to evoke sensations.  From a 
Platonic perspective, sensations are an obstacle on the path toward virtuous living—“a 
tendency to pervert right thinking into falsehood” (Hicks, 1907/1976, p. xxxiii).  While 
Plato conceded that sensation characterized the movement which body and soul must 
share, he firmly believed that true knowledge began with a thinking soul and the 
operations of the intellect independent from a feeling body.   
Aristotle, on the other hand, believed that all knowledge derived from sense 
impressions and depended on making connections between abstract concepts and images 
as in the concept of courage and images of courageous acts.  Aristotle’s (1968) empiricist 
view of reality in De Anima posited concrete imagery as being fundamental to all thought 
processes.  In his view, thought began with images which led to abstract constructions, 
and finally to language.   
 
                                                 
2  I intend to dispute Kintsch’s (1998) claim that his revised construction-integration (CI) model of 
comprehension using predicate-argument propositions depends on an architecture of cognition based on 
Aristotelian perception and experience.  
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Imagination in Language 
 In The Origins of Knowledge and Imagination, Bronowski (1978) describes the 
evolution of human language as an instrument that shapes and orders our existence.  
According to Bronowski, human language has evolved to function differently from 
animal communication in three important ways.  First of all, the human capacity for 
imagination is evidenced in language by our ability to delay our response to another 
human being and separate information from emotional content.  Second, our ability to 
foresee events is related to the “prolongation of reference” or the ability to apply 
language to the past, present, and future.  And third, Bronowski cites internalization of 
language or the ability to talk to ourselves as being of great evolutionary advantage. 
Decades earlier, Langer (1957) provided an evolutionary account of human 
language in Philosophy in a New Key: A Study in the Symbolism of Reason, Rite, and Art.  
She too, notes that language grants us the imaginative capacity to retain objects and their 
relations when not immediately present.  According to Langer, language probably 
evolved from expressive voice-play associated with ritual gestures and dances.  
Eventually certain syllables became associated with certain actions pantomiming events 
that held ritual importance such as death or triumph. Rhythmic groups of syllables 
eventually came to be connected with particular actions or individuals.  Language began 
as an expressive act and through long habit, fixed associations eventually led to the 
denotative function of language.  Langer advances the idea that language evolved in the 
service of mental imagery to provide us with the means to name, fixate, and conceive 
objects (and not, as we so often believe, in the service of communication).  What is 
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interesting from a literary point of view is that this account suggests the critical role of 
metaphor in the evolution of language.   
Imagery, Affect, and a Neurobiology of Consciousness 
  In The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of 
Consciousness, Damasio (1999) explores the biological underpinnings of the mind and 
consciousness to demonstrate how feelings and emotions are responsible for the 
construction of self.  In a more recent work, Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the 
Feeling Brain, Damasio (2003), extends the neurobiology of consciousness to define in 
greater detail the affective realm of feelings and emotions and their related states.  Like 
Spinoza, Damasio sees affect as being central to our humanity and as such, is the key to 
understanding how human beings might live their lives better.  As it becomes clearer that 
imagery and affect—drives, motivations, emotions, and feelings—are integral to the 
reading process, the argument that literature can contribute to the moral enhancement of 
the principles and policies that govern public life becomes increasingly cogent. 
Fundamental Western philosophical assumptions about a disembodied mind and 
transcendent reason are further usurped in Lakoff and Johnson’s (1999) Philosophy in the 
Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought.  In this 
groundbreaking work, Lakoff and Johnson challenge the Cartesian dualism with which 
we have structured our philosophical traditions regarding mind and morality, time and 
space, and causation.  Building upon their earlier work Metaphors We Live By (1980), the 
authors provide a detailed account of how our sensorimotor experience is responsible for 
the conceptual metaphors we use to structure our reasoning, our experience, and our 
everyday language.  Lakoff and Johnson (1999) state this later work focuses on the 
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“conflict between a priori philosophies and empirical findings in cognitive science” (p. 
469).  They describe an embodied realism that incorporates three major and interrelated 
themes: the cognitive unconscious, the embodiment of the mind, and metaphorical 
thought.  Developments in the relatively new field of cognitive science which began in 
the 1970’s has revealed that most of our thought is unconscious.  Lakoff and Johnson 
suggest that possibly as much as ninety-five percent of all thought occurs within the 
realm of the cognitive unconscious, and in turn, shapes and structures all conscious 
thought.  I contend that we must look to a constructive integration of both philosophy and 
cognitive science to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the embodied mind, the 
construction of self, and the metaphysical basis of our ethics and moral judgment.  Lakoff 
and Johnson’s (1999) embodied realism and Sadoski and Paivio’s (2001) dual coding 
theory share an empirical view of mind and mental abstractions grounded in concrete 
experience. 
French neuroscientist, Changeux and French philosopher, Ricoeur (2000) argue 
the nature of the correspondence between neuronal and mental events from the point of 
view of their respective disciplines in What Makes Us Think?: A Neuroscientist and a 
Philosopher Argue about Ethics, Human Nature, and the Brain.  In other words, can 
mental experience be identified with neuronal activity and if so, to what extent is a 
neurobiology of consciousness able to account for the vast richness of human experience?  
More specific to this discussion, what can this correspondence tell us about the 
phenomenology of the literary experience?  While both scientist and philosopher concur 
that thought does not function without a physical basis, Ricoeur questions whether the 
self-knowledge that comes with a growing understanding of the correspondence between 
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structure and function achieved in the laboratory effectively captures the conditions in the 
social and physical world governing human existence.   
  Nussbaum (2001) explicitly sets forth the ethical implications of the embodied 
mind in Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions.  Nussbaum, a distinguished 
professor of law and ethics at the University of Chicago, contends that there cannot be 
any adequate ethical theory without an adequate theory of emotions that acknowledges 
their cultural sources, their development from infancy, and the sometimes unpredictable 
way with which they operate in our daily lives.  She asserts that emotions are the “the 
fuel that powers the psychological mechanism of a reasoning creature, they are parts, 
highly complex and messy parts, of this creature’s reasoning itself” (p. 3).  Nussbaum 
demonstrates that literature deserves a place among more conventional texts of moral 
philosophy because the narrative dimension provides us with a cohesive means of 
examining our motives and emotional life.  Many of her claims are consistent with the 
role the affective and the imaginative in Dewey’s (1916/1980, 1922/1983) moral 
deliberation.  
Toward a Poetics of Fiction 
In Consciousness in the Novel: Connected Essays, Lodge (2003), whose quest for 
a poetics of fiction first ended with his discovery of Bakhtin’s (1981) characterization of 
the novel as dialogic and polyphonic, revisits the question, “What does literature do and 
how does it do it” (p. ix).  Having completed an investigation into Bakhtin’s dialogism in 
theories of reader response (Krasny, 2002), my journey into novelistic discourse and the 
dialogic imagination has taken a similar turn.  Lodge’s renewed interest in addressing the 
age-old question concerning the function of literature arises in response to the new 
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interdisciplinary field of consciousness studies.  Through a series of connected essays 
focusing on the life and works of various novelists Lodge effectively shows how 
literature permits us to examine the qualia of our subjective experience in the world.  He 
points out that the persistence of Western philosophical beliefs is often implicit in literary 
language.  Contesting the assumption of an individual and immortal soul that pre-exists 
human birth, Lodge argues that “to distinguish between flesh and spirit, body and soul, 
the material and the immaterial, the earthly and the transcendent, is to commit the fallacy 
of dualism” (p. 5).  Lodge’s (2003) discussion of Henry James’ consciousness-centered 
art of fiction is particularly relevant to the idea that any moral value to be derived from 
literature depends on its potential to evoke the imaginative projection of oneself into the 
consciousness of another.   
In stating his case for consciousness in the novel, Lodge (2003) relies on Watt’s 
(1957) classical study The Rise of the Novel: Studies in Defoe, Richardson, and Fielding 
to illustrate how the ascent of this form of narrative literature parallels innovations in 
philosophical thought.  Watt emphasizes however, that any causal relationship between 
philosophical and literary innovations is fairly indirect and should be viewed as the 
parallel manifestations of the vast transformation of Western civilization since the 
Renaissance.  This transformation encompasses a rejection of the unified world picture of 
the Middle Ages focusing instead on “a developing, but unplanned aggregate of 
particular individuals having particular experiences at particular times and at particular 
places” (p. 31).  Watt is careful to point out that while modern realism assumes that “truth 
can be discovered by the individual through his senses” (p. 12), the view that “the 
external world is real, and that our senses give us a true report of it” (p. 12) has little to do 
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with literary realism.  He suggests instead that the most important analogy linking 
philosophical realism to the rise of the novel in the mid-eighteenth century is the manner 
in which both adopt a critical and anti-traditional orientation to studying the particulars of 
experience and paying greater attention to semantics and “to the problem of the nature of 
the correspondence between words and reality” (p. 12).  In “The Origins of Human 
Rights in the Eighteenth Century: Toward a Post-Foucaultian History of Personhood,” 
Hunt (2004) revisits the parallel between the appearance of the psychological novel in the 
mid-eighteenth century and the dramatic turn toward the development of human rights 
and a recognition of personhood.   
In Re-Educating the Imagination: Toward a Poetics, Politics, and Pedagogy of 
Literary Engagement, Bogdan (1992) establishes the contested relationship between word 
and world as being at the heart of issues surrounding justification, censorship, and 
response.  Any attempt to address these three critical issues begins with seeking the 
answers to the questions why literature is taught, what is taught as literature, and how is 
literature taught.  The book is both a critique and defense of literature education as 
Bogdan carefully analyzes its relationship to moral values throughout the history of 
Western civilization.  The work is a direct result of Bogdan’s (1992) ongoing 
preoccupation with the attempt to reconcile within the language arts curriculum, the 
conflicting goals “of enculturation into a collective ethos, on the one hand, and personal 
growth and development, on the other” (p. xxii).  In 1963, the Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation aired The Educated Imagination, a series of radio talks by Northrop Frye.  
Frye (1957, 1963) articulates a poetics of total form that embodies the dialectic between 
the intrinsic and extrinsic value of literature.  His assertions often appear contradictory.  
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For example, Frye insists that posing the question of the social value of literature 
effectively relegates it to a secondary status as a form of knowledge.  Alternately, Frye 
(1957) declares literature to be “an ethical instrument, participating in the world of 
civilization” (p. 349).  Within the context of a number of contemporary examples drawn 
from literature, film, media, and her teaching experience, Bogdan (1992) problematizes 
the implicit dualism in Frye’s educated imagination that entails a synthesis of aesthetic 
engagement and critical consciousness.  It is my intention to further Bogdan’s challenge 
to the distinction often made between aesthetic engagement and critical thinking in the 
language arts curriculum by taking into greater account the implications of an embodied 
mind and the central role of imagery and affect in exercising moral imagination.  
Imagination and Moral Theory 
 In “Morality As Art: Dewey, Metaphor, and Moral Imagination,” Fesmire (1999) 
suggests that developing an understanding of the relationship between imagination and 
moral theory might begin not with the question of “How ought I to live?” but rather 
“How do human beings actually make sense of their moral experience?”  In Art and 
Experience, Dewey (1934/1987) conceptualizes imagination as the extension of our 
immediate experience.  The potential for moral thought emerges in our capacity to see 
present circumstances in light of past experience and in relation to projected possibilities.  
Perhaps Dewey’s (1922/1983) most elaborate attempt to explain the critical role of 
imagination and emotions in moral conduct is his aesthetic model of moral deliberation 
as dramatic rehearsal.  Dewey contends that we execute small spatial stories or “dramas” 
to try out alternate solutions when faced with morally problematic situations.  This 
imaginative process often entails adopting a different role and anticipating the reaction of 
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other agents involved and the possible consequences and implications of the imagined 
act.  Dewey’s view on aesthetics and moral deliberation holds renewed promise for 
literature studies in the language arts curriculum given the recent developments in 
cognitive science describing the role of metaphor and imagination outlined in Johnson’s 
(1993) Moral Imagination.  I am contending that the formation of imagery and the 
evocation of emotion during literary engagement allow readers to enter into the drama of 
the text to make sense of their moral experience.   
Narrative thinking and the execution of small spatial stories are also at the crux of 
Turner’s (1996) The Literary Mind.  Turner elaborates on the principles of mind he refers 
to as story, projection, and parable that, as I intend to demonstrate, rely on the 
imaginative process of rearranging and recombining images in a literary way.  Once 
again, I look to pragmatically oriented theories of language and existence to advance an 
understanding of the construction of self through concrete interactions and imaginative 
projection.  Mead (1934) in Mind, Self and Society, describes how we develop a socially 
shared system of gestures and an abstract set of rules through the direct experience of 
playing a succession of roles.  Continued and varied experience, both direct and 
vicarious, shapes our understanding of the interrelationship of these roles that combine to 
form the generalized other.  Imagination is critical to Mead’s (1964) articulation of the 
process of communication in which “the individual is an other before he is a self” (pp. 
312).  Similarly, in I and Thou, Buber (1970) claims, “Man becomes an I through a You” 
(p. 80), that is to say, the emergence of self is dependent on the individual entering into 
reciprocity with others.  Greatly influenced by Buber’s (1970) intersubjective 
construction of self, Bakhtin (1986) in Speech Genres and Other Essays, argues that 
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meaning in language and existence is a tripartite construction consisting of a subject, an 
addressee and the relation between the two.  In “Discourse in the Novel,” Bakhtin (1981) 
extends this tripartite construction to literary transactions in which the author, the text, 
and the reader are interlocutors alternating between the role of the speaking subject and 
addressee within a dialogic exchange. 
Phenomenological Approach to the Act of Reading 
 Any theory of reader response advancing the idea that reading is a discourse of 
the body must seek to understand the phenomenal experience of the reader—the 
sensations that shape the reader’s intentionality.  Intentionality is simply the idea that all 
consciousness is consciousness of something.  In Phenomenology of Perception, 
Merleau-Ponty (1962) recognizes that “sense-experience is a vital process” (p. 10).  He 
argues that for centuries, science and philosophy have been misguided in their 
preoccupation with perception as a quasi-teleological means by which we can discover 
truth in itself.  Contrary to Husserl’s phenomenological project of the constitution of flux 
which still adheres to the metaphysical tradition that “all contradictions can be 
removed…that which is indeterminate for me could become determinate for a more 
complete knowledge” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 54), perception for Merleau-Ponty and 
Dewey is never static and always partial.  While phenomenological reflection seeks a 
pure description of perceptual experience as it presents itself to consciousness, Merleau-
Ponty (1962) concedes, “Reflection can never make me stop…thinking with the cultural 
apparatus with which my education, my previous efforts, my personal history, have 
provided me” (p. 61).  More importantly, while the physical manifestations of emotions 
are often discernible to the outside world—blushing cheeks, sweating palms, and 
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spontaneous facial expressions—consciousness is not.  This invisibility and the fact that 
we rely on the use of metaphors “to make manifest the life of the mind” (Arendt, 1971, p. 
31) ensures that the responses readers share are merely reflections of their psychic 
experience and not the experience itself. 
These are important assertions to consider when re-examining the aesthetic 
distancing necessary to achieve Frye’s (1957, 1963) educated imagination and too, in 
questioning Rosenblatt’s (1978) aesthetic response as a personal lived-through 
experience of the text as described in The Reader, the Text, and the Poem.  Rosenblatt 
(1978) distinguishes the poem from other types of reading as a “coming-together of 
reader and a text” where “the reader brings to the text his past experience and present 
personality” (p. 12).  Rosenblatt’s aesthetic reading entails a laudable sense of Deweyan 
“undergoing” in which the literary engagement is seen as growth in experience.  
Nevertheless, we must be mindful that embodied readers consciously or unconsciously 
always come to the text with their “past experience and present personality” (p. 12).  
Rosenblatt’s transactional theory of reader response is not comprehensive enough to 
account for the possibility that readers can experience a text in aesthetic and political 
terms simultaneously nor does it sufficiently address the qualitative variability of 
response to individual literary works among individual readers.  In other words, why is it 
that certain readers are not able to shift their attention from the referential to the more 
qualitative aspects of the language of the text?  However, the biggest challenge to 
Rosenblatt’s theory arising from recently generated knowledge about the critical role of 
imagery and affect in human consciousness concerns her distinction between aesthetic 
and efferent reading in which she insists that readers perform “very different activities 
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during aesthetic and nonaesthetic readings” (p. 23).  Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of 
perception also has important implications for challenging some of the assumptions in 
Iser’s (1978) phenomenological approach to reading that is based on more Husserlian 
traditions.  Nevertheless, Iser’s (1978, 2000) conceptualization of reading as “filling in 
the gaps” in a “virtual text” described in The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic 
Response and The Range of Interpretation resembles dual coding theory’s account of 
how readers form images to achieve textual coherence.   
Many of the works cited in support of embodied cognition assume that emotions 
and imagery are fundamental to navigating the world—products of an evolutionary 
existence that function in maintaining homeostasis.  They derive from individuals in 
interaction with a concrete world and are necessary to the human capacity to imagine.  
This ability to form images and project these images on objects and events in order to 
interpret subsequent experience is basic to the metaphorical thinking that makes language 
possible.  In The Life of the Mind, Arendt (1971) aptly describes the cognitive role of 
metaphor as the bridge between the inner world of sensory experience and the outer 
world of appearances.  In Chapter III, I begin to examine how imagery and affect are 
central to cognition and in turn, how they operate in the process of recoding visual stimuli 
in the form of features, letters, words, and phrases into meaningful text. 
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CHAPTER III 
READING AS AN ACT OF COGNITION 
Introduction 
What is an idea?  It is an image that paints itself in my brain. 
-Voltaire, cited in Edelman, Bright Air, Brilliant Fire 
Understanding the critical role of imagery and affect in reading demands an 
explanation that is consistent with established theories of general cognition.  Reading, 
like all forms of cognition, relies on the human capacity to perceive, recognize, interpret, 
comprehend, evaluate, organize and store in memory information received through 
external stimuli.  We may learn to “read” pictures, “read” people’s expressions, or even 
feel that we can “read” someone’s mind, but for the purposes of this discussion, reading 
will be regarded as a specific act of cognition involving written language.   
In recent years, theories explaining the cognitive act of making meaning from 
written language have focused on the role of the reader’s prior knowledge in 
comprehension, learning, and memory.  A number of such theoretical models of reading 
derive from schema theory (Kintsch, 1988, 1998; Kintsch & van Dijk, 1978, 1983; 
Rumelhart, 1977) and support for schema-based models is reflected in current reading 
research (Anderson, 1994; Anderson & Pearson, 1984; Rumelhart, 1980; Rumelhart & 
Ortony, 1977).  The mental processes used in schema-based models are consistent with 
the metaphor of the mind as a computer.  Thought is abstract and rational and can be 
represented in much the same way as mathematical calculations using systematic 
universal principles.  Dual coding theory provides an alternative to schema-based models 
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that reflects an empirical view of the mind.  Unlike schema-based models, dual coding 
theory is premised on the idea that “all mental representations retain some of the concrete 
qualities of the external experiences from which they derive” (p. 3).   
In this chapter, I begin by examining some of the Western metaphysical 
assumptions underlying computational and embodied theories of cognition.  Next, I 
introduce schema theory as a general theory of cognition widely applied to understanding 
the mental processes used in reading.  This is followed by an account of how 
comprehension is achieved in two schema-based models, Rumelhart’s (1977) parallel 
input model and Kintsch’s (1988, 1998) construction-integration model.  These theories 
are discussed in terms of how adequately each can account for its purported range of 
reading phenomena.  In the sections that follow, dual coding theory (Paivio, 1971, 1986, 
1991) is presented as an embodied alternative to computational theories of cognition.  I 
explore its extension into the literacy field (Sadoski & Paivio, 2001) in order to 
demonstrate how the formation of images is integral to the reading process at all levels 
and is necessary to accounting for a more comprehensive range of phenomena.  Finally, I 
discuss the extent to which dual coding theory appears to be consistent with 
neuropsychological evidence related to the functional asymmetry of the brain.   
The Nature of the Mind and Mental Imagery in Western Philosophy 
Plato and the World of Ideas 
For Plato, the mind is an immortal soul, the realm of all reason.  The soul, 
however, inhabits a body that is tied to a sensory and therefore, unreliable world.  Plato’s 
philosophy focuses on the nature of rational thought.  In his Myth of the Cave, Plato 
parables the philosopher’s journey from living among the shadowy images of the world 
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to experiencing the renewed clarity from the realm of true ideas.  Through a series of 
dialogues, Plato argues that the world is shaped by ideas perceivable by the mind.  For 
example, in Plato’s Euthyphro, Socrates argues that piety cannot be defined by concrete 
pious actions but rather by the ideal form or essence that makes all pious actions pious.  
As Plato sees it, the job of the philosopher is to seek knowledge by employing reason to 
discern the ultimate forms or essences that underlie perceptible things.   
Plato’s concern for prototypes leads to a correspondence between degrees of 
knowledge and degrees of Being, that is to say, we can only come to know an act of piety 
insofar as it conforms to all the characteristics that together must be present for an act to 
be truly pious.  Reality for Plato is located in eternal and immutable ideas that are directly 
present in the mind.  Plato compared mental images generated through sensory 
perception to the impressions of a signet ring on a wax tablet.  In his view, images were 
imperfect and insignificant copies of pure forms.  Plato establishes a hierarchy of reality 
in which ideas are considered superior in their degree of Being to physical objects and 
physical objects as being superior to images.   In poetry, as in all things, Plato was 
concerned with the ontology of the object—the degree to which the images evoked by the 
poem could approach the metaphysical reality of pure reason. 
Aristotle’s Empirical View of the World 
In De Anima, Aristotle (1968) describes a world of sensation.  Aristotle’s 
philosophy differs from Plato’s in a fundamental way.  Where Plato conceives of a world 
that takes its shape in ideas, for Aristotle, ideas take their shape from the immediate 
physical world.  Aristotle still concerned himself with forms but forms, he contended, are 
in the things themselves and are not innate ideas independent of any concrete experience.  
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The five senses—seeing, hearing, touching, tasting, and smelling—are the means through 
which we take in the world.  Aristotle (1968) too, likens sense perception to a wax 
impression.   
In general, with regard to all sense-perception we must take it that the sense is that 
which can receive perceptible forms without their matter, as wax receives the 
imprint of the ring without the iron or gold, and it takes the imprint which is of 
gold or bronze, but not qua gold or bronze.  (pp. 42-43).   
To perceive of something is to incorporate its form into one’s mind, but Aristotle reminds 
us that images are not synonymous with the reality that inspired them.  Lakoff and 
Johnson (1999) relate the mental sense impression of Aristotle’s realism to the metaphors 
of the mind as a container, understanding as grasping, and ideas as physical objects with 
a definite structure.  Accordingly, perceiving is seen as receiving objects external to the 
mind.   
Both Plato and Aristotle distinguished between perceiving and thinking, but 
where Plato maintained that knowledge is to be found in the discourse of reason, 
Aristotle (1968) claimed that thought requires sensibility as well.  He distinguished 
imagination from perception and discursive thinking adding that perception is a necessary 
condition for imagination and similarly, imagination is a necessary condition for 
judgment.  For Aristotle, it is not ideas but perception that holds reigning ontological 
status for “perception is always true and is found in all animals, whereas it is possible to 
think falsely” (pp. 52-53).  Most notably, Aristotle (1968) maintained that there is no 
thought without an image.   
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Aristotle (1968) conceived of imagination as a willful act of consciousness and 
unlike Plato, he held that the human mind is capable of discerning between ‘objective’ 
reality and images to yield varying emotional judgments. 
For [imagining] is up to us when we wish (for it is possible to produce something 
before our eyes, as those do who set things out in mnemonic systems and form 
images of them); but believing is not up to us, for it must be either true or false.  
Morevoer, when we believe that something is terrible or alarming we are 
immediately affected correspondingly, and similarly if it is something 
encouraging; but in the case of the imagination we are just as if we saw the 
terrible or encouraging things in a picture.  (p. 53)  
While I intend to demonstrate that the imagination is all but unaffecting, Aristotle’s 
distinction between real and imaginary as evidenced by our emotional responses is 
important to later discussions on evaluating the rhetorical merit of literature and 
understanding what might be meant by the expression, the “lived through experience” 
(Rosenblatt, 1978, p. 27) of a text by a reader.  Aristotle contends that where perception 
always indicates a presence, imagination does not.  How an image functions to make 
present an object that is not immediately present has long been the subject of 
philosophical speculation and is regarded as a central problem to be resolved within the 
emerging field of consciousness studies.  Any discussion of the relationship between 
literature and life needs to entertain the ramifications of the idea that an image posits a 
nothingness, the perception of an object that is not there (Sartre, 1940/2004). 
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Cogito, ergo sum: Descartes and the Separation of Mind and Body 
Descartes’ declaration, “Cogito, ergo sum” (“Je pense, donc je suis/I think, 
therefore I am”) solidified the Western philosophical belief in the separation of mind and 
body.  Descartes argued that the occurrence of thought requires a thinker and there could 
be no greater intuitive certainty than the first-person formulation of the perception of 
oneself as a thinking being.  For Descartes, not only is reason innate but also the 
existence of God as a perfect entity is self-evident to the thinking soul.  The 
Enlightenment thinker posited a rationalist and dualist philosophy that focused on the 
relationship between mind and body.   
Up until the seventeenth century, philosophers had not postulated any radical 
division between mind and matter.  For Aristotle, the soul was pervasively present 
throughout the organism as its life principle and it was inconceivable to think of the soul 
being separate from the body.  Even Plato could not explain how the mind influenced the 
body and conceded that the mind and body together share the same movement.  Plato was 
however, convinced that what we grasp with our mind is more real than what we grasp 
with our senses.  Descartes too, believed that the senses could not be trusted.  He posited 
that the thinking “I” was more real than the anything in the material world.  In his view, 
the mind is pure consciousness and not subject to the spatial or temporal conditions of 
matter.  It was one of two forms of reality that Descartes referred to as res cogitans or 
thinking things.  The other form of reality in Descartes’ dualist philosophy was res 
extensa or extended things, that is to say, matter in general.  According to Descartes’ 
substance dualism, humans have both a mind and a body but thought is independent from 
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matter and material processes.  The body is more or less mechanistic—an automaton that 
operated according to natural laws.   
Descartes’ philosophy was characterized by the pursuit of certainty.  As the father 
of analytic geometry, Descartes believed that in the contemplation of natural phenomena, 
measurement and enumeration could ensure that nothing was left to chance.  He 
therefore, sought mathematical proofs for philosophical truths.  However, despite 
Descartes’ insistence on a mind independent of the body, we know from his writings that 
he recognized that mind and body do interact.  In an attempt to account for how bodily 
needs and desires might affect thought, Descartes (1978) mistakenly designated the 
pineal gland as the locus where body and soul could communicate.  Damasio (2003) 
suggests that Descartes may have wondered more about the embodiment of the mind but 
distorted his own thinking to deny any doubt of the existence of an immortal soul in 
response to the looming threat of the inquisition.  The profound influence of Cartesian 
dualism in Western philosophy and psychology cannot be underestimated.  Its ideas and 
its variants persist in modern times.  For example, computation in human cognition, that 
is, the “manipulation of symbols according to a definite procedure” (Edelman, 1992, p. 
13) is conceived of as independent of the nervous system and cognitivism has supported 
the idea of an inborn language acquisition device (Chomsky, 1957) comprising rules for 
syntax and constituting a universal grammar.  
Kant and the Schematization of Concepts 
 Kant held that the rationalists were too extreme in their belief that reason was the 
sole basis of reality.  He also thought that the realists placed too much faith in sensory 
experience.  Kant attempted to account for how the rational mind and sensuous 
 47
experience together constitute the elements of our cognitive faculties.  In this regard, he 
was the first to postulate a theory of mind based on how body and mind interact.  In his 
Critique of Pure Reason, Kant (1781/1990) declared that knowledge begins in 
experience, then immediately qualifies his position by insisting that sensuous experience 
merely provides the occasion for knowledge to occur.  In his view, there are certain pre-
existing or a priori conditions that determine the way we experience the world.   
Kant distinguished between rational or higher-levels of human cognition and sub-
rational or lower levels of human cognition.  He named the higher levels of cognition 
verstand or understanding.  To Kant, understanding represents the logical, discursive, 
proposition-forming faculty of the mind that produces concepts as output.  Concepts are 
abstract semantic propositions that correspond to linguistic predicates and to a set of 
properties.  Kant referred to lower levels of cognition as sinnlichkeit or sensibility.  
Sensibility has to do with the affective, perceptual, and imaginal faculty of the mind that 
produces intuitions as outputs. According to Kant, concepts constitute the non-empirical 
or a priori form of every intuition generated by sensibility.  He explains:  
…the only manner in which objects can be given to us, is by the means of the 
modification of our sensibility….  This formal and pure condition of sensibility, 
to which the conception of the understanding is restricted in its employment, we 
shall name the schema of the conception of the understanding and the procedure 
of the understanding with these schemata we shall call the schematism of the pure 
understanding. (p. 102)      
A schema has as its aim the unity of sensibility and therefore is distinguishable from any 
single image.  For example, in Kant’s estimation “no triangle can ever be adequate to our 
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conception of a triangle in general” (p. 102).  In other words, a schema purportedly 
synthesizes perceptual information into appropriate conceptualized form.  It should be 
emphasized that in Kant’s transcendental philosophy, a priori conditions determine both 
conceptual categories and the synthesis of empirical consciousness.  How this is done 
remains a mystery, no clearer now than when Kant (1781/1990) wrote: “This schematism 
of our understanding, in regard to phenomena and their mere form, is an art concealed in 
the depths of the human soul, whose true modes of actions we shall only with difficulty 
discover and unveil” (p. 103).3   
 Kant’s transcendentalism proved particularly inspirational for the romantics.  The 
idea that the human mind possesses the faculties to unite idealism with imagination 
appealed to those interested in interpreting the natural and social world.  By now, it 
should be evident that Western philosophy has been characterized by efforts to reconcile 
the tension between abstract rationalism and concrete realism.  At this point, it seems 
appropriate to re-examine this tension within the context of two general theories of 
cognition that form the basis for several current models of reading. 
General Theories of Cognition and Reading Comprehension 
Schema Theory 
  The word ‘schema’ remains widely used within the field of cognitive science and 
is generally accepted to mean abstract knowledge structures (Anderson & Pearson, 1984) 
or data structures for representing human generic concepts in memory (Brewer, 1999; 
Rumelhart, 1980; Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977).  Applied in such a general way as to 
                                                 
3 In Norman Kemp Smith’s earlier translation of Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, New York, 
1963, the citation is considerably more dubious about the possibility of ever understanding the mental 
processes underlying schema, “This schematism of our intellect…is an art concealed in the depths of the 
human soul, whose real modes of activity nature is hardly likely ever to allow us to discover and to have 
open to our gaze” (pp. 180-181).    
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accommodate a plethora of models, schema has been extended to include a number of 
variants.  Schemata are also conceptualized as frames (Minsky, 1975), scripts (Schank & 
Abelson, 1977), ideals (Bregman, 1977), plans (Schank, 1982), and macrostructures 
(Kintsch & van Dijk, 1978).  These variants have been applied in the analysis of general 
procedural knowledge in routine situations, perceptual recognition, memory, motor skills, 
and discourse comprehension.  For example, scripts are applied in the analysis of 
behavioral responses in broad situations such as dining in a restaurant and in the specific 
acts constituting the broader situation such as being seated, ordering, and selecting the 
proper silverware for each course. 
Regardless of the variation in application, Alba and Hasher (1983) have identified 
four encoding processes and one retrieval process that appear to be characteristic of all 
schema theories.  The four encoding processes include: selection, whereby information to 
be represented is selected; abstraction, whereby the meaning of a message is stored; 
interpretation, whereby relevant prior knowledge is activated; and integration, whereby a 
coherent representation is formed from the preceding processes.  The retrieval process 
entails accessing any remaining details as well as general knowledge in order to 
reconstruct the episode.  Schema theory has been closely linked to Piaget’s (1926) 
cognitive constructivism, insofar as the intake of new information results in either the 
assimilation of new knowledge into existing schema or the modification of the existing 
schema structure to accommodate new data.  In this regard, schema theory has prompted 
reading research to examine the constructive nature of reading comprehension and to 
focus on the critical role of the reader’s prior knowledge.  Nevertheless, as I have 
suggested earlier in the discussion on Kantian schematism, current schema theory does 
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relatively little more to explain how knowledge is actually represented, organized, and 
used.  Major criticism of schema theory focuses on its definitional vagueness, reification, 
and problems associated with empirical testing (Alba & Hasher, 1983; Paivio, 1986; 
Sadoski, Paivio, & Goetz, 1991).   
As Kant himself pointed out, understanding schematism is likely to elude the 
human mind.  It has become clear, however, that schema’s elusiveness has more to do 
with its imprecision than its complexity.  The definitional vagueness of schema allows for 
different theorists concerned with different aspects of cognition to apply the term in 
convenient ways as to yield any number of appropriations.  While some appropriations of 
schema appear related, at times, the word stands in direct theoretical opposition to itself.  
For example, Lakoff and Johnson’s (1999) image schemata that closely resemble mental 
imagery differ significantly from Rumelhart’s (1975, 1980) computational data structures 
and from the proposition as the basic unit of knowledge in Anderson and Pearson’s 
(1984) schema theory.   
The ambiguity of schema might best be illustrated in Brown’s (1979) challenge to 
“remove the word schema from any paper written in schematese and look for any 
changes in meaning” (p. 231).  I must admit to having tried this exercise with a fellow 
graduate student who brought Brown’s game to my attention.  We read through several 
articles in journals from her field of bilingual education and quickly found that apart from 
having to make some minor grammatical changes and occasionally, having to substitute 
the words prior knowledge, or simply knowledge where a subject or object was needed, 
removing the word schema did not seem to result in any loss of meaning.  Even Bartlett 
(1932), who is credited with early investigations into the construction of cultural 
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schemata for interpreting stories, expresses his dissatisfaction with inadequacy of 
schema.   
I strongly dislike the term “schema.”  It is at once too definite and too sketchy….  
It would probably be best to speak of “active, developing patterns;” but the word 
“patterns,” too being now very widely and variously employed, has its own 
difficulties.  (pp. 200-201). 
 Definitional vagueness is directly related to the problem of reification, or 
“attributing actual existence to something that is only a name or an abstraction” (Sadoski, 
Paivio, & Goetz, 1991, p. 467).  In other words, it becomes fairly difficult to define 
something that has no concrete referent apart from metaphorical constructs such as 
“schemata are like little containers into which we deposit particular experiences that we 
have” (Pearson, 2000).  Ironically, schema theory appeals to the unquestioned evidence 
of sense experience through the use of metaphors.  Arendt (1971) explains:  
Metaphors…can be used by speculative reason, which indeed cannot avoid them, 
but when they intrude, as is their tendency, on scientific reasoning, they are used 
and misused to create and provide plausible evidence for theories that are actually 
mere hypotheses that have to be proved or disproved by facts.  (pp. 112-113)4   
I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge at this time that philosophy is also subject to 
the allure of metaphors to state its case.  Reification is an epistemological concern likely 
to arise from purely abstract reasoning and in scientific and philosophical speculations 
about what is currently unknown about human consciousness.   
                                                 
4 Arendt references Hans Blumenberg’s Paradigmen zu einer Metaphorologie, Bonn, 1960, in which he 
traces such common figures of speech as the iceberg metaphor, used in psychoanalysis to describe 
consciousness, to uncover the extent to which modern pseudo-sciences owe their plausibility to the illusory 
evidence of the metaphor which they substitute for the lack of data.     
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It is not surprising that theories that rely heavily on metaphor to establish their 
plausibility are difficult to demonstrate.  In fact, studies cited in original support for 
schema theory have come under considerable criticism.  The inherent difficulties in 
providing evidence for schema theory’s encoding and retrieval processes relate to the fact 
that ultimately, the most that these findings can hope to evince has already been observed 
in memory research.  Moreover, schema theory fails to account for the richness and 
accuracy of detail often reported in the existing body of memory research (Sadoski, 
Paivio, Goetz, 1991).  Critics have found that the evidence cited in support of the 
encoding and retrieval processes described in schema theory can be attributed to 
procedural peculiarities, context effects, and the use of ambiguous and bizarre texts used 
in experimentation.  Analyses of so-called ‘landmark’ studies in schema theory have led 
Alba and Hasher (1983), Paivio (1986), and Sadoski, Paivio, and Goetz (1991) to 
demonstrate that schema is not critical to the interpretation of the results of these studies.   
For example, in a study by Anderson, Reynolds, Schallert, and Goetz (1977), 
participants were asked to interpret a text that could be describing either a prison break or 
a wrestling match and another describing either a card game or a musical evening.  The 
researchers concluded that participants with either a background in music or in sports 
interpreted the texts according to their respective backgrounds.  But as Sadoski (1981) 
asserts, the deliberate ambiguity of such texts places the validity and generalizability of 
the findings in question.  Attempts to replicate the findings of this study (Carey, Harste, 
& Smith, 1981; Cunard, 1983) showed that the social and physical setting in which the 
participants read the text had significant and independent effects on interpretation.  The 
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addition of disambiguating titles or clarifying language was also shown to have a 
significant effect on interpretation independent of participants’ background knowledge.   
While schema research has made an undeniable contribution to emphasizing the 
importance of prior knowledge in reading and cognition, accepting the results of schema 
research and its reifying metaphors at face value has far-reaching consequences for the 
field.  In my former role as a curriculum coordinator, I have witnessed both workshop 
facilitators and teachers submit colleagues and students to what I can only describe as a 
misguided effort to put theory into practice.  In one teacher workshop, participants were 
asked to read a deliberately ambiguous text similar to the type used in the study by 
Anderson, Reynolds, Schallert, and Goetz (1977) and then discuss what they thought it 
was about.  After teachers read through the text and the expected “huhs”, embarrassed 
giggles, and expressions of “I don’t get it!” were heard across the room, teachers began to 
work in pairs to unravel the meaning of the text passage.  A colleague of mine 
immediately identified the passage as having to do with the voyages of Christopher 
Columbus.  The facilitator then expounded on the importance of bringing to the text the 
right background knowledge or ‘schemata’ in order to comprehend the text passage.   
Of course, having some background knowledge helped, but I have serious doubts 
about whether my colleague knew anything more about Columbus than any of the other 
sixty or so Canadian educators present who did not make sense of the text passage.  The 
point of contriving a text this ambiguous is that you are not supposed to “get it.”  If these 
texts can demonstrate anything, it is bad writing.  Such exercises, whether used in 
experimentation or in demonstrating theoretical implications do not illustrate the 
selection of information.  These passages merely take the idea of reading as a 
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“psycholinguistic guessing game” (Goodman, 1969) to extremes by the deliberate 
exclusion of concrete referents and a discernible context and therefore are hardly 
representative of naturally occurring texts. While some may contend that the 
disconnectedness of the text simulates the lack of clarity associated with reading 
culturally unfamiliar texts, there is nothing conclusive to suggest that schema necessarily 
accounts for the effects of cultural background.   
Is the schema in current computational theories of cognition the same as Kant’s 
(1781/1990) schema in Critique of Pure Reason?  Kant’s verstand was ultimately 
concerned with knowledge arising from the senses.   In Kant’s view, a schema served 
only a “heuristic” (p. 376) function conceding, “Pure reason is, in fact, occupied with 
itself and not with any object” (p. 381).  Kant thought pure reason (vernunft) alone was 
insufficient to deal directly with sensory experience and supposedly a schema provided 
the necessary organizing principle.  Bartlett (1932) too, reasoned that that a schema was 
functional and transitory in nature and did not constitute a cognitive structure (p. 304).  A 
schema, according to Kant (1781/1990) is not to be taken as the object of experience 
itself, but rather as “possessing a comparative reality….  They are to be regarded not as 
actual things, but as in some measure analogous to them” (p. 377).  The following 
examination of two schema-based theoretical models of reading describes how 
comprehension is initiated through abstract and amodal propositions.  The failure of these 
models to adequately address the imagistic and affective aspects of reading strongly 
suggests that current schema theory no longer holds as its primary aim the coherence of 
sense experience. 
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Computational Models of Reading 
Rumelhart’s Parallel Input Model 
 Rumelhart (1977) developed a parallel distributed processing model of reading in 
which input from various levels come together simultaneously to produce perception and 
comprehension.  According to Rumelhart, patterns of information from several 
knowledge sources including orthographic knowledge or knowledge of letters and 
sounds, lexical knowledge or knowledge about words, and syntactic and semantic 
knowledge are synthesized in a “message center.”  The “message center” maintains a 
running list of hypotheses generated at discrete levels and these hypotheses are evaluated 
in relation to input from other levels.  Rumelhart describes his “message center” as a 
three-dimensional space where each dimension represents either the visual print 
information at a particular point along the line of text, the level of hypothesis (feature 
level, letter level, letter-cluster level, lexical level, syntactical level), or alternative 
hypotheses at the same level. 
 Rumelhart’s (1977) model attempts to account for reading phenomena occurring 
when the apprehension of information at a level of analysis is partially determined by 
higher levels of analysis as in the syntactic effects on the level of word perception.  For 
example, in the following sentences punctuation provides the syntactic cues to determine 
the phonological recoding of the word read:  
a) Johnny read the book. 
b) Johnny, read the book!  
The explanatory potential of Rumelhart’s “message center” is illustrated in an 
experimental procedure in which a subject is briefly presented with a picture of a 
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Volkswagen passing through a mountain village.  Participants are instructed that a 
tachistoscopic presentation of a noun phrase referring to one of the objects in the picture 
will be presented.  The participant is to decide to which object the noun phrase referred.  
The instructions provide the participant with some important semantic-level knowledge 
with which to build her hypotheses even before the tachistoscopic presentation insofar as 
she knows the phrase will refer to an object.  Such knowledge is likely to elicit the 
participant’s syntactic knowledge about common phrases used to denote objects, for 
example determiner + noun (as in “a lake”) or determiner + adjective(s) + noun (as in 
“the winding road”).  These hypotheses are said to be entered into the message center in a 
top-down fashion because they involve the use of information from the reader’s memory.   
Once graphic input enters the message center after the tachistoscopic presentation, 
the reader begins to simultaneously form hypotheses in a bottom-up fashion as the reader 
uses featural information for word recognition.  Suppose that from the information prior 
to the tachistoscopic presentation “THE CAR,” the reader has hypothesized  “a” and 
“the” as two possible determiners in the noun phrase.  The lexical hypotheses have led 
the reader to letter hypotheses with which to test against the featural information of the 
tachistoscopic presentation where “A” is soon discarded in favor of “T” and from the first 
letter position “T” to the letter cluster “TH” or whole word “THE.”  From the graphic 
depiction, the reader is likely to have eliminated the syntactic possibility of a longer 
three-word phrase using a determiner + adjective + noun.  Where VOLKSWAGEN, 
VILLAGE, and MOUNTAIN serve as rival hypotheses for the noun CAR, the reader 
may rely on a number of different processing possibilities for word recognition.  In this 
case, the configuration of both the entire phrase and the individual noun is likely to 
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eliminate longer words but nevertheless, the initial “C” may serve to enhance the 
probability that “CAR” is the noun referred to in the picture.  At the syntactic level, the 
word “CAR” is integrated with “THE” to confirm the semantic level hypothesis.   
 Rumelhart provides a plausible explanation for how readers access knowledge 
from various sources in response to abstract propositions in order to achieve 
comprehension.  In many ways, the development of his interactive model of reading has 
put to rest many of the arguments surrounding the linearity in both data-driven or 
‘bottom-up’ processing and meaning centered or ‘top down’ processing.  Yet, 
Rumelhart’s account does not include the possibility that readers rely on the formation of 
images in order to process the phrase sequences like “THE CAR.”  Sadoski and Paivio 
(2001) introduce imagery to their dual coding version of Rumelhart’s illustrative example 
of the message center at work.   
As described earlier, dual coding theory maintains that mental representation is 
organized into two separate coding systems—one specialized for language and the other 
for nonverbal objects and events.  The basic units for verbal representations are called 
logogens and the basic units for nonverbal representations are called imagens.  Sadoski 
and Paivio suggest that the brief presentation of the picture and the instructions that 
follow will activate imagens of the whole picture and its nested parts.  These imagens in 
turn, trigger referential or between system connections that run back and forth between 
imagens in the nonverbal system and logogens in the verbal system.  In this case, the 
projected image may prime a number of possible noun phrase sequences such as “THE 
CAR,” “A MOUNTAIN,” or “A VILLAGE.”  Associative or within system connections 
might prime possible adjectives such as a color for the car (“THE RED CAR”) or a 
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country for the village (“A SWISS VILLAGE”).  Verbal adjectives could also be 
triggered referentially by the nested images.   
 Similar to Rumelhart’s example, dual coding theory accounts for the activation of 
familiar letter and word logogens in response to graphic stimuli such as the overall length 
and configuration of the words in the phrase, word division, and features of initial letters.  
In contrast to the operation of Rumelhart’s message center, dual coding theory also 
introduces phonological recoding, a form of mental imagery relying on associative level 
of processing whereby readers enact an auditory encoding of phonemes, for example, /k/ 
as represented by the “C” in “CAR.”  While imagery does not appear to figure into the 
operation of Rumelhart’s schema-based model of reading, it is included in Kintsch’s 
(1988, 1998) two-stage construction-integration model as a possible outcome of building 
abstract propositions.  
Kintsch’s Two-Stage Construction-Integration Model 
In Kintsch’s two-stage construction-integration model a text base is constructed 
from the linguistic input and the reader’s knowledge base and subsequently integrated 
into a coherent whole.  The construction stage of Kintsch’s model is a four step process 
that involves: 1) the formation of concepts and propositions directly relating to the 
linguistic input; 2) the elaboration of each of these elements through the selection of 
several closely related semantic and associative neighbors in the general knowledge net; 
3) the inference of additional propositions; and 4) the assignation of numerical values 
indicating the strength of the connection between pairs of elements in the propositional 
framework.  Comprehension is largely the result of a process of constraints.     
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In Kintsch’s model, words are converted to propositional form according to a 
schema based case grammar.  Consider the simple sentence Officials closed the bank.  
Proposition building begins with linguistic parsing in which Officials [agent of CLOSE] 
closed [predicate] the bank [object of CLOSE].  As the reader visually processes a word 
in a text, the incremental construction of meaning begins with the bottom-up spreading 
activation of associated propositions in the general knowledge net.  According to 
Kintsch’s model, knowledge is organized in a loose associative network of mental 
propositions.  Propositions are interconnected by stronger and weaker positive and 
negative connections.  Using the word bank, Kintsch (1988) describes the creation of an 
abstract propositional network for discourse comprehension.   
According to Kintsch (1988), the word bank would be likely to activate the lexical 
nodes bank1 (financial institution) and bank2 (riverbank) as well as several of their 
strong semantic or associative neighbors in the general knowledge network (e.g., bank1: 
money, debit card, teller, First National Bank; bank2: flood, Red River, soil).  
Connections between associates are assigned values between –1 and +1 based on the 
degree of relationship.  Connections between lexical nodes and their associates are 
assigned positive values whereas connections between competing nodes and associates of 
competing nodes are assigned negative values.  For example, the connection between 
bank1 (financial institution) and bank2 (riverbank) is assigned a value of –1, the 
connection between bank1 (financial institution) and money is assigned a value of +0.5, 
and the connection between bank2 (riverbank) and First National Bank is assigned a 
value of -0.5.  Primary associates then generate secondary abstract propositions.  For 
example, soil might yield erosion and flood might generate the associate alluvial 
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deposits.  These secondary associates would have an assigned value in the propositional 
network proportionate to their relationship to the lexical node bank2.  In the tradition of 
computer-based theories of cognition (Baylor, 1973; Minsky, 1986; Pylyshyn, 1978) in 
which thought is represented by logical language and reason as mathematical calculation 
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1999), Kintsch’s numerical connections lead to the development of 
formulae to represent how readers computationally arrive at a stable interpretation.  Once 
the propositional network is linked into a text base, positively interconnected items 
reinforce each other, while disparate items are eliminated and inconsistent items become 
inhibited.  This occurs at the level of word recognition as well as of textual integration.  
In the integration stage, knowledge about language and the world is integrated with 
linguistic input to constrain the associative possibilities and eventually allow readers to 
construct a stable and coherent text base through repeated context checks.  It is at this 
point in Kintsch’s model that readers can finally tap into imagery as a source of 
information in order to achieve textual coherence.   
It is questionable whether Kintsch’s (1998) “architecture of cognition” (p. 5) 
initially developed in complete isolation of the nervous system can ever hope to account 
for the actual coding and processing operations involved in discourse comprehension.  
Dual coding theory and Kintsch’s model both assume the spreading activation of 
associates.  However, according to Kintsch’s theory, readers may form non-linguistic 
images but only in response to the creation of the abstract propositional framework.  The 
model neither allows for the possibility that imagery can be an integral part of the 
construction of word and phrase meaning nor does it attempt to explain how images are 
derived from abstract propositions.  Dual coding theory also introduces the possibility 
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that the visual representation of words or phrases can lead to the direct activation of 
logogens available in memory particularly in literate persons when they encounter a 
familiar word such as the name of a popular make of automobile as in “Volkswagen.”  
Repeated advertising is done to ensure that brand names are instantly recognizable to a 
buying public.    
Paivio and Begg (1971) compared imagery and reaction times and concluded that 
images can be activated before sentence comprehension is complete.  For example, let us 
return to the sentence Officials closed the bank and change it slightly so that it now reads 
like the newspaper headline, “OFFICIALS CLOSE BANK.”  The intent of headlines is to 
create an immediate image in the mind of the reader, in this case of the closing of a 
financial institution or perhaps, the restricted access to a particular riverbank or barrier.  
Either image might be accompanied by an emotional response according to the needs and 
desires of the individual.  The headline may confirm an anticipated event where the 
reader has already imaginatively projected the possibility of it happening.  For those who 
have lived through numerous flood threats, or have experienced the direct consequences 
of the collapse of Eastern European currency, or the battle for control of the West Bank, 
the headline “OFFICIALS CLOSE BANK” is likely to provoke very different but vivid 
imagery accompanied by intense emotional response.  Paivio and Begg (1971) found that 
readers may begin to form images at the beginning of the sentence rather than waiting 
until after the entire sentence has been read.  In the case of the headline example, visually 
processing the word officials can evoke the image of a trusted city official possibly 
accompanied by a sense of relief and confidence or conversely, the image of unwanted 
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military personnel—an ever-present threat to personal freedom and accompanied by a 
sense of fear and resentment.   
As readers read, imagery and affective responses are constantly being evoked in 
anticipation of what is to come, that is to say, readers come to the words on a page with 
images stored in memory which is why they are compelled to read on and confirm or 
reconfigure their representations according to new information.  Imagery and affect are 
not an after thought as most theories of reader response would have us believe, but rather, 
integral features of the ongoing construction of meaning.  Dual coding theory accounts 
for the possibility that readers can form images at any point in the comprehension process 
and provides a more comprehensive psychological accounting of how readers 
simultaneously access both verbal and nonverbal representations in the online processing 
of text.   
Neuroscience provides us with an ever-growing body of evidence about the multi-
modal nature of the brain.  Such evidence strongly supports the conclusion that different 
parts of the brain are specialized for processing stimulus information verbally or 
nonverbally.  Where Kintsch (1998) claims his construction-integration model might 
serve as a paradigm for cognition, dual coding theory of reading and writing derives from 
existing cognitive theory.  Comparing the cognitive assumptions in each theory permits 
us to evaluate how the mental representations described in each theory deal 
simultaneously with language and nonverbal objects and events.  The account of dual 
coding theory that follows is intended to provide the necessary basis for understanding 
that readers do not bypass the cognitive processes of perception and feeling in an attempt 
to achieve a state of isolated reason required by computational models of reading.  Later 
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in Chapter IV, I explain how a state of pure reason, either as a Platonic ideal or as Kant’s 
vernunft, is biologically untenable insofar as it depends on “the individual’s degree of 
removal from awareness of the other parallel activities of the mind” (Edelman, 1992, p. 
17). 
A Dual Coding Approach to Mental Representations 
 Dual coding theory is a reaction to the singular and dominant view in psychology 
up until the 1960’s that mental representations used in cognition were primarily verbal or 
linguistic (Paivio, 1986).  The theory attempts to account for the empirical nature of 
knowledge and thought through the presentation of a set of assumptions and hypotheses 
relating to the structure and function of mental imagery.  Its emphasis on perceptual, 
motor, and affective experience as the developmental origin of internal mental 
representations is extremely compatible with many of the philosophical ideas expressed 
in pragmatism and recent neurobiological evidence describing the evolution of mind and 
consciousness.  In large part, it is the intriguing nature of this common ground that 
prompts this investigation into the structure and function of imagery and affect in the 
literary experience.  While dual coding theory can tell us much about the continuity 
between perception and memory, I believe the theory offers valuable insights into the 
phenomenal experience of the reader and how the evocation of images and emotions 
during literary engagement might contribute to the reader’s expanding ethical 
consciousness. 
Dual coding theory rejects the rationalism adopted by computational theories of 
cognition that rely on formulating general truths through logical reasoning alone.  
Instead, dual coding theory favors an empirical approach to studying mental phenomena 
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relying on observable behavior to formulate assumptions and hypotheses.  A dual coding 
approach to understanding mental representations is a thoroughly embodied theory of 
cognition. There is an internal consistency between dual coding theory’s empirical view 
of the mind and the methodology applied in studying mental representational systems.  
Later in the discussion, I will explain how this internal consistency between philosophy 
and method is lacking in Kintsch’s (1998) revised construction-integration model thereby 
undermining credence in the logical basis of the theory.  In the interest of brevity, I 
review dual coding theory directly within the literacy context so as to make the necessary 
connections to literal, inferential, and critical comprehension in reading.     
The Organization of Knowledge in Dual Coding Theory of Reading and Writing 
Recalling the mental sense impression in Aristotle’s realism, Sadoski and Paivio 
(2001) assert that our mental representations retain some of the concrete qualities of 
external experiences.  As previously stated, mental representation is organized into two 
separate coding systems, one system to deal with the representation of nonverbal objects 
and events and the other to deal with language.  The basic nonverbal and verbal 
representational units are referred to as imagens and logogens.  Both systems are 
organized hierarchically but not similarly.  The verbal system is ordered sequentially 
whereas the nonverbal system is ordered nonsequentially.  For example, morphemes 
occur in sequential patterns that adhere to associative constraints (e.g., prefix + root + 
suffix) whereas, nonverbal representations often appear in compound images and 
represent episodes holistically.   Sadoski and Paivio indicate that there is some empirical 
evidence to suggest that logogens are word-like images while imagens are object or 
scene-like.  It is important to note that to fully understand the empirical nature of dual 
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coding theory one must recognize that mental imagery is not limited to visual images but 
includes mental representations associated with all sensory modalities—the visual, 
auditory, haptic, gustatory, and olfactory.  
Dual coding theory presents a unified theory of reading and writing to explain the 
orthogonal relationship between mental codes and sense modalities.  According to the 
theory, representational structures and processes in both the verbal and nonverbal systems 
are modality-specific.  While mental encodings result in concrete imagery, they can still 
handle abstract information in the form of language symbols, charts, or diagrams.  The 
possibility for verbal representations is present in visual, auditory, and haptic modalities.  
For example, a visual verbal encoding might be the mental representation of the letter “p” 
or the entire word “pipe” whereas an auditory verbal encoding might be the phoneme /p/ 
or the pronunciation /paip/.  Visual logogens include that body of familiar written units 
with consistent features such as letters, numbers, or punctuation marks, common subword 
combinations of letters, whole words, and often familiar phrases as in popular advertising 
logos or expressions.  Imagens or nonverbal representations are often embedded in other 
imagens in a hierarchical arrangement of associations and are said to be contextualized.  
For example, one can imagine a book, lying open on a coffee table, in front of a sofa, in a 
living room, and so forth.  Dual coding system assumes that as we read, we are activating 
verbal and nonverbal representations and making connections between them.   
According to dual coding theory, the capacity for forming mental imagery derives 
from direct sensorimotor experience, that is to say, patterns of response to external 
experiences are instantiated as part of our cognitive representations.  Dual coding theory 
appears to have an explanatory advantage over other theories of reading that generally 
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limit their focus to a particular aspect of the reading process.  For example, Kintsch’s 
(1988) two-stage construction-integration model focuses primarily on comprehension, 
whereas dual coding theory describes how imagery is used in the representative, 
referential, and associative thought processes enacted in decoding, comprehension, and 
response.  
Mental Imagery and Word Recognition 
 An underlying premise of dual coding theory in reading is that the activation of 
meaning is fundamental to word recognition and that word recognition is part of a larger 
continuum of processing that includes logogens of various sizes—letter features, letters, 
syllables, morphemes, words, and larger units.  Dual coding theory effectively accounts 
for the interaction of bottom-up and top-down models of reading.  The various sizes of 
logogens and the context effects from both the verbal and nonverbal sources allow for 
greater flexibility of thought and the possibility that readers actually engage in moving 
between the bottom-up detection of print features and the top-down contextual priming.   
I am reminded that while assessing students through the use of running records, a 
number of children substituted “coat” for “cloak.”  In this situation the word “coat” is 
visually similar to “cloak” and the context did not provide readers with assistance in 
decoding the word correctly.  As Sadoski and Paivio (2001) explain, skilled readers 
notice minor differences in letter features and often these differences can make a major 
impact on meaning as in their example Change the battery and Charge the battery.  The 
visual representation of the letters recoded into phonologic form may be used to access 
semantic memory or alternately, the recoding of the visual representation of whole words 
(change and charge) into phonologic form may directly evoke nonverbal mental 
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representations of two very different actions causing the reader to pay closer attention to 
letter features in “change” and “charge.”  How the attention of the reader determines 
which unit takes perceptual precedence has long been a question of theoretical debate.  In 
contrast to the rigidity of the semantic parsing used in the construction of amodal and 
abstract propositions theorized in computational models, Sadoski and Paivio’s theory is 
flexible enough to accommodate any number of scenarios.   
For example, in a resource manual I was reading for teaching word analysis, 
Gunning (2000) describes his recent first encounter with the word “agonal.”  He 
reportedly began by attempting to phonologically recode the visual representation and 
use syllabic analysis to construct the word’s pronunciation which he guessed might be 
/uh-GON-uhl/.  However, the phonological recoding did not afford Gunning access to the 
word’s meaning which prompted him to attempt a morphemic analysis.  Accessing his 
mental store of words, he questioned whether the “gon” could mean “sides” as in 
“polygon,” which may have triggered a mental representation of geometric figures (I 
know it did in my mind as I read this).  Thinking that he might be on to something, he 
then asked himself if the “a” in “agonal” might mean “not” as in “alliterate” and that the 
suffix “al” made the word an adjective.  By putting all the elements together, he came up 
with the idea that “agonal” meant something close to “without sides or angles.”  
However, his definition did not fit with the context.  As a last resort, he consulted the 
dictionary only to find that “agonal” is pronounced /AG-uh-nul/ meaning “pertaining to 
agony.”  Nevertheless, this example gives us a picture of the back and forth movement 
between units of analysis and establishes the contributing role of imagery in visual and 
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phonological recoding in order to develop a hypothesis for problem solving word 
meaning.   
Mental Imagery and Comprehension 
 To explain Sadoski and Paivio’s (2001) approach to issues relating to 
comprehension, again I must emphasize that dual coding theory contends that without the 
activation of mental representation, no meaning can be present.  Whereas computational 
models view comprehension as a product of constraints, comprehension within dual 
coding theory is seen as a system of both building up information and narrowing down 
information.  According to dual coding theory, comprehension is a function of three 
levels of processing—the representation, the referential, and the associative—all of which 
involve both the verbal and nonverbal systems described earlier. 
 At the most basic level, the representational level of comprehension consists of 
the activation of logogens through linguistic stimuli and the activation of imagens 
through non-linguistic stimuli.  This activation can be intermodal.  For example, naming 
written words requires recoding between visual logogens and articulatory logogens.  This 
process might also entail the activation of phonological recoding as an intermediate step.  
Processing at the representational level depends on familiarity or the availability of 
modality-specific logogens or imagens stored in memory.  At the representation level the 
word “cup” is easily recognized, even expressions like “hot cup of tea,” but for most 
people the word “agonal” is not and requires that readers make a series of verbal 
associations which may or may not fully resolve possible ambiguities in meaning.  This 
demonstrates that representational processing often operates in tandem with other levels 
of processing. 
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 At the referential level of meaning, connections are made between logogens in the 
verbal system and imagens in the nonverbal system.  In other words, readers make 
connections between known language units and the mental images they have constructed 
based on their experience.  Sadoski and Paivio explain that these connections have a 
neurological base and therefore referential processing occurs as neural pathways.  These 
pathways can run from logogens to imagens or from imagens to logogens.  Typically in 
reading, language units evoke imagens although subsequently, the imagens evoked may 
create within the reader, a strong sense of anticipation of the language to come.  The 
articulation of the referential level of meaning in dual coding theory is critical to 
understanding the difference between the effects of concrete and abstract language.  
Concrete language has more direct referential connections to imagens than does abstract 
language.  Studies of mental imagery in reading (Gambrell, 1982; Gambrell & Jawitz, 
1993; Pressley, 1976; Sadoski, 1983; Sadoski, Goetz, & Avila, 1995; Sadoski, Goetz, & 
Kangiser, 1988; Sadoski & Quast, 1990) suggest that the meaningful comprehension and 
recall of texts can be enhanced through concreteness of language, the use of imagery 
instructions, and the use of pictures and animation.  
 Where referential processing involves between-system connections, the 
associative level of meaning involves within-system connections.  Logogens form 
sequential connections to other logogens and include associations between letters, 
morphemes, words, and larger units such as clauses and sentences.  An example of an 
inter-morpheme/intra-word association is a free morpheme such as “safe” modified by a 
bounded morpheme to obtain “safety,” “unsafe,” “safely.”  Associations between larger 
units of language such as inter-word, inter-clause, and inter-sentence create various 
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syntactical and semantic contexts that contribute to the meaning making process and 
textual coherence.  
Textual coherence refers to the reader’s subjective interpretation of how well the 
mental representations evoked by the text serve to enhance the comprehensibility and 
unity of the text.  As readers actively engage in the process of making meaning from text, 
they operate constantly in internal and external, verbal and nonverbal situational contexts.  
Both referential and associative processes assist the reader in making inferences or 
‘reading between the lines.’  An inherent aspect of processing text is the creation of 
mental models.  Where the text employs ambiguous imagery or unconventional language, 
textual coherence is often more difficult to achieve as in the type of texts used in some of 
the studies supporting schema theory.   
Even when texts are fairly unambiguous, readers often contribute more to the text 
than what is actually presented.  Language cannot possible represent everything the 
writer wishes to express and therefore meaning is often inferred by accessing both 
nonverbal and verbal representations.  For example, in a recent undergraduate class in 
content area literacy, I asked students to read a short passage from the course textbook 
describing a series of events in an art gallery (Vacca & Vacca, 2002).  Although nothing 
in the text explicitly stated so, most students assumed that a robbery had taken place and 
that a woman was the perpetrator who sped off with a painting in a waiting truck.  
Moreover, students had formulated a mental description of both the woman and the truck 
and had constructed a mental representation of the interior of the art gallery.  In this 
example, verbal-associative connections between events were not evident and therefore 
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students began to fill in the gaps by importing previously experienced images to make 
causal language connections between the events. 
The Thematic and Symbolic Function of Imagery in Literature 
In addition to helping the reader fill in the gaps and read between the lines, 
imagery performs a thematic and symbolic function in literature.  Dominant images link 
ideas within a literary work to provide a sensuous alternative to amodal proposition 
building described in schema-based approaches to text comprehension and memory  
(Paivio, 1986). In Shakepeare’s Imagery and What it Tells Us, Spurgeon (1935) noted 
that the repeated use of image-clusters such as death and disease in Hamlet, lightness and 
darkness in Romeo and Juliet, and animal imagery in King Lear are instrumental in 
defining characters, establishing mood and atmosphere, and creating thematic unity. 
Similarly, imagery performs a unifying function in literature written for children 
and young adults.  Author-illustrator, Maurice Sendak (1963) uses the repetition of 
familiar images as a thematic and structural device in the picture book classic, Where the 
Wild Things Are.  The story, the first of a trilogy that also includes In the Night Kitchen 
(1970) and Outside Over There (1981), recounts the adventures of a mischievous boy 
named Max, who is sent to his room without his supper for acting like a “wild thing.”  In 
his confinement, he sails away to a fantasy world—a hidden forest where he is crowned 
king of all wild things by a benign group of grotesque monsters.  Sendak manages to link 
the events of the real world with those of the fantasy world through parallel images.  In 
addition to Max’s moniker, there is the real world image of Max being “sent to bed 
without eating anything” and the fantasy world image of Max’s later decree in which he 
“sent the wild things off to bed without their supper.”  The verbal and graphic 
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juxtapositions of reality and fantasy, death and renewal, and day and night are repeated 
throughout many of Sendak’s works to achieve what Spurgeon (1935) referred to as 
leading motives.   
Images combine and recombine in the unconscious mind in ways in which the 
artist may or may not be consciously aware (Paivio, 1991; Spurgeon, 1935).  Throughout 
his famous trilogy, Sendak recalls and reconfigures childhood images to animate 
expressions of the dream life.  In In the Night Kitchen, Sendak’s child-hero, Mickey 
plunges into the depth of the night to knead the dough and shape the stuff that dreams are 
made of.  Sendak’s alchemy derives its ingredients from the memories and artifacts of his 
Brooklyn childhood.  In his surrealistic skyline, composed of an assortment of everyday 
packaging—a nostalgic collection of boxes, bottles, cartons, and sacks each bearing a 
significant name or date from the artist’s past, we see that “…dreams have a different 
texture” (Jung, 1964, p. 2). Word and image merge in the “prototypical representations” 
(Paivio, 1986, p. 228) and archetypal heroes that lend the works their psychic complexity.  
It is therefore not surprising that Sendak gratefully acknowledges William Blake as his 
cornerstone (Lanes, 1980).  Through his poetry, paintings, and engravings, Blake also 
sought simultaneous expression for animating the images that appeared “before his 
mind’s eye” (McKellar, 1957, p. 135).  From a dual coding perspective, Paivio (1986) 
explains, “both verbal and imaginal contexts and associations contribute to the reader’s 
[and writer’s] psychological organization of the text including its overall integration or 
cohesiveness” (p. 227).   
Where the literary art of the picture book is often achieved through the repetition 
and juxtaposition of verbally generated and graphic images, poetry relies on metaphor to 
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link internal images with the external world.  As Ernest Feollosa writes: “Metaphor 
is…the very substance of poetry…[without it] there would have been no bridge whereby 
to cross from the minor truth of the seen to the major truth of the unseen” (cited in 
Arendt, 1971, p. 106).  In poetry, similes and metaphors function to render abstract 
concepts into concrete images.  These images in turn, can be further elaborated upon, 
reconfigured, and projected upon other objects and events to gain a richer and more 
personal interpretation.  Metaphorical thinking, whereby the reader is able to 
imaginatively conceive of an object or event as representative of another, is fundamental 
to the ability to read beyond the lines in order to achieve critical comprehension. 
A sociocultural perspective (Allen, 2000; Bakhtin, 1981, 1986; Kristeva, 1980) on 
language and literacy has emphasized the polyvocalic nature of literary works.  Within 
the context of a unified theory of literature and composition, dual coding theory can 
account for the referential and associative connections constructed by both author and 
readers that contribute to the work’s intertextuality, or as Kristeva (1980) explains, how 
one text may be transposed in another textual system such as that of the novel.  
According to Kristeva, “any text is constructed as a mosaic of quotations…the absorption 
and transformation of another” (p. 66).  For example, fairy tales, Shakespearean plays, 
and religious texts make repeated use of images drawn from ancient Greek mythology, 
the fated love story in Romeo and Juliet is a recurrent theme in classic and contemporary 
works, and the Aristotelian view of the body can be read in Whitman’s poem, “I Sing the 
Body Electric.”  In addition, intertextuality extends to individual responses made by 
readers to enhance the connotative possibilities.  In several studies investigating the 
relationship between imagery and affect evoked during the reading of literary texts 
 74
(Krasny & Sadoski, 2004; Sadoski & Kangiser, 1988; Steffensen, Goetz & Cheng, 1999), 
qualitative reports of both imagery and affect revealed that participants often made 
associative links to personal experiences and events outside of the text and that these 
images were often accompanied by the arousal of emotions.  In this regard, the dense 
overlap of within system and between systems connections made by readers begins to 
explain the text to self, text to text, and text to world connections described in theories of 
reader response. 
In novels, imagery performs the added function of an organizing principle in 
literary analysis whereby specific images assist readers in the recall of plot and action.  
Studies investigating the relationship between mental imagery and recall in both literary 
and expository texts (Sadoski, 1983, 1985; Sadoski, Goetz, Olivarez, Lee & Roberts, 
1990; Sadoski & Quast, 1990) provide considerable support for the “conceptual peg 
hypothesis” (Paivio, 1986) which contends that images function as a mnemonic device.  
Key images act as ‘pegs’ or ‘hooks’ on which other associated and less salient memories 
are hung for storage and retrieval.  Sadoski’s (1983, 1985) early studies investigating the 
relationship between reported imagery and the comprehension and recall of a story 
demonstrate that while imagery relates to participants’ ability to identify theme, the lack 
of a significant relationship between reported imagery and verbal mental ability as 
obtained on standardized measures suggests that mental imagery constitutes a nonverbal 
mode of comprehension that remains a relatively untapped source of insight for reading 
researchers and educators.  The referential and associative connections described in dual 
coding theory make possible the thematic, symbolic, and retrieval functions of images.  
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In sum, imagery in literary works manages to perform the unifying function once 
ascribed to Kant’s schema without the obligatory construction of abstract propositions. 
Conceptual Pegs in Childhood Verse 
The idea that images are conceptual pegs upon which to hang related ideas and 
new information can be extended to the recitation of childhood verses.  Early childhood 
educators may be inadvertently teaching important imagery strategies used in recall 
through popular nursery rhymes, songs, and chants.  Paivio (1991) recounts the 
experience of Simonides, a Greek poet who lived around 500 B.C. to illustrate how 
orderly arrangements and images of things in their place serve as an aid to memory.  
Simonides was summoned from a banquet while he was reciting a lyric poem to the 
guests.  When he returned, the roof of the banquet hall had collapsed, crushing the guests 
beyond recognition.  Simonides was able to identify the dead by reconstructing the 
orderly arrangement of guests through images of localities or places.  Simonides’ 
technique became popular among public speakers who found carrying around written 
speeches too cumbersome.  Children who use images as conceptual pegs to reconstruct 
cumulative songs and chants such as “Oliver Twist,” “Quand Jean Petit danse,” and 
“Dans mon pays d’Espagne” employ the same strategy used by teachers and students of 
rhetoric in ancient Greece.   
For example, “Oliver Twist” is a popular chant that challenges children to recall, 
recite, and perform a series of actions. Children stand in a circle and recite: 
Oliver Twist, Twist, Twist 
Can’t do this, this, this, 
Touch his toes, toes, toes, 
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And around he goes, goes, goes. 
With each successive recitation, another child adds another line to the rhyme calling for a 
different action not as yet mentioned (e.g., Touch his nose, nose, nose; Touch his toes, 
toes, toes….).  Play continues until all the children have contributed a line, often yielding 
more than twenty or so actions.  The kinesthetic act of performing the actions, and the 
rhyme, rhythm, and repetition of the words and phonemes contribute to a bodily 
incorporation of the chant, not unlike that achieved through the murmuring meditations 
of medieval monks.  Yet as the number of lines increases, recalling the actions of the 
chant in sequential order generally depends on visually reviewing each child in her or his 
respective place in the circle.  In this case, the immediate image of each child in the circle 
triggers the memory of the verbal call for a particular action.  Later in Chapter 4, I 
discuss the notion of “bodyreading” (Grumet, 1988, p. 129) and examine in detail the risk 
of excising the sensuous contribution of rhyme and rhythm and its inherent invitation to 
play from the literature used in early reading instruction.   
Neuropsychological Support for Dual Coding Theory 
Paivio (1986) consulted several interpretive summaries of neuropsychological 
evidence on verbal and imagery processing (e.g., Bryden, 1982; Ley, 1983; Paivio & 
Begg, 1981; Paivio & te Linde, 1982) to examine the theoretical plausibility of the 
representational systems described in dual coding theory.  Much of the evidence cited in 
support of dual coding theory relates to the functional asymmetry of the brain, that is to 
say, the way certain regions of the brain appear specialized to perform specific functions.  
In studies investigating the functional asymmetries between the two hemispheres of the 
brain, material is presented selectively to either hemisphere for perceptual recognition or 
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other types of cognitive processing.  The selective presentation of material may include 
dichotic listening tasks or tachistoscopic presentations like those used in researching 
Rumelhart’s parallel input model.  Evidence is collected from people with normal brains 
and from patients with unilateral brain lesions and those in whom the corpus callosum 
connecting the two hemispheres has been damaged.  For example, the independence 
between verbal and nonverbal processing purported in dual coding theory is observed in 
the differences between the episodic memory performance of patients with right- or left-
temporal lesions.  Patients with left-temporal lesions show deficits in verbal memory 
tasks, whereas those with right-temporal lesions show deficits in nonverbal memory 
tasks.   
However, Paivio (1986) emphasizes that hemispheric functional distinctions 
relating to verbal and nonverbal episodic memory need to be qualified.  Moreover, these 
qualifications are in many ways consistent with assumptions in dual coding theory.  First, 
despite the apparent right-hemisphere superiority for nonverbal episodic memory, 
evidence from both normal subjects as well as split-brain patients reveals that pictures of 
common objects are perceptually recognized equally well by either hemisphere.  This 
leads to the conclusion that representational systems needed for visual recognition of 
common objects are present in both hemispheres.  Second, a similar qualification must be 
made to account for tachistoscopic recognition studies in which abstract words were 
recognized better in the right visual field indicating left-hemisphere superiority while 
concrete words were recognized equally well in both the left and right visual fields.  
Nevertheless, conflicting evidence (e.g., Boles, 1983) exists to support right-field (left-
hemisphere) superiority for the recognition of both abstract and concrete words.   
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While it seems presumptuous to make any generalizations regarding hemispheric 
superiority in reading concrete words, Paivio (1986) offers several interpretations of the 
findings of these studies.  One possibility is that the right hemispheric superiority in 
imagery processing contributes to the right-hemispheric reading of concrete words.  
According to dual coding theory, this would entail associative or within system 
connections.  Another possibility is that the lexical representations of concrete words are 
present in both hemispheres.  This may be accounted for in dual coding theory by the 
direct activation of logogens in the verbal representational system or verbal imagens 
within the nonverbal representational system.  It is important to note that Paivio (1986) 
stresses that the independence characterizing the separate representational systems 
described in dual coding theory is not reliant on functional differences being neatly 
divided between the left- and right-hemispheres.  Arguably, any correlations between 
activity in specific regions of the brain and functional differences can prove to be 
theoretically insightful.  Edelman (1992) maintains that ultimately, it is the brain’s 
morphology—the shape of cells and the development of tissue form that determine the 
function of the various regions of the brain.   
Paivio (1986) cites a range of neuropsychological literature postulating the 
relationship between neuroanatomical distinctions and functional differences in support 
of several other key assumptions in dual coding theory.  These include the orthogonal 
nature of symbolic and sensory modalities (e.g., Bryden, 1982; Curry, 1967), the 
representational, referential, and associative levels of processing (e.g., Beauvois, 1982; 
Geschwind, 1965; Luria, 1973) and the distinction between sequential and synchronous 
processing (e.g., Kimura, 1982; Luria, 1973; Mills & Rollman, 1979).  Paivio’s 
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interpretation of the literature reviewed restates the premise in dual coding theory that 
verbal and nonverbal systems are both functionally independent and interconnected.  
Interconnections between systems may account for the evidence that concrete words and 
common objects appear to be recognized equally well by both hemispheres.  The 
orthogonal relationship of the verbal-nonverbal symbolic distinction to sensory 
modalities is consistent with the dissociated patterns of hemispheric asymmetries.  This is 
demonstrated in patients where localized brain damage can affect their ability to activate 
neuronal systems specialized for the auditory processing of words (auditory logogens) 
without affecting neuronal systems specialized for visual processing of words (visual 
logogens).   
Paivio (1986) also considers the neuropsychological findings relevant to the 
representation of emotions.  Most importantly, the evidence reviewed suggests an 
operational link between imagery, affect, and right-hemispheric efficiency that appears 
consistent with dual coding theory’s approach to emotions.  Functional interconnections 
may explain how words acquire affect-arousing qualities through referential processing to 
trigger an emotional reaction.  Evidence continues to mount and while there are few 
comprehensive summaries, Kosslyn’s (1994) book, Image and the Brain: The Resolution 
of the Imagery Debate has compiled considerable neuropsychological evidence from a 
wide range of studies.  He concludes that there is no question that mental imagery is a 
vital mental phenomenon that is functionally and anatomically distinct from language.  
The dual coding assumption that verbal-nonverbal referential experience results in the 
development of functional interconnections or associative pathways is consistent with an 
epigenetic account of emotions and mental imagery described in Chapter IV.   
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It is important to remember that the strict controls used in laboratory study are 
once again, hardly representative of actual experience in the natural world.  In 
considering the evidence supporting dual coding theory as a general theory of cognition 
and its extension to accounting for reading phenomena, I recommend maintaining a sense 
of humility in confronting the sheer number and complexity of neuronal networks in the 
brain.  The following description should provide us with an idea of the astonishing nature 
of the brain. 
Each nerve cell receives connections from other nerve cells at sites called 
synapses…. [T]here are about one million billion connections in the cortical 
sheet.  If you were to count them one connection (or synapse) per second you 
would finish counting some thirty-two million years after you began. (Edelman, 
1992, p. 17) 
To his credit, Paivio (1986) characterizes his review of neuropsychological evidence as a 
“theoretical sketch” (p. 276) and concedes that it does not yet account for the biochemical 
activity and other structures that play a potential role in representational activity.  
Nevertheless, I believe that correspondences between neuroanatomical distinctions and 
functional differences continue to make a valid contribution to the construction, 
elaboration, and refinement of cognitive theory and models of reading when viewed with 
the understanding that is it individuals and not “brains” that represent the world 
(Edelman, 1992). 
Conclusion 
At this point in the discussion, what should be becoming more and more apparent 
is that imagery performs a number of important functions that are inadequately met by 
 81
formal syntactical structures alone.  Images are dynamic insofar as unlike words, they 
“can be easily transformed, manipulated, and used flexibly” (Paivio, 1991, p. 266).  
Words might be “the images of things,” (cited in Paivio, 1991, p. 253) as Simonides once 
proclaimed but as we shall read in Chapter V, images allow the writer and reader to get at 
what is intentionally important to them.  In Chapter IV, I will begin to investigate the 
structure and function of emotions as products of an embodied and evolutionary existence 
and how both imagery and affect come to constitute central elements of human 
consciousness and the phenomenal experience of readers. 
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CHAPTER IV 
READING AS AN EMBODIED ACT  
Introduction 
The wonderful thing about language is that it promotes its own oblivion: my 
eyes follow the lines on the paper, and from the moment I am caught up in 
their meaning, my eyes and body are there only as the minimum setting of 
some invisible operation.   
-Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception 
In Chapter III, the structure and function of imagery and affect were described in 
terms of the integral role they play in the cognitive act of reading.  Studies that help us 
come to know the neuroanatomical organization of the brain are instructive in postulating 
theories of cognition but are presently insufficient in terms of understanding how the 
body interacts with the world to produce a developing sense of self.  Furthermore, we 
need to understand the origins of sensory imagery and emotions if we are to comprehend 
how they might contribute to the phenomenal and embodied experience of readers.  In the 
present chapter, emphasis shifts from the functional distinctions of the brain to the body’s 
direct relationship to human consciousness and the critical role of imagery and affect in 
shaping a sense of self. 
For the most part, human consciousness remained “an entirely private, first-
person phenomenon which occurs as part of the private, first-person process we call 
mind” (Damasio, 1999, p. 12).  As such, it has been relatively absent from scientific 
third-person discourse and left to philosophical introspection.  Broca’s and Wernicke’s 
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discoveries of a connection between language and specific regions of the left-hemisphere 
of the brain in the mid-nineteenth century opened the door to correlating the private with 
the public, that is, the mechanisms of the mind with behaviors (Damasio, 1999).  As we 
have seen, observations of people with lateral brain lesions and those in whom the 
connecting tissue between the two hemispheres of the brain has been damaged provide 
valuable insights into the functional asymmetry of the brain.  Scientific probes such as 
functional resonance imaging (fMRI) and positron emission tomography (PET) make 
possible more detailed and precise observations of neuronal activity to inform our 
understanding of the structure and function of the brain in both neurology patients and 
humans without brain diseases.  
Neurological observations and neuropsychological evidence combine to give us a 
more comprehensive picture of how activity in the brain corresponds to behavior.  Some 
of the most interesting ideas emerging from this constructive alliance relates to the 
critical relationship between consciousness and emotions (Damasio, 1999, 2003).  From 
an evolutionary and pragmatist perspective, I stress, however, that knowledge about brain 
activity can never fully account for human behavior.  According to Edelman (1992), 
“[t]he brain and the nervous system cannot be considered in isolation from the states of 
the world and social interactions. …[S]uch states, both environmental and social, are 
indeterminate, and open-ended” (p. 224).  At the same time, Edelman (1992) warns, “The 
notion that we can think about how mental matters occur in the absence of reference to 
the structure and function, development, and evaluation of the brain is intellectually 
hazardous” (p. 68).  In this chapter, I examine the biological basis for imagery and affect.  
Later in Chapter 5, I extend the investigation into the affective realm of consciousness to 
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include the historical and social bases for emotions to explain reading as an act of 
emotional intentionality.  
Antonio Damasio: Two Types of Images 
Damasio (1995, 1999, 2003) describes a neurobiology of consciousness in which 
the brain maintains a representation of what is going on in the body.  Consistent with 
Sadoski and Paivio’s (2001) contention in dual coding theory in reading that meaning 
cannot occur without the activation of images, Damasio’s (2003) “feeling brain” is based 
on the premise that “the ability to perceive objects and events, external to the organism or 
internal to it, requires images.”  He describes two types of images. Images of the flesh are 
associated with changes that occur throughout the interior landscape of the body and are 
therefore referred to as somatosensory images.  Examples of this type of imagery include 
pain, nausea, and pleasure.  Sensory images are those associated with specialized body 
parts responsible for perceiving external changes such as the retina in the eye, the cochlea 
in the ear, the vestibular nerve also located in the ear, the olfactory nerve endings in the 
nose, the gustatory papillae on the tongue, and the nerves endings throughout the skin.  
Regardless of the type of body image, the method of production is the same. Activity in 
body structures results in momentary structural changes.  The brain constructs maps of 
the changes affecting the body state in a number of appropriate regions which give rise to 
emotions and feelings. 
Emotions and Feelings 
In his account of a “feeling brain,” Damasio (2003) makes a functional distinction 
between emotions and feelings and then later recombines them under the heading of 
affect.  Affect refers to human emotion and feeling including drives, motivations, and 
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desires.  According to Damasio, emotions play out in the theatre of the body.  They are 
triggered by what he refers to as an emotionally competent stimulus (ECS) which he 
defines as “a certain object or situation actually present or recalled from memory” 
(Damasio, 2003, p. 57).  For example, the actual sight of Picasso’s Guernica or the 
verbal auditory mental representation of Sylvia Plath’s haunting recitation of her poem 
“Daddy” and its accompanying nonverbal visual imagery potentially serve to trigger 
neural and chemical responses leading to visceral changes.  Literary works emote in such 
a way as to reflect their narrative structure.  For example, suspense novels and “thrillers” 
depend upon the continual and increasingly intensifying evocation of a visceral and 
embodied response.  Similarly, Aristotle was quick to recognize that the catharsis in 
tragedies is achieved through the sudden suspension of a “steadily induced state of fear 
and pity” (Damasio, 1999, p. 59).  Furthermore, the pattern of ratings for emotional 
responses in two studies (Krasny & Sadoski, 2004; Sadoski, Goetz, & Kangiser, 1988) 
investigating the relationship between imagery and affect as readers read short stories 
clearly demonstrates the correspondence between heightened emotional response and the 
rising action of the plot.   
Emotions can often be detected by such outwardly physical manifestations as a 
change in vocal timbre and pitch, facial expression, and tensing of the muscles.  In 
studies, neuroscientists can use scientific probes such as magnetic resonance imaging 
(MRI) producing refined images of the brain and positron emission tomography (PET) 
which measures the amount of blood flow in multiple brain areas5 to detect emotions that 
are not visibly apparent.  According to Damasio’s account of the “feeling brain,” 
                                                 
5 Damasio (2003) explains that the amount of blood flow ultimately corresponds to the amount of local 
neuronal activity.   
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emotions are part of the basic mechanism of life regulation helping the body achieve 
homeostasis. 
Feelings, on the other hand, play out in the theatre of the mind and are always 
subsequent to emotions.  They are not overtly detectable and therefore present a potential, 
but not insurmountable, challenge to empirical research.  In Damasio’s account of body 
and emotion, feelings are mental images of objects and object-organism relationships.  
Here we see some important differences between the ways dual coding theory and 
Damasio’s account of a “feeling brain” conceptualize mental images.  Whereas in dual 
coding theory, mental images and emotions are shown to correlate as evinced by the 
many studies conducted in the reading field, Damasio suggests that feelings and mental 
images are one in the same and are inseparably linked to emotions in a complex chain of 
events that constitutes affect.   
Damasio’s assertion that emotions are antecedent to images is supported by new 
experimental evidence emerging from studies investigating the patterns of brain activity 
in association with experiencing certain feelings.  He describes a study (Damasio, 
Grabowski, Bechara, Damasio, Ponto, Parvizi & Hechwa, 2000) in which participants 
were asked to recall a powerfully emotional episode from their life and raise their hand to 
signal when they began to feel an emotion. What Damasio (2003) and his colleagues 
found was that “changes in skin conductance [as measured by electric monitors] always 
preceded the signal that a feeling was being felt (p. 101).  I would, however, contend that 
participants were not likely to share the same semantic non-difference between “images” 
and “feelings” as the researchers.  According to the instructions, participants were 
instructed first to conjure up images of a past experience and then to indicate when they 
 87
began to feel a feeling.  Whether we call the recalled episode “feelings” or “images,” it 
arguably served, to use Damasio’s term, as the emotionally competent stimulus preceding 
the emotional reaction recorded by the sensors, and this emotional reaction is likely to 
have triggered yet other “feelings.”   
The study, however, seems to have successfully captured the complex chain of 
events Damasio describes as affect.  Nevertheless, I have the impression that the 
beginning of a “feeling” reported by participants and the emotional response recorded by 
the monitors relate to one in same phenomenon and that the results may merely indicate 
that the monitor is more efficient in reporting somatic changes.  In other words, it might 
take less time for the monitors to signal changes in skin conductance than it takes for the 
brain to receive and interpret the stimulus and respond by sending the appropriate 
message to the muscles in order to raise a hand.  I am left with the thought that any 
modification made to the stimulus as a result of the brain’s interpretation might be the 
qualifying difference implied in Damasio’s distinction between emotions and feelings.     
Shakespeare, Shadows, and the “Chicken and the Egg” 
In Damasio’s (2003) reformulation of Richard’s soulful remark near the end of 
Shakespeare’s Richard II, the neuroscientist makes clear his contention that it is feelings 
(mental images) that are “mostly shadows of the external manner of emotions” (p. 29).  
The lines from the play read:  
‘Tis very true my grief lies within 
And these external manners of laments 
Are merely the shadows of unseeing grief 
That swells with silence in the tortur’d soul (IV: I: 305-308) 
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In Damasio’s opinion, Shakespeare astutely understood that affect can be analyzed in 
parts but he was mistaken to think that the “external manners of laments,” that is to say, 
Richard’s emotions were “shadows” of the feelings of “unseen grief” that lies within.  
Damasio informs us that it is emotions that are externally detectable and antecedent to 
feelings or mental images.  Hence, it is the internal “grief” that is the mere shadow of 
visible emotions.  In both dual coding theory and Damasio’s neurobiology of 
consciousness, images are assumed to be mental representations resulting from the neural 
mapping of sensory experience.  There is nothing to say that the verbal-nonverbal 
representations described in Paivio’s dual coding theory are simply called “feelings” in 
Damasio’s neurobiology of consciousness.  We are, however, left to ponder the 
proverbial “chicken or the egg” question for what is in contention is the order in which 
images and emotions occur. 
 In Paivio’s (1986) theory, it is implied that emotional reactions result from the 
prior activation of verbal or nonverbal representations.  From a dual coding perspective, 
objects and words must be processed at least up to the representational level in order to 
evoke an affective response.  Paivio explains that in the case of objects and events that 
are highly emotive, the cognitive route can be fairly direct.  This is more likely to occur 
with nonverbal representations.  A review of the findings of studies investigating the 
representation of emotions (Bryden & Ley, 1983) indicate that like nonverbal imagery, 
the perception and expression of emotion are localized in the right hemisphere of the 
brain. From a practical perspective, the argument as to what comes first, images or 
emotions, does not matter in the constant volley between emotional responses and the 
formation of images.  In short, imagery and affect are implicated in a sustained two-way 
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network in which emotional responses trigger the production of images which in turn 
trigger emotions.      
Damasio’s contention that images are themselves, an affective response appears 
to confound the relationship between imagery and affect described in dual coding theory.  
The difference, however, may be subtler than the nominal difference between Paivio’s 
“images” and Damasio’s “feelings” suggests.  Damasio’s (1999) following explanation of 
textual transactions seems fairly consistent with the assumptions in dual coding theory. 
The words that I am using to bring these ideas to you are first formed, however 
briefly and sketchily, as auditory, visual, or somatosensory images of phonemes 
and morphemes [logogens and imagens], before I implement them on the page in 
their written version.  Likewise, those written words now printed before your eyes 
are first processed by you as verbal images before they promote the activation of 
yet other images, this time non-verbal [imagens] with which the “concepts” that 
correspond to my words can be displayed mentally.  (p. 319)   
 It would appear that both Paivio and Damasio have reached some of the same 
conclusions about how writers and readers use mental representations to process verbal 
text.   
I believe that the discrepancy between theoretical conceptualizations of feelings 
and images relates directly to the controversial relationship between cognition and affect.  
A more traditional view assumes that cognition and affect are two separate phenomena 
and that affective responses follow cognitive identification and interpretation of a verbal 
or nonverbal stimulus (Paivio, 1986).  Zajonc (1984) presents an opposing view which 
maintains that affect is part of cognition implying that affective reactions can occur 
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without stimulus recognition.  According to Paivio, dual coding theory adheres more to 
the traditional view that cognition and affect are separate, but the theory is flexible 
enough to consider the reverse causal relationship in which an emotional state increases 
the probability of activating relevant verbal-nonverbal representations.  Continued efforts 
to understand how psychological processes relate to physiological ones should help 
reconcile definitional differences and contribute to a resolution of the debate.  Presently, I 
am of the opinion that deciding as to whether an affective reaction is possible before 
stimulus recognition depends upon at what point in cognition we can say that an object or 
event has been identified and what role does imagery and affect play in the process of 
object identification.  My initial response to what is now known is to adopt a more 
holistic and embodied approach and to state that sensory perception is at the origin of 
stimulus recognition.  Since it appears that imagery and affect function to maintain the 
“wax impression” of the object or event initially perceived, they are unquestionably 
implied in all subsequent cognitive processing but do not operate in isolation of other 
faculties. 
Dewey (1905/1977) postulates qualitative differences between the affective 
response associated with the initial perception of an object or event and that associated 
with the subsequent cognition of the same object or event.  In the process of moving from 
perception to cognition, the human mind seeks to resolve the tension between the known 
and unknown by relating the unknown to previously formed categories grounded in 
experience.  Dewey describes the reconfiguration of the mental imagery that transforms 
an unknown and fearsome noise into the known and less startling tapping of a shade 
against a window to illustrate his postulate of immediate empiricism. In the process of 
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moving from a fearsome noise (Damasio’s ECS) to the known tapping of a shade against 
the window, the experience has changed.  This change is effected through a cognitive 
process in which the perceiver relates and contrasts the experiential content of being 
frightened to subsequent experience in order to determine that the noise is due to the 
tapping of a shade.   In other words, the noise has been cognized.  Dewey asserts that 
while the content of the latter experience is cognitively regarded as truer, the content of 
the earlier more immediate experience is no less real.  Our subjective consciousness is 
constructed through our interactions with an objective world which is further influenced 
by a social, cultural and historical context.  This brings to mind important questions about 
whether literature classes can or should, to use Frye’s (1963) expression, educate the 
imagination and whether the resulting reinterpretations are any “truer” than the reader’s 
initial lived-through experience of the text.    
The Biological Origins of Imagery and Affect 
 Damasio (1999, 2003) contends that the sustained two-way network of emotions 
and feelings (images) is the bedrock of human consciousness.  He claims it is so 
ubiquitous that at most times we are not aware of it.  While nonhuman creatures appear 
capable of emotion, there is something distinctly human in our ability to use emotions 
and imagery in the apprehension of complex ideas and in the development and 
application of values, principles, and judgments (Bronowski, 1978).  Both Edelman 
(1992) and Damasio (1999, 2003) present convincing evidence that the pervasive 
presence of imagery and affect can be traced to the evolution of mind and body.   
As organisms develop within their environment, they acquire factual and affective 
experience with a range of objects and situations.  As a result of interacting with our 
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social and natural environments, objects and events are represented by neural patterns 
constructed in the appropriate sensory cortices of the brain.  It is important to note, “the 
patterns of nervous system response depend on the individual history of each system, 
because it is only through interaction with the world appropriate response patterns are 
selected” (Edelman, 1992, p. 226).  As a result, “brains possess enormous individual 
structural variation at a variety of organizational levels” (Edelman, 1992, p. 224).  
Different experiences will result in differences between individual nervous systems and 
within a single system over time.  In sum, no two persons are likely to form exactly the 
same images of the same object or event or respond in exactly the same manner to a 
particular stimulus.   
Damasio (1999) explains that emotions and feelings work to connect “virtually 
every object or situation in our experience, by virtue of conditioning, to the fundamental 
values of homeostatic regulation” (p. 58).  Homeostasis is defined as the coordinated and 
seemingly automated physiological reactions required in maintaining an internally 
consistent body state.  Examples of biological mechanisms used to achieve homeostasis 
include among other things, the automated regulation of temperature, pH and oxygen 
levels, the production of antibodies, and the complex combination of chemical and neural 
responses that constitute an emotion-proper.  Damasio (1999) further claims that 
homeostatic regulation is the key to the biology of consciousness. 
 In an evolutionary sense, the construction of neural patterns is both dependent 
upon the genetic make up of the brain and body and epigenetic events that is to say, 
events that occur contingent upon certain previous events having taken place.  For 
example, as we will read later, the ability to represent and think in images was likely a 
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necessary step in the evolution of human language.  Complex behaviors such as emotions 
have both genetic and epigenetic components.  As Edelman (1992) explains: “Selection 
not only guarantees a common pattern in a species but it also results in individual 
diversity at the level of the finest neural network” (p. 64).  The brain is a dynamic and 
self-organizing system.  Its potential for diversity and variability as indicated by the sheer 
number of possible connections described earlier precludes any possibility of the brain 
functioning as a computer.  Imagery and affect are a direct result of the brain constructing 
neural patterns that map the object-organism relationship.  Studies of perception, 
learning, memory, and language (including reading) have provided us with a general idea 
of how the brain processes objects and events in sensory and motor terms.  This 
embodied knowledge of the world in the form of sensory images allows the body to 
anticipate future interactions.  According to Bronowski (1978), the ability to image or 
represent what is absent in memory is an evolutionary advantage that humans have over 
other forms of animal life.  Furthermore, Bronowski contends that the human capacity to 
combine and reconfigure images in novel ways is ultimately the basis for all invention 
and creativity. 
The Body as the Emotional Main Stage 
 William James proposed that feelings are the perception of the actual body state 
changed by emotion.  The body as the emotional epicenter is similarly captured by 
Arendt’s (1971) remarks equating “moods and emotions” with “the continual change of 
our bodily organs” (p. 32). 
Every emotion is a somatic experience; my heart aches when I am grieved, gets 
warm with sympathy, opens itself up in rare moments when love or joy 
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overwhelms me, and similar physical sensation take possession of me with anger, 
wrath, envy, and other affects. (p. 33)   
By and large, Damasio’s (1999; 2003) neurobiology of consciousness supports James’ 
conjecture that feelings reflect the changes in the body state.  However, it is 
understandable that from a contemporary point of view, James’ basic idea now appears 
incomplete.  Damasio (1999) offers an added dimension to James’ contribution.  Where 
James understood the body to be “the main stage for emotions” (Damasio, 1999, p. 287), 
according to Damasio (1999), “emotional responses target both body-proper and brain” 
(p. 288).  In other words, the body receives emotionally relevant information through 
several sources.  Effectively, the brain produces changes in neural processing that form 
much of what we conceive of as feeling.  Relevant information often travels in nerves 
such as the vagus.  These nerves exit and enter the brain at the level of the brain stem.   
 Until recently, James’ original idea has traditionally come under criticism by 
those who would argue that input from the body cannot possibly provide emotionally 
relevant information since patients with spinal cord damage are still able to emote and 
feel.  In refuting the body-proper as the exclusive theatre for emotions and expanding our 
understanding of the corporal theatre to include everything above the neck as well, 
Damasio (1999) is able to dispel the attacks of James’ critics.  While I hesitate to wander 
too far astray into laboratory experiments using non-human subjects, Damasio (1999) 
cites McGaugh’s work with both humans and rats to support his contention regarding the 
role of the vagus nerve.  I believe that McGaugh’s work connects in an important way to 
reading research investigating the relationship between affective responses and text recall 
and for this reason, I have decided to include a brief summary of the findings.   
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Studies by McGaugh (1989, 1990) using both humans and rats found that learning 
and recall were enhanced by emotional responses.  McGaugh (1990) demonstrated that if 
you hear two stories of comparable length, with a comparable number of facts, but 
different in terms of the level of emotional content, you will recall significantly more 
detail from the emotionally charged story than from the other.  This is consistent with the 
findings from a study by Hidi and Baird (1988) that investigated the immediate and 
delayed recall of expository text.  The researchers noted that expository materials such as 
textbooks are not written in a captivating or interesting way and as a consequence, they 
lose rhetorical sway.  Hidi and Baird revised a science-biography text in ways to promote 
greater reader interest and presented it to fourth- and sixth grade students.  The students 
were asked to provide written free recalls immediately after reading the text and after a 
one-week delay.  The results showed that students recalled more of the modified text than 
the students in previous comparable studies had recalled of standard science and social 
studies texts. 
Similarly, in experiments using non-human subjects, rats performed better on a 
standard learning task when a certain amount of emotion occurred at specified times.  
Continued experimentation with rats provides some intriguing physiological evidence 
from which we can only make inferences about the neural processing involved in human 
emotion and feeling but is compelling nonetheless.  McGaugh and his colleagues found 
that when the vagus nerve of the rats was severed, emotion no longer aided their 
performance.  The results suggest that the particular visceral input necessary for the type 
of emotion that enhances learning and recall is supplied to the brain through the vagus 
nerve.  
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Embodied Reading 
 Earlier in Chapter III, I drew attention to the importance of “bodyreading” 
(Grumet, 1988) in which the text is made corporeal.  Sadoski and Paivio (2001) explain 
that mental imagery was the foundation for ruminative reading in the Middle Ages 
whereby the text was literally incorporated into the senses through a “murmuring 
meditation” (Sadoski and Paivio, 2001, p. 19).  Etymology provides us with valuable 
historical insights into the connections between mental imagery and ruminative reading 
in which the text was “reheard, reseen, refelt, and reexperienced” (Sadoski & Paivio, 
2001, p. 19).  As I pointed out earlier in the introduction, the Anglo Saxon rœdan and the 
German rathen capture the perceptual and empirical dimensions of reading as the act of 
uttering aloud or reciting inaudibly, of taking in the sense of words, and of learning by 
observation.  But to fully understand reading as embodied act, we must return to the Latin 
verb ruminare—to ruminate.  
In “Bodyreading,” Grumet (1988) goes into considerable detail to explore the 
etymological implications of ‘reading’ as ruminare.  Borrowing from Merleau-Ponty’s 
“body subject” as human consciousness, Grumet intends to bring reading home to the 
body where it belongs and rescue it from the “inaccessible reaches of idealism” (p. 129).  
Like Grumet, I maintain that modern schooling has functioned in ways that excise the 
body and the sensual from anything we deem has educational merit for children.  Casting 
aside the phenomenal experience of the reader to accommodate instruction based on a 
hierarchy of discrete skills and the demand of aligning with policy makers’ criteria for 
“scientifically-based evidence,” the aesthetics of bodyreading remains exiled as a 
curriculum project worthy of pursuit.  Grumet creates the persona of the body reader to 
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establish the act of reading as oriented toward intentionality.  She urges us to remember 
that the symbolic system of language, number, art, and culture emerged as part of our 
lived worlds.  Symbolic thought directly evolved from the desire for human expression.  
As Merleau-Ponty (1962) reminds us, we must look beyond the delimiting meaning of 
words and take in account the emotional content of words. 
It would then be found that the words, vowels and phonemes are so many ways of 
‘singing’ the world, and that their function is to represent things not, as the naïve 
onomatopoeic theory had it, by reason of an objective resemblance, but because 
they extract, and literally express, their emotional essence.  (p. 187) 
 According to Grumet’s etymological account, ruminants are animals—cattle, 
sheep, goats, antelope, deer, and giraffe—that graze in the fields.  Grumet highlights the 
elaborately planned digestive system of ruminants which allow them to grab a meal and 
temporarily store it in a convenient compartment of the stomach until such time as they 
can leisurely masticate and digest it.  Interestingly, it is the fourth and last stomach 
containing the gastric glands for the secretion of digestive juices that is called the read.  
Further delving into the etymological past of the word read, reveals that at one time, the 
reid also signified the stomach of a human.  Etymology also connects the word ‘read’ to 
the “sense of considering or explaining something obscure or mysterious” (Grumet, 1988, 
p. 133).   The text becomes in Grumet’s (1988) view, “another stage where the possible 
worlds that the texts points to can be identified and experienced as good places for 
grazing” (p. 149)   
Like Lodge (2003), Kundera, (1988) and Watt (1957), who recognize that the 
novel may represent the best record of human consciousness we have, Grumet describes 
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reading as an “anatomy of mystery” lodged within us that “seeks what is hidden, internal, 
unseen in our experience” (p. 133).  Consider, for example, how in Where the Wild 
Things Are, Sendak (1963) engages the child’s capacity to exercise the power of myth 
and liberate the psyche in order to confront the shadow of the unconscious.  Max’s 
adventure to “where the wild things are” could very well represent the first step in the 
slow and life long process of individuation.  Among the “wild things,” Max can discharge 
his anger and proclaim himself “the most wild thing of all.”  Childhood emotions play out 
in “Dionysian abandon” (Cech, 1995, p. 1) across a double-page spread in which Max’s 
coronation as king of all wild things culminates in a “wild rumpus” that Cech (1995) 
describes as “a complete, pre-Oedipal submersion in the child’s ecstatic eroticism…a 
primal, orgiastic moment when the child’s deepest hungers can be satisfied” (p. 120).  
Here is a work that dares to acknowledge the fears, anxieties, and sexuality of children.  
The idea of ruminative reading, the chance to embody the text and mull over our own 
intentions, assumptions, and positions in light of the possibilities presented in the text 
seems incongruent with locating meaning in the topic sentence and in the story structure.  
This may explain why empirical studies (Sadoski, Goetz, & Kangiser, 1988; Sadoski & 
Quast, 1990) have shown that mental imagery and emotional response, both products of 
an embodied mind, have a significant relationship independent of importance in both 
literary and expository texts.  
 One way to bring reading home again and pay greater attention to the aesthetic 
experience of young readers is to offer children within their assortment of books, a 
selection of works that incorporate rhyme, rhythm, and repetition.  Earlier, I suggested 
that children’s chants were somewhat akin to the murmuring meditations of medieval 
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monks who through a process of repeated verbal, visual, auditory-motor encoding 
incorporated the text into their senses.  In order to illustrate how the rhythmical quality in 
children’s verse might serve to bring reading back to its symbolic roots, it is necessary to 
introduce Susanne Langer’s (1957) account of the evolution of speech and language. 
Susanne Langer and the Evolution of Language 
 Langer (1957) describes the evolution of language according to our need to 
represent reality symbolically.  Like Bronowski, Langer claims that between “the clearest 
animal call of love or warning or anger and man’s least trivial word, there lies a whole 
chapter of evolution” (p. 103).  Symbol making, Langer contends, began with 
representing the aesthetic sense of the object or event.  She emphasizes that the 
transformation of experience into concepts, and not the elaboration of signals used in 
communication, served as the primary motive for language.  Langer’s (1962) assertion 
that “the whole mechanism of symbolization was probably worked out in the visual 
system before its power could be transformed into the vocal-auditory realm” (p. 49) 
suggests that language evolved in the service of mental imagery.  In other words, in the 
evolution of human development, thinking in images preceded thought as language. 
 Vocalization appears to have originated in primitive festival rituals.  Vocal 
ululations expressed a highly emotional state and eventually became associated with 
rhythmic body movements and ritual objects used in dance.  Langer (1957) explains: 
The voice could be used; like the drum, to attract attention and accentuate rhythm; 
and this the force of a change of pitch to make some notes stand out (one in four, 
etc.) was naturally discovered.  Being more valuable than the drum, voices soon 
 100
made patterns, and the long wandering melodies of primitive song became an 
integral part of communal celebration.  (p. 130).   
Over time, these vocalizations began to symbolize or bring to memory mental 
representations of the gestures and objects outside of the context of the ritual itself.  
Articulate noises in the form of groups of syllables began to emerge in relation to specific 
festivities centered around a central figure as in a celebratory hunting dance around a 
fresh kill or a death dance around a corpse.  These articulate noises first expressed the 
affective response, that is, the particular feelings or perceptions of the players engaged in 
ritual festivities. Eventually, the mental imagery associated with these sounds became 
sufficiently vivid and consistent that these articulate sounds came to symbolize the 
ritualistic objects and events themselves. 
 It is this evolutionary acquisition of language that furnishes us with the 
descriptive power to link one mental image to another (Edelman, 1992).  Language 
provides us with an enhanced ability to hold knowledge in mental display and manipulate 
it intelligently (Damasio, 1999, 2003).  Moreover, this higher-order consciousness allows 
us to maintain a representation of ourselves as having a social self capable of acting upon, 
or being acted upon by, an environment.  In other words, animals may be aware, but 
humans are conscious of having a consciousness. 
Toward an Embodied Curriculum 
 I am suggesting that if we are to adopt Grumet’s curricular project of bringing 
reading home to where it belongs, we might start by honoring the emotional and 
imagistic roots of language within our reading and language arts instruction.  The origins 
of language resonate in the chants of children at play and are embodied through the 
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accompanying rhythmic beating, clapping, bouncing and skipping.  Yet sometimes, 
parents and educators look disparagingly upon predictable books, such as Bill Martin’s 
(1970) highly popular Brown Bear, Brown Bear or Arnold Lobel’s equally engaging and 
visually exciting picture book On Market Street that incorporate the basic elements of 
rhyme, rhythm, and repetition as materials for early reading instruction because it appears 
that children are merely memorizing and not actually ‘reading’ the text.  A book such as 
Bill Martin’s Chicka Chicka Boom Boom (1989), however, is more likely to be used in 
classrooms because in addition to capitalizing on children’s natural propensity to chant, 
the book teaches letter recognition—a skill that holds primary status among the hierarchy 
of early language skills taught in schools.   
Perhaps cast aside in favor of more decodable texts, I would argue that shared 
reading of these cadenced literary works and the often accompanying rhythmic gestures 
engage early readers in a pleasurable state in which they undergo an embodiment of 
language similar to that experienced through the vocalizations and rhythmic body 
movements in primitive rituals.  Consistent with the evolutionary origins of language, 
Carl Orff’s approach to music for young children seeks to bring out the inner rhythm of 
each child and holds that music lives first in the body and then in vocal and instrumental 
expression.  I believe that early language development would benefit from beginning by 
drawing out the inner music in each child.  “Song, the formalization of voice-play,” 
Langer tells us, “probably preceded speech” (p. 128).  Jespersen concluded, “there was 
once a time when all speech was song, or rather when these two actions were not yet 
differentiated…” (quoted in Langer, 1957, p. 129).  By denying children opportunities to 
reunite language with its musical and embodied roots, educators are missing valuable and 
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engaging opportunities for developing phonological awareness and, as we have seen with 
childhood verse, memory skills—both considered desirable in good readers.    
Unfortunately, in many North American early years classrooms, any hope of an 
enriching literature-based reading program which has as its mainstay the literary works 
that potentially arouse vivid imagery and affective responses has succumbed to the fate of 
so-called educational frills.  Rigorous testing standards and political agendas have, to a 
large degree, determined the commercially packaged materials used with children 
learning to read.  As a consequence, class libraries and school literacy labs (as in 
laboratory) are filled with collections of “little books” organized and codified 
alphabetically or numerically in hierarchical fashion according to such textual features as 
the number of decodable words, the number of return sweeps on a page, the ratio of text 
to illustrations, and at more advanced levels, the number of multisyllabic words, sentence 
length, and the number of pages.  It is important that teachers are aware of the textual 
features that may aid or inhibit children’s access to meaning in print materials and are 
able to respond to children’s individual needs and design instruction accordingly.  
Nevertheless, I’m sure that when E. B. White wrote the beloved Charlotte’s Web he did 
not stop to think whether he was writing for an “L” or a “P” audience of readers.  He 
wrote however, convinced of literature’s potential to arouse the human emotion of 
compassion by narrating the relationship between a spider and a pig. 
On some level, I suspect that it is this embodied quality of reading that helps 
ground us.  Reading to my students every morning provided us both with the opportunity 
to take emotional stock of our lives.  This has to be considered at least as important as 
recalling the precipitating events that lead to the story’s climax.  As Grumet (1988) 
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suggests, the body reader “pores over the text, like the priest reading the entrails, seeking 
signs of how to live” (p. 133).  Arthur Danto (1985) explains the regenerative potential of 
literature as a window into consciousness: 
…a kind of mirror, not simply in the sense of rendering up an external reality, but 
as giving me to myself for each self peering into it, showing each of us something 
inaccessible without mirrors….  Each work of literature shows…an [external] 
aspect we would not know were ours without benefit of that mirror: each 
discovers…an unguessed dimension of the self.  It is a mirror less in passively 
returning an image than in transforming the self-consciousness of the reader who 
in virtue of identifying with the image recognizes what he is.  Literature is in this 
sense is transfigurative.  (p. 79) 
The corporeal embodiment of the text has yet to be fully understood in terms of 
how story might provide a narrative roadmap for negotiating life.  In The Birth of 
Pleasure, Carol Gilligan (2002) writes of how the love story of Psyche and Cupid can 
lead to the path of resistance and pleasure thus diverting us from the loss and betrayal 
typically portrayed in Greek mythology.  But the path to pleasure through embodied 
narrative need not be this complex.  Over the years, I have had the joy of reading with 
children from a wide range of social, economic, and ethnic and racial backgrounds.  
Many of these children entered my classroom with an assortment of labels identifying 
them as special needs.  One such student diagnosed with Tourette’s syndrome shared my 
love of A. A. Milne and the simple wisdom of Winnie the Pooh.  Each morning, he 
entered through the doorway of my grade four/five classroom, caught my eye, and with a 
spring in his step walked toward me chanting:  
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The more it snows  
(Tiddely pom),  
The more it goes  
(Tiddely pom),  
The more it goes  
(Tiddely pom),  
On snowing.  
And nobody knows  
(Tiddely pom),  
How cold my toes  
(Tiddely pom),  
How cold my toes  
(Tiddely pom),  
Are growing. (Milne, 1957, p. 161) 
I believe this how he managed to find his way to his seat each day. 
Conclusion 
 From the discussion on reading as an embodied act, we have seen that the body 
acts as a kind of emotional mainstage.  The images encoded from our experiences are not 
just sense-specific but are invested with emotional associations as well.  I have suggested 
that curriculum should pay greater attention to the embodied nature of reading and 
pointed to its cognitive and psychological benefits.  Langer’s (1957) account of the 
evolution of language makes clear the contributing role of imagery and emotions in 
defining language as first and foremost an expressive act.  In Chapter V, I examine to 
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what extent current theories of cognition can account for the phenomena associated with 
the aesthetic response to literature and how the imagery and affect are related to an 
developing sense of self. 
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CHAPTER V 
READING AS AN AESTHETIC ACT 
Introduction 
We read books to find out who we are.  What other people real or imaginary, 
do and think and feel…is an essential guide to our understanding of what we 
ourselves are and may become….   
-LeGuin, Language of the Night 
In the preceding chapters, I have attempted to show that a renewed understanding 
of the structure and function of imagery and affect gives us cause to reexamine the 
assumptions in prevailing theories of reading comprehension.  In the present chapter, I 
rely on Edelman’s (1992) and Damasio’s (1999, 2003) account of human consciousness 
to make clear why computational models of the mind that have had a dominant influence 
on contemporary reading theories are inadequate in accounting for the richness and 
diversity of the aesthetic response to literature.  I discuss how a neurobiologically 
informed understanding of the development of consciousness and an emerging sense of 
self might provide insights into the psychological effects of undergoing the text.  As an 
embodied theory of cognition, dual coding theory maintains a theoretical advantage 
insofar as it recognizes the powerful role imagery and affect play in human thought 
processes.  The underlying premise in dual coding theory that mental representations 
retain some of the concrete qualities of the external experiences from which they are 
derived suggests that literary transactions yield sufficiently vivid perceptual experiences 
that constitute the reader’s autobiographical consciousness.   
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In the second part of the chapter I reexamine the animating role of the reader in 
two prevalent theories of reader response in light of what we know about human 
consciousness and the embodied mind.  Reader response theorists, Louise Rosenblatt and 
Wolfgang Iser believe that the convergence of the text and reader brings the literary work 
into existence.  Iser (1978, 1980) claims to adopt a phenomenological perspective by 
which the text engages the reader’s creative participation.  Rosenblatt (1978) has enjoyed 
considerable recognition for her transactional theory of reader response in which she 
claims “a text, once it leaves its author’s hands, is simply paper and ink until a reader 
evokes from it a literary work—sometimes, even, a literary work of art” (p. ix).  In 
reviewing the selected theories, I hope to offer the reader a neurobiologically informed 
account of how literary response occurs and the extent to which such an explanation can 
help us qualify our understanding of the phenomena described in each of these theories. 
Consciousness Defined 
 There appears to be no consensus among psychologists, neuroscientists, or 
philosophers as to a clear definition of consciousness.  The situation is somewhat 
analogous to the seemingly impossible task of defining the actual moment life begins.  
Nevertheless, the simple dictionary definition of consciousness cited in Damasio (1999) 
“as an orgainism’s awareness of its own self and surroundings” (p. 4) provides us with 
some sense of how humans have evolved in such a way as to make such things as the 
arts, sciences, religion, and social and political organizations possible.  However, it is 
also true that consciousness allows us to know and experience a range of emotions.   
 Damasio’s (1999) separation of consciousness into simple and complex kinds is 
helpful in developing our understanding of the structure and function of imagery and 
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affect in reading literary texts.  Damasio refers to the simplest kind of consciousness as 
core consciousness.  Core consciousness relates to the organism’s sense of self within a 
present moment in time.  It has to do with the sense of self that emerges in the here and 
now of perception which neither projects the future nor recalls the past outside of the 
instant occurring just before.  In other words, core consciousness amounts to a basic 
awareness of the object-organism relationship.  Extended consciousness, on the other 
hand, is far more complex and relies extensively upon the ability to map emotional 
reactions and form images in order to provide the organism with an elaborate sense of 
self.  It enables us to see ourselves at a particular point in time in relation to a lived past 
and an anticipated future.  In addition, we are aware of places outside of our immediate 
spatial position.  Core consciousness remains stable across a lifetime and is not exclusive 
to humans.  Extended consciousness evolves over the lifetime of the organism and while 
it is unknown to what extent it may be present in nonhumans, it does depend on 
conventional and working memory and is enhanced by the human acquisition of 
language.  It is likely that extended consciousness is what Bronowski (1978) referred to 
as the considerable evolutionary advantage humans have over other species. 
Two Kinds of Self 
 Damasio (1999) also offers two kinds of “self” which relate to the two forms of 
consciousness.  The core self emerging from core consciousness is a “transient entity 
ceaselessly re-created for each and every object with which the brain interacts” (p. 17).  
What we traditionally think of as the “self” is connected to the idea of identity which 
corresponds to a “nontransient collection of unique facts and ways of being which 
characterize a person” (p. 17).  Damasio refers to this entity as the autobiographical self.  
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The autobiographical self emerges from an organized record of past experiences of an 
individual organism which Damasio calls autobiographical memory.  It is my contention 
that reading literature provides alternate ways of being and introduces new situations 
which contribute to the readers’ autobiographical memory. 
 Both core consciousness and extended consciousness depend on the generation of 
images.  As Damasio (1999) explains: “We become conscious…when our organisms 
internally construct and internally exhibit a specific kind of wordless knowledge—that 
our organism has been changed by an object—and when such knowledge occurs along 
with the salient internal exhibit of an object” (pp. 168-169).  The first function of the 
image is to account for the organism-object relationship to inform the organism what is 
happening.  Core consciousness is nonverbal and, as Damasio insists, is not a 
postlanguage phenomenon.  Extended consciousness allows us to link up these 
representations in a meaningful and coherent manner, a process, I might add, which at 
some point, implicates language in considerable measure.  Damasio suggests that the 
natural representation of sequences of images emerging from consecutive brain events 
may well be the source of the creation of drama and books.  The brain most likely is 
obsessively engaged with wordless storytelling.  Damasio posits that narrative 
storytelling probably began relatively early in terms of evolution and the development of 
the complex neural structures required to create narratives or brain maps.  Consistent with 
Langer and Bronowski’s evolutionary account, wordless storytelling precedes language 
and is in fact, a condition for language to emerge.  Also of significance, Damasio 
contends that the philosophical problem of intentionality, that is to say, the fact that 
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mental events are always directed toward or “about” something external to the mind, 
relates to the brain’s disposition for storytelling. 
Like core consciousness, extended consciousness depends on “the creation of 
mapped accounts of ongoing relationships between organisms and objects” (Damasio, 
1999, p. 197).  The difference between core and extended consciousness appears to lie in 
the expansion of the compass of knowledge resulting from the ability to hold multiple 
neural patterns in mind over substantial periods of time.  Extended consciousness 
accounts for the ability “to generate a sense of individual perspective, ownership, and 
agency” (Damasio, 1999, p. 198) over a wider scope of knowledge.  Yet, extended 
consciousness is not intelligence.  Intelligence refers to the ability to manipulate the 
knowledge embodied by the extended consciousness allowing for the planning and 
execution of novel responses.   Extended conscious is, however, a prerequisite for 
intelligence and furnishes the mind with vast domains of knowledge.  It allows us to pay 
attention to a number of different mental events simultaneously.   
Damasio (1999) also distinguishes between extended consciousness and working 
memory.  Whereas extended consciousness relates to the ability of holding in mind 
multiple neural patterns over substantial periods of time, working memory relates to the 
ability to hold images in mind just long enough that they can be manipulated 
intelligently.  For example, having just moved to a major city, I find myself repeatedly 
relying on my working memory in order to remember a set of detailed instructions in 
order to get from one place to another. 
At this point, I would like to stop and mention that at no point thus far in this 
neurobiological account of consciousness has it been necessary to formulate complex 
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abstract amodal propositions or deep structures to explain how the brain maps the object-
organism relationships and connects past experience to an anticipated future.  The fact 
that humans develop an autobiographical self which allows them to situate themselves 
within a historical sequence of mental events long before they become competent at using 
a complex system of language strongly suggests that propositional accounts of how the 
brain accesses prior knowledge in the reading process simply do not make sense. 
Damasio (1999) argues that while language allows us to hold images in place and 
manipulate them intelligently, the autobiographical self emerging from extended 
consciousness requires substantial memory capacity and reasoning ability but not 
necessarily language.  Needless to say, reading literature does require an ability to recode 
and comprehend verbal language but we must always remember that language in turn, 
relies on extended consciousness—the internal deployment of recalled knowledge in 
different sensory systems and the subsequent abilities to manipulate that knowledge in 
response to the text.  As the discussion of imagery and affect extends into aesthetic 
response and how literary engagement might help us discriminate better forms of human 
interactions, it might help to remember some of the mental abilities associated with 
extended consciousness.  These include: 
…the ability to create helpful artifacts; the ability to consider the mind of the 
other; the ability to sense the minds of the collective; the ability to suffer with 
pain as opposed to just feel pain and react to it; the ability to sense the possibility 
of death in the self and in the other; the ability to value life; the ability to 
construct a sense of good and of evil distinct from pleasure and pain; the ability to 
take into account the interests of the other and of the collective; the ability to 
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sense beauty as opposed to just feeling pleasure, the ability to sense a discord of 
feelings and later a discord of abstract ideas, which is the source of the sense of 
truth.  (Damasio, 1999, p. 230) 
In the following sections, I intend to make it clear why propositional accounts of reading 
cannot account for the extended consciousness required to respond to literature.  
Literary Response and Extended Consciousness 
 The ability to convey feelings and emotions symbolically through literature and 
the arts is undoubtedly one of the most extraordinary consequences of human 
consciousness.  Edelman (1992) argues that the artist’s expressive content constrained by 
history, culture, education, and skill realized in works of art cannot be adequately 
analyzed by scientific methods abstracted from experience.  This should come as no 
surprise since understanding and responding to poetry, novels, paintings, or symphonies 
“requires reference to ourselves in a social and symbolic mode” (p. 176).  In other words, 
response requires an autobiographical or higher order consciousness which can only 
emerge through social, affective, and intersubjective exchanges. 
Response to literary works and works of art requires attention to qualia.  Qualia 
are phenomenal states comprised of “personal and subjective experiences, feelings, and 
sensations that accompany awareness” (Edelman, 1992, p. 114).  Qualia are 
discriminated through different neural structures and behavior in different sensory 
pathways.  Creatures that have only a primary consciousness and therefore lack 
conceptual selves cannot report or reflect upon qualia.  Neither, I might add, can 
machines, and more importantly, machines do not have phenomenal experiences based in 
a social and historical existence.  Humans, however, have the necessary extended or 
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higher order consciousness to be able to refine, remember, alter and report the subjective 
qualia of existence (Edelman 1992).  Any computational theory of cognition premised on 
the idea that the brain is hard wired like a computer is totally inadequate in accounting for 
the human capacity to respond to literature because quite simply, “no convincing 
evidence for the kinds of codes that humans use in telegraphy, computing or other forms 
of human communication have been found in the human nervous system.  (p. 27).  In 
other words, such theories are biologically untenable.  Cognitive architectures like the 
one Kintsch (1998) describes which are founded on a purely rational and abstracted level 
of analysis and which seek only to provide a convenient language to describe, predict, 
and postdict phenomena preclude any possibility of accounting for the qualia of 
subjective human experience fundamental to an aesthetic response to literature. 
Literary Response and the Embodied Mind 
As an embodied theory of cognition, dual coding theory has the explanatory 
potential to account for the mapping of sensory experience and the resulting mental 
imagery requisite to an emerging sense of self and the capacity to assume a spatial and 
temporal perspective in order to reflect upon mental events.  The structure and function 
of imagery and affect as evidenced by empirical studies from a dual coding perspective 
explain how readers are able to interpret the qualia associated with the literary 
experience.  For example, in a study investigating the relationship between imagery and 
affect among bilingual readers (Krasny & Sadoski, 2004), students in a Canadian French 
immersion high school read two short stories and in addition to a rating task, responded 
to a qualitative writing task in which they elaborated on the imagery experienced and 
feelings evoked while reading.  Written reports of imagery were characterized by visual 
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detail and often included emotional descriptions.  Students frequently made associative 
links to personal experience and events not contained in the story as captured by reports 
of the formation of mental images and the arousal of emotional reactions.  This can be 
explained by the back and forth within system and across system processing in dual 
coding theory.  Literary trope relies on this capacity to relate information represented in 
the text with external images.  Abstract propositions are of little use in helping readers 
metaphorically project the images and affect evoked by a work upon situations and 
events foreign to its literal content.  The capacity for story projection (Turner, 1996), is 
what makes Gulliver’s Travels a political satire and not simply a children’s tale. 
A notable feature of many of the students’ responses related to readers’ capacity 
to empathize with the stories’ characters and tentatively embrace their thoughts, feelings, 
and motives.  A further elaboration of readers’ empathetic identification and its potential 
for effecting individual and social change is discussed in Chapter VI.  Readers in the 
study reporting emotional response often used a combination of first and third person 
statements to describe their personal feelings, to interpret the feelings of the characters, or 
to characterize a situation in the story.  The study provided considerable evidence that the 
experiential uniqueness of individual readers also contributed to the arousal of imagery 
and affect.  This was most often recorded in the associative connections made to 
individual experiences outside of the text.  It would appear that the representational, 
associative, and referential processing described in dual coding theory provide us with an 
accounting of how readers access the vast domain of knowledge described as extended 
consciousness to respond aesthetically to the literary text.  Much of this knowledge was 
stored as images and evoked within the reader powerful affective reactions.   
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I wish to re-emphasize however, that there are no a priori conditions that govern 
aesthetic response.  The nature of human consciousness and the brain’s morphology is 
such that no amount of knowledge about the structure and function of imagery and affect 
can predict the actual content of individual responses to a given text.  And furthermore, 
given the often unpredictable and idiosyncratic nature of human existence that 
contributes to how the brain has mapped experience, no two readers will ever respond to 
the exact same text in exactly the same way.  At the same time, dual coding theory and a 
neurobiology of consciousness can account for the similarities that exist among readers’ 
responses to the same text.  An embodied perspective would support Fish’s (1980) 
contention that shared experiences among members of the same interpretive community 
are likely to promote similar values and attitudes.  These may lead to the evocation of 
similar, but not identical, emotional responses and images.  Nevertheless, a fundamental 
difference exists between Fish’s (1980) theory and an embodied view of cognition.  Fish 
(1980) contends that individual differences regarding the meaning of the text are 
subsumed by the immediacy of the interpretive community’s “structure of assumptions” 
(Fish, 1980, p. 318).  A biologically informed approach to language and reading suggests 
that the constraints on meaning emerge within the reciprocity characterizing the object 
organism relationship, in this case the relationship between reader and the text. 
Concrete Language Effects 
Apart from the fact that computer simulations are not a sufficient demonstration 
of human cognition (Edelman, 1992; Sadoski, 1999), the idea that information taken in 
by the reader is encoded as abstract propositions is inadequate in explaining the 
considerable evidence that concrete language encountered in text is remembered better 
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than abstract language.  In a recent study investigating dual coding theory versus 
relational processing in memory for concrete and abstract words, Richardson (2003) 
found that concrete material that readily evokes mental imagery is much more easily 
recalled than abstract material that evokes mental imagery only with difficulty.  
Furthermore, the greater memorability of concrete language appears to be directly linked 
to the function of mental imagery as a mnemonic strategy.  This mnemonic function of 
concrete language connects in an important way to the use of repeated images clusters 
(Spurgeon, 1935) that combine to lend the literary work its thematic unity. 
If, as computational models of reading insist, all information derived from the text 
is encoded as propositions then readers should recall abstract and concrete language 
equally well but this does not appear to be the case.  Neuropsychological evidence also 
exists to support the findings of the studies investigating language comprehension and 
memory.  Using an electroencephalographic technique to measure activity in the cerebral 
cortex, West, O’Rouke, & Holcomb (1998) concluded that the brain behaves differently 
when reading abstract material compared with concrete material.  Their findings provide 
clear evidence for the existence of an image-based representational system and 
demonstrate that verbal and nonverbal semantic systems are functionally and 
anatomically distinct.  The conclusions drawn by the investigators provide strong support 
for Paivio’s dual coding model of mental representations which regard imagery and 
language as separate but connected codes.  The fact that empirical studies have 
consistently shown that concrete language is remembered better than abstract language 
suggests that the varying degree of language concreteness within the literary text may 
determine which images are immediately available to readers as they respond to the text.   
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Empirical Science and Subjective Consciousness 
A theoretical advantage of dual coding theory over cognitive architectures is its 
testability.  Damasio (1999) argues that the idea that subjective experiences are not 
scientifically accessible is nonsense.  Without a doubt, the aesthetic response is a private, 
first person phenomenon.  Nevertheless, Damasio contends that knowledge gathered from 
subjective observations, for example, first person accounts of feelings and images evoked 
during reading, can be checked for consistency and yield some form of measurement 
such as the rating scales used in the cited studies investigating the evocation of mental 
imagery and emotional response (Krasny & Sadoski, 2004; Sadoski, Goetz, & Kangiser, 
1988; Steffensen, Goetz, & Cheng, 1999).  Written and oral reports of imagery and affect 
can also be subject to a qualitative content analysis to examine patterns relating to the 
nature and type of responses to a given text or text situation.  To my mind, such an 
approach can yield a richer and more detailed account of the phenomenal experience of 
readers.  Case studies might benefit from interview techniques and the analysis of 
extended reflexive journal entries.   
Regardless of the method selected, studying response requires the collection of 
readers’ first-hand reports for as Damasio (1999) claims, “I will never know your 
thoughts unless you tell me, and you will never know mine until I tell you” (p. 309).  In 
light of recent neuroscientific advances directed at establishing a biological link between 
emotions and images (Damasio, 1999, 2003), dual coding theory continues to provide a 
viable framework for empirically investigating readers’ responses to literature.  I should 
add that embodied theories of cognition recognize that the imagery and affective 
responses reported by readers are likely shaped by any number of mental events that 
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occur under the threshold of consciousness and therefore even psychoanalysis will never 
yield a total picture of the non-replicable phenomenal experience of the reader. 
Literature and Consciousness 
Approaching reading from an embodied perspective might help us understand 
what makes certain texts more engaging than others.  Undergoing the text creates mental 
states like those associated with nonvicarious experiences.  Concrete language is 
especially conducive to the formation of images in which we imagine scenes and events 
described in the text.  These images are psychologically real to us and therefore become 
part of our autobiographical consciousness.  Undergoing the text can generate somatic 
changes that play out in the theatre of the body.  Once mapped these changes become 
feelings so powerful that we are propelled into the text as active participants.  As a result, 
we weep openly at Charlotte’s farewell in E. B. White’s classic tale, find ourselves 
unexpectedly sympathetic with Dostoevsky’s murderous Raskolnikov, and feel the 
torment resulting from the routinization of evil that compels Sophie’s choice in Styron’s 
(1976) novel.  Cotterill (1989) has commented on Freud’s account of the powerful effects 
of the senses which bears a striking resemblance to embodied nature of the mind 
described by Damasio (1999, 2003). 
Freud came surprisingly close to divining that way in which the brain serves the 
senses, and the manner in which it stores records of experiences.  Amongst his 
clairvoyant conjectures, mention should be made of his belief that nerve fibres 
carry signals to the brain, where the body’s outer surface is appropriately 
represented…. He saw the brain’s neural elements as being capable of discharging 
when sufficiently excited…. And he guessed that the neural elements are mutually 
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separated by what he called contact barriers and we now cal synapses. (Cotterill, 
1989, pp. 217-218) 
Lodge (2003) suggests that the unconscious, ego, and superego that define Freud’s model 
of the mind indicate consciousness has a dimension of depth.  In his opinion, the task of 
modernist writers was to plumb the depths of consciousness to create within the mind of 
the reader a psychological reality.  Literature in this regard, has more in common with 
psychoanalysis than it does with architectures of cognition. 
What we often forget is that text variables have an effect on depth processing 
(Sadoski, 1999).  How well the author is able to encode the chaotic flux of experience 
and make it comprehensible to readers may determine the extent to which readers 
become engaged and experience the revelatory effects of the text.  Some works while not 
for the weak of heart, may be worth the effort.  I can remember my friends and I 
struggling through Ondaatje’s The English Patient, frequently lost within the 
juxtapositions of time and space but for some reason, content to let the language of the 
text simply wash over us until the scenes formed in our minds provided us with a clearer 
vision of Ondaatje’s cartography of people and histories.  We were left with a satisfying 
if admittedly, somewhat still perplexing literary experience.  The potential for moral 
communication is lost when theories of comprehension and reader response do not 
recognize that long before the reader undergoes the revelatory effects of the text, the 
actual process of working out the plots and relationships in an ambitious novel like The 
English Patient has had a revelatory effect upon the writer (Smiley, 2002). 
What has also been missing from propositional accounts is attention to the qualia 
encoded in the text by the author.  Kintsch (1998) acknowledges that his theory of 
 120
meaning “is not only constructivist but also minimalist” (p. 80) which despite his candor, 
does little to promote reading as an aesthetic experience.  He claims, “the process of 
meaning construction remains shallow, not just because comprehenders are inherently 
lazy but mostly because no more is required.  A slight knowledge elaboration of a text is 
usually quite sufficient for whatever action is intended” (p. 80).  I believe that 
computational theories of comprehension that rely on abstract propositions contribute to a 
reductionist approach to reading instruction which explains why students are so 
unfamiliar with judging the qualia of experience as it relates to literature and the arts and 
for that matter, to life in general.  We have chosen to treat comprehension and literary 
response as two separate phenomena while in fact we have seen that the mental imagery 
and affect often associated with aesthetic response play a powerful role in cognition and 
are integral to every level of the reading process. 
The assembly line “pump ‘em in, pump ‘em out” philosophy that pervades 
modern schooling in which children undergo a quality control check to see if they have 
met minimum performance standards leaves little time for ruminating through books to 
experience the sensual effects of the text.  Aesthetic engagement with the text allows 
students to develop elaborate systems of appraisal and evaluation.  It provides them with 
opportunities to describe relationships and gain an appreciation for constructive diversity.  
According to Eisner (2002), most judgments in life do not conform to algorithms and if 
students are going to develop critical thinking skills they will need a curriculum that 
encourages them to inquire into the relationship between whole and part, between 
literature and life, and between self and society.  In Chapter VI, I discuss the perils of 
satisfying ourselves with “a process of meaning construction that remains shallow” (p. 
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80).  As a prelude, I offer Dostoevsky’s (in Morson, 1999) rather prophetic 
denouncement of calculating life according to the “laws of nature” in Notes from the 
Underground  
…we have only to discover the laws of nature, and man will no longer be 
responsible for his actions…All human actions will then, of course be tabulated 
according to these laws, mathematically, like tables of logarithms…in which 
everything will be so clearly calculated and designated that there will be no more 
incidents or adventures in the world. (p. 187n)   
Reader-Response Theories 
Generally, reader-response theorists were concerned with ascribing status to the 
reader in the literary transaction thereby rejecting the notion that literature is an aesthetic 
ideal rendered invariable by authorial intentions, textual features or universal truths.  
Among the many theories of reader response, I have elected to briefly highlight Iser’s 
(1978, 1980) and Rosenblatt’s (1938, 1978) for several reasons.  First, I believe that 
many of the phenomena purportedly accounted for by these theories can now be 
explained in neurobiological terms.  Second, there is a professed emphasis in both of 
these theories on the phenomenal experience of the reader.  And third, Rosenblatt’s 
theory is easily the most widely circulated and accepted theory of reader response among 
North American teachers of language arts at all levels. 
Wolfgang Iser: The Virtual Reader 
 Iser’s (1978) theory of reader reception revolves around a critical analysis of the 
text from a phenomenological perspective in an attempt to explain how the text engages 
the reader’s creative participation.  His phenomenological approach to understanding the 
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role of the reader derives from Husserl’s hermeneutic method in which understanding is 
achieved through an anticipatory movement.  According to Husserl, the work of 
phenomenology is the constitution of flux.  Iser (1978, 1980) believes that the literary 
experience induces the reader to constitute the work’s intention by ordering the aesthetic 
effects of the text discursively.  
Ingaarden’s intentional sentence correlatives are the central means through which 
an anticipatory movement is created to engage the reader in the constitution of the work.  
Iser (1980) explains that a sentence is not merely a statement but it aims to say something 
beyond what it states on an immediate level.  Sentences link up with other sentences in a 
variety of ways to form more complex units of meaning.  Iser (1980) contends: “In their 
capacity as statements, observations, purveyors of information, [sentences] are always an 
indication of something that is to come, the structure of which is foreshadowed by their 
specific content” (p. 53).  The notion of “pre-intentions” associated with Husserl’s (1966) 
phenomenological hermeneutics helps explain how the actual content of the text emerges 
from the intentional correlative of sentences.  “Every originally constructive process is 
inspired by pre-intentions, which construct and collect the seed of what is to come, as 
such, and bring it to fruition” (cited in Iser, 1980, p. 53).  In other words, individual 
sentences work together to foreshadow what is to come and create expectations within 
the reader. 
Iser envisions the literary work as having two poles—the artistic, which refers to 
the text written by the author, and the esthetic, which refers to the reader’s realization of 
the artistic text.  He describes the literary text as having a virtual quality claiming that it 
is neither identical with the actual text nor synonymous with the reader’s realization of 
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the text, but lies halfway between the two.  Iser (1978) is very clear that the text is always 
aimed at what he calls an “implied reader” (p. 35).  Traversing the virtual plane between 
reader and text is what lends the literary work its inherent dynamism.  In Iser’s estimation 
the text is animated through the reader’s use of a variety of schematized views (another 
opportunity to play the ‘schema’ game) offered by the text which allows the reader to fill 
in the gaps created within the liminal space resulting from something being transposed 
into something else. Reading is only pleasurable when it is active and creative depending 
on the unwritten aspects of the text to draw the reader’s participation (Iser, 1980, p. 50-
51).   
 If this is beginning to sound familiar it is because intentional sentence correlatives 
operate very much like the propositional textbase described in Kintsch’s (1998) 
construction integration model of reading.  Like Kintsch’s (1998) reader, Iser’s reader is 
expected to constitute the intention of the work by reducing or “normalizing” the 
polysemantic possibilities within the framework of text conventions.  According to Iser, 
intentional sentence correlatives make possible the virtual world presented by the text.  
Iser’s virtual dimension is premised on the idea that the preexisting text conditions the 
interaction between reader and text.  The reader actively fills in gaps according to what is 
concealed and what is restricted by what is revealed by the text.  Similar to the place of 
propositions in computations models of reading, Iser emphasizes the heuristic value of 
sentence correlatives.  But unlike computational models of reading, Iser accords more 
than a tacit acknowledgement of the function imagery in constituting the work. 
According to Iser (1978), the image and the reading subject are indivisible.  In his 
view, images are dualistic in that they “emerge from the reader, but they are also guided 
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by the signals which project themselves into him” making it “extremely difficult to gauge 
where signals leave off and the reader’s imagination begins the process of projection” (p. 
135).  Images are fundamental to performing a necessary synthesis of the aesthetic 
elements of the text, the execution of which takes place below the threshold of 
consciousness.  Due to its unconscious nature, Iser refers to the imaging synthesis as both 
passive and pre-predicative.  Citing Dufrenne (1973), Iser situates the image “between 
the brute presence where the object is experienced and the thought where it becomes 
idea, allows the object to appear, to be present as represented” (p. 345). 
At this point, I must admit to having some difficulty reconciling the dualism in 
Iser’s conceptualization of images and the unconscious synthesis.  Damasio (1999, 2003) 
concedes that while neural mapping provides a plausible account of how sensory 
information is stored in the brain, it is still unclear how sensory experience mapped by 
the body is transformed into images.  As a consequence, the elusive point at which the 
pre-predicative, non-verbal mental representations described actually constitute a form of 
thought in Iser’s theory remains purely speculative.  Also, Iser’s conceptualization of 
imagery and thought needs to be reevaluated in light of advances in cognitive science that 
support Lakoff and Johnson’s (1999) articulation of the cognitive unconscious and the 
suggestion that as much as 95 percent of all thought (which, they add, might be a gross 
underestimate) occurs under the threshold of consciousness suggesting that the pre-
predicative images are a form of thought.  Iser’s theory fails to describe in any depth the 
possibility that we are simultaneously and constantly processing information verbally and 
non-verbally in response to representations activated within both the unconscious and 
conscious realm.  In fact, the mind is constantly interacting with itself as much, if not 
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more so, than with the text.  The idea in Iser’s theory that images perform a necessary 
function in constituting the literary work might also benefit from Lakoff and Johnson’s 
(1999) explanation that the pre-predicative images activated within the cognitive 
unconscious act as a sort of guiding hand in shaping how we take in our world and grants 
us our commonsense understanding of the self.  
Iser (1978) makes clear the critical role of imagery in engaging the reader in the 
text to the extent to which “the reader cannot detach himself from such an interaction, on 
the contrary, the activity stimulated in him will link him to the text and induce him to 
create the conditions necessary for the effectiveness of that text” (p. 9).  Iser describes in 
beautiful detail how the text and reader are merged in a private realm where “the division 
between subject and object no longer applies, and it therefore follows that that meaning is 
no longer an object to be defined, but is an effect to be experienced” (Iser, 1978, pp. 9-
10).  Yet somehow, Iser’s implied readers are defined by the phenomenological 
bracketing that abstracts aesthetic experience from everyday experience in sublimation to 
the effects of the text.  From a neurobiological point of view the idea of 
phenomenological bracketing is untenable.  I recall once again Merleau-Ponty’s (1962) 
contention that the process of reflection “can never make me stop…thinking with the 
cultural apparatus with which my education, my previous efforts, my personal history, 
have provided me” (p. 61).  Engaged in the literary experience, readers cannot shed their 
autobiographical memory.  The autobiographical self remains embedded in the body and 
at some level is cognizant of its role in the body’s actions (Hunt, 2004).  While 
surrendering to the effects of the text might in fact appear to be a fairly unconscious act it 
is nevertheless an intentional one.  Iser’s (1978) theory falls short of recognizing that the 
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reader’s autobiographical consciousness is at work shaping the reader’s responses and 
directing the reader’s attention to various signals in the text. 
Iser, like many reader receptionist theorists, is intent on demonstrating that the 
ascending role of the reader does not mean succumbing to the affective fallacy described 
in Wimsatt & Beardsley’s (1946/1954) contentious essay.  Wimsatt and Beardsley 
(1846/1954) discount entirely the emotional effects of the literary work on the reader and 
emphasize that the only correct reading of the text is one which explicates the unity, 
coherence, and emphasis of the work.  They warn that any concern for the emotional 
effects produced by the text could lead to relativism and impressionism. 
The Affective Fallacy is a confusion between the poem and its results (what it is 
and what it does)…It begins by trying to derive the standards of criticism from the 
psychological effects of the poem and ends in impressionism and relativism.  The 
outcome…is that the poem itself, as an object of specifically critical judgment, 
tends to disappear. (Wimsatt and Beardsley, 1946/1954, p. 21, emphasis in the 
original)  
Iser (1978) elaborates on the schematized views presented in the text in order to dispel 
any criticism that his theory might reflect subjective anarchy.  Implied readers orient 
themselves from a standpoint derived from the convergence of the shifting textual 
perspectives that include “those of the narrator, the characters, the plot and the fictitious 
reader” (p. 35), all of which combine to project the author’s vision.  The role of Iser’s 
reader is to “occupy shifting vantage points…geared to a prestructured activity and to fit 
the diverse perspectives into a gradually evolving pattern” (p. 35, emphasis added). 
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 Iser (1978) believes that a reader’s interaction with the literary text can lead to an 
enhanced self-critical consciousness.  Reading demands that we bring to the text our own 
codes and conventions that are subject to frustrations of expectation or interruptions in 
the flow creating a gestalt in the virtual dimension—a defamiliarization that not only 
opens up opportunities for multiple realizations but interrogates our normative ways of 
seeing.  Iser (1980) contends, “the potential text is infinitely richer than any of its 
individual realizations” (p. 55).  Implicit in this statement is the idea that the text is 
enriched by multiple realizations but I believe that in light of what we are learning about 
human consciousness, Iser can be more resolute about the enhanced possibilities for his 
readers.  The idea that a gestalt in the virtual dimension, in this case, a literary 
defamiliarization, prompts us to interrogate our normative ways of seeing is consistent 
with the possibility described later in Chapter VI that literature engenders mind altering 
experiences that contribute to individual and social change. 
Iser’s theory remains problematic with respect to a biological account of 
consciousness because he describes the phenomenology of the reader only insofar as it is 
circumscribed by the parameters of the text itself and is deliberately conceived to 
discount the powerful effects of human emotion.  I am not the first to comment on Iser’s 
(1978) unwavering adherence to the text.  Freund (1987) remarks that despite the 
professed interest on the animating role of the reader, Iser’s theory effectively establishes 
the text as independent of the reader’s meaning making. Ultimately, Iser’s theory shares 
with computational models of cognition, a rationalist approach to reading in which 
readers are to rely on the construction of a propositional textbase to initiate the activation 
of mental representations. 
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Louise Rosenblatt’s Transactional Theory of Reader Response 
Perhaps more than any other reader response theorist, Rosenblatt (1978) has 
caused us to pay attention to the aesthetic dimension of reading in schools.  Influenced by 
Dewey’s (1934/1987) seminal work, Art as Experience, Rosenblatt envisions the aim of 
literature education as growth in experience rather than the means to acquiring 
knowledge.  Her theory centers on the reader’s role in the two-way transactional 
relationship with the text.  Guided by a pragmatist sense of reciprocity Rosenblatt 
proposes a theory that is in many ways consistent with an embodied view of the mind.  
Like Iser, Rosenblatt emphasizes the convergence of text and reader but rather than 
treading over phenomena already explored, I have decided to focus this discussion on 
Rosenblatt’s articulation of the aesthetic efferent continuum. 
Rosenblatt (1978) distinguishes between the text and the poem.  The text is 
essentially mere ink marks on a page which embody a yet to be realized potential until a 
reader brings it to life.  The poem on the other hand, signals the active engagement of a 
reader with a text and comes to stand for all literary works of art including novels, plays, 
poems and short stories.   
Rosenblatt also distinguishes between two types of reading—aesthetic and non-
aesthetic or efferent reading.  She describes efferent or non-aesthetic reading as focusing 
on the information to be acquired—the residue that will remain after the reading.  
Efferent comes from the Latin efferre meaning “to carry away” and, concerns itself with 
carrying away information, lexical meaning, explanations, or directions.  According to 
Rosenblatt (1978), aesthetic reading requires “[s]ensing, feeling, imagining, thinking, 
under the stimulus of words” (p. 27).  Rosenblatt purports that readers assume a stance 
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along a continuum between aesthetic and efferent reading that directs the construction of 
meaning in transaction with a given text.  In Rosenblatt’s classic example of efferent 
reading, she describes a mother whose child has ingested a poisonous liquid and who is 
quite predictably frantically reading the label in search of an antidote.  In Rosenblatt’s 
estimation, the mother’s aim is to get through the information as rapidly as possible and 
is only interested in the objects, ideas, and actions indicated.  What is missing from 
Rosenblatt’s account from a dual coding perspective is that in the quest to administer the 
antidote accurately, the mother may indeed rely on the direct activation of images to 
narratively construct the critical sequence of steps to save her child (barring the need for 
semantic parsing, of course!). 
 An embodied view of cognition and the growing body of empirical evidence on 
imagery and affect strongly suggest that aesthetic engagement enhances the efferent 
quality of the reading experience.  In other words, the evocation of the imagery and affect 
contribute to the recall of information regardless of the type of text.  This does not mean 
that we get lost in complete reverie while reading the directions to assemble the family 
barbecue.  The transaction operates two ways and the text does act upon the reader within 
a particular context. 
I believe that given the emphasis Rosenblatt places on building aesthetic capacity 
in the literature curriculum, she would see this as a welcome revision to her longstanding 
theory.  For years, Rosenblatt (1985) has maintained that the aesthetic reader “pays 
attention to the associations, feelings, attitudes and ideas that [the] words and their 
referents arouse within him” (p. 50).  It would seem that from an embodied perspective 
that this description would fit a broader range of reading situations.  I would contend that 
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validating the artificial bifurcation between aesthetic and efferent reading works once 
again in a reductionist way to discount the important role of imagery and affect while 
forcing us to see aesthetic response as something additive rather than integral to 
comprehension. 
Conclusion 
 According to a neurobiological account of consciousness, computational models 
of cognition are insufficient in dealing with the qualia of subjective experience.  
Moreover, they are in both Damasio (1999, 2003) and Edelman’s (1992) view, 
biologically untenable.  Damasio’s (1999) detailed description of extended consciousness 
implies that the evocation of imagery and affect during literary transactions contribute the 
experiential store of information that constitutes an individual’s autobiographical 
memory.  Dual coding theory is shown to have several theoretical advantages in 
explaining phenomena related to aesthetic response.  First, the back and forth movement 
between and within representational systems can account for the images and emotions 
related to objects and events contained within the text and associative connections made 
to objects and events external to the text.  Second, dual coding theory accounts for the 
effects of language concreteness on memory.  And third, dual coding theory provides a 
viable framework for empirically investigating the phenomena associated with aesthetic 
response.   
 I believe that the recent advances in neuroscience prompt a reexamination of 
reader response theories that focus on the animating role of the reader in transactions with 
texts.  In this chapter, I have attempted to initiate such a reexamination and suggest that a 
parallel exists between contemporary theories of reading comprehension and reader 
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response insofar as differences in meaning are eventually resolved in the structure of the 
text.  In Chapter VI, I revisit some of the phenomena associated with aesthetic response 
to establish reading as act of moral imagination.    
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CHAPTER VI 
READING AS AN ACT OF MORAL IMAGINATION 
Introduction 
A novel that does not discover a hitherto unknown segment of existence is 
immoral.  Knowledge is the novel’s only morality.   
-Kundera, The Art of the Novel 
In The Ethics of Ambiguity, Simone de Beauvoir (1948) argues that ambiguity 
characterizes the human condition.  At every waking moment, we are aware of the “non-
temporal truth” of our existence, caught as it were “between the past which no longer is 
and the future which is not yet” (p. 7).  In de Beauvoir’s opinion, philosophy throughout 
the ages has concerned itself with trying to reconcile or eliminate ambiguity.  Platonic 
ideals, Cartesian certainty, Kantian categorical imperatives, Hume’s skepticism, and a 
Hegelian synthesis are all aimed to either “reduce mind to matter, or to reabsorb matter 
into mind, or to merge them within a single substance” (de Beauvoir, 1948, p. 8).  
Attempts to deny the ambiguity of existence lull us into “consoling ethics” (de Beauvoir, 
1948, p. 8) that ironically emphasize the paradox emerging from an anthropocentric view 
toward mastering the world and the inevitability of finding ourselves falling victim to our 
own ambition and forces beyond our control.   
Written in the wake of the World War II and the Nazi occupation of France, de 
Beauvoir (1948) illustrates the paradox of human condition in our ability to master the 
science to create the atomic bomb, a towering achievement aimed at human destruction.  
Today ‘weapons of mass destruction’ (or the fear at the mere suggestion of their 
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existence) continue to decide the fate of human beings throughout the world.  The idea 
that we are ultimately the supreme end “to which all action should be subordinated” leads 
us “to treat one another as instruments or obstacles, or means” (p. 2).  As a result, 
increased mastery leads to an enhanced sense of vulnerability.  Consider how we 
continue to live under the threat posed by the ecologically devastating effects of human 
progress in the face of our stubborn resistance to give up any of the material objects and 
technological gains that define our current lifestyle and the pursuit of being in possession 
of more.  Human beings find themselves living in the troubled complacency emerging 
from the metaphysical promise of immortality or from the “marvelous optimism where 
even the bloody wars simply express the fertile restlessness of the Spirit” (de Beauvoir, 
1948, p. 8).  The denial of our fundamental ambiguity, de Beauvoir (1948) insists, 
amounts to a denial of freedom.  She argues: 
Perhaps in no other age have they manifested their grandeur more brilliantly, and 
in no other age has this opportunity, the truth comes to light, the truth of life and 
death, of my solitude and my bond with the world, of my freedom and my 
servitude, of the insignificance and the sovereign importance of each man and all 
men.  There was Stalingrad and there was Buchenwald, and neither of the two 
wipes out the other.  Since we do not succeed in fleeing it, let us therefore try to 
look the truth in the face.  Let us try to assume our fundamental ambiguity.  It is 
in the knowledge of the genuine conditions of our life that we must draw our 
strength to life and our reason for acting (p. 9). 
Kundera (1988) argues that the paradoxical nature of human action is “one of the 
novel’s greatest discoveries” (p. 24).  In this chapter, I argue that theoretical and 
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instructional attempts aimed at resolving ambiguity in the text limit literature’s potential 
to incite moral communication.  The mental imagery and emotional reactions evoked 
throughout literary reading serve an ethical function inasmuch as that they contribute to 
the autobiographical and moral consciousness of the reader.  I intend to demonstrate that 
literature is morally relevant but not in the positivistic sense that education should 
concern itself with using literature for the explicit teaching of moral lessons.  Literature, 
like ethics, does not provide a recipe for life nor can it provide us with some path to 
ultimate good.  It often narrates that which we would find insufferable or unimaginable in 
real life.  Literature provides us with an opportunity to explore both good and evil 
bringing us face to face with the fundamental ambiguity of our existence.  It serves an 
ethical function insofar as it constitutes a means for intersubjective collaboration and 
creates an imaginative extension of the sociocultural environment in which we act and 
respond.  And finally, I believe that as a record of human consciousness, literature can 
prove to be a source of individual and social agency basic to the development of moral 
autonomy and an emerging sense of self.   
Reading as an Intersubjective Collaboration 
Understanding the intersubjective nature of the literary experience might begin 
with Mead’s (1934) articulation of the “I” and the “me”—the relationship between the 
mind and the self—in the imaginative formation of the “generalized other” (p. 154).  To 
Mead, the development of the self is a social process, one that begins in childhood when 
we take on the role of others in play.  For example, pre-school and kindergarten children 
are often seen playing ‘mommy’ or ‘fire fighter’ or ‘teacher.’  The direct experience of 
playing a succession of roles eventually leads to the development of a socially shared 
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system of gestures that lead to an abstract set of rules.  Continued and varied experience, 
both direct and vicarious, shapes our understanding of the interrelationship of these roles 
that combine to form an image of the generalized other defined as “[t]he organized 
community or social group which gives to the individual his unity of self” (Mead, 1934, 
p. 154).   
According to Mead (1964), “In the process of communication, the individual is an 
other before he is a self,” and furthermore, “out of this process thought arises, i.e., 
conversation with one’s self, in the role of the specific other and then in the role of the 
generalized other”  (pp. 312-314).  In other words, our social consciousness, even the 
shared rules that govern our ability to communicate with one another through language, 
depends on the imaginative transformation of our direct interactions with the world into 
the emergence of the mind and self.  Mead stresses the inseparable nature of the “I” and 
the “me”—the individual and the social selves.  Likewise, a sense of community emerges 
only when individuals can take on the attitudes of others.  In the literary transaction 
between author and reader, both participants maintain these two faces of the self in order 
to complete the “social act” (Mead, 1934, p. 7).  The social act assumes that the whole 
(society) is antecedent to the part (individual) and therefore the conduct of both the 
author and reader can be explained in terms of the organized conduct of the social group.  
The imaginative formation of the generalized other supports the idea that the author has 
in mind an imagined reader and that readers can tentatively embrace the thoughts, 
feelings, and motivations of others.       
Like Mead, Bakhtin (1981) recognizes that there is always an audience.  
Bakhtin’s social theory of utterance contends that consciousness arises in the dialogic 
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utterance constructed internally according to voices previously heard and in anticipation 
of a response.  This inner dialogue also characteristic of Mead’s generalized other, is in 
fact, mental imagery in the form of auditory-verbal encoding and may be accompanied by 
images related to other sense modalities.  Bakhtin describes a dialogic consciousness that 
is also dependent on the imaginative transformation of concrete interactions with the 
world.  All utterances are double-voiced in that words are inescapably populated with the 
intentions of others.  Grounded in the relation between self and other, the literary text 
constitutes a field of “answerability” (Bakhtin, 1990, pp. 1-2; Holquist, 1990, p. 154) in 
which meaning is intersubjective, that is, contested within a tripartite construction 
consisting of a speaking subject (the author), an addressee (the reader) and the dialogic 
relation between the two.  The intersubjective life of the mind described by Mead (1934) 
and Bakhtin (1981) suggests we are not just conscious of having a consciousness, but that 
our consciousness is also conscious of the consciousness of others.  Intersubjectivity 
depends therefore, on the mind’s capacity to image and hold these images in place for 
extended periods of time.    
Early in his essay “Discourse in the Novel,” Bakhtin (1981) summarizes the 
novel’s potential as a “means for displaying otherness” (Holquist, 1990, p. 89): 
 The novel can be defined as a diversity of social speech types…and a 
diversity of individual voices, artistically organized.  The internal stratification of 
any single national language into social dialects, characteristic group behavior, 
professional jargons, generic languages, language of generations and age groups, 
tendentious languages, language of the authorities, of various circles and of 
passing fashions, languages that serve the specific sociopolitical purposes of the 
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day, even of the hour … this internal stratification present in every language at 
any given moment of its historical existence is the indispensable prerequisite for 
the novel as a genre.  (Bakhtin, 1981, pp. 262-263) 
In terms of accounting for literature’s ethical function, Bakhtin maintains that language is 
a form of persuasion, a way of controlling others’ behavior or directing their thinking.  
The word is a “two-sided act…determined equally by whose word it is and for whom it is 
meant. …A word is territory shared by both addresser and addressee, by the speaker and 
his interlocutor.” (Bahktin/Volosinov, 1929/1973, p. 86 emphasis in the original).  In 
sum, from an intersubjective perspective, literature augments the continued and various 
experience “which gives to the individual his unity of self” (Mead, 1934, p. 154) and 
constitutes an ethical situation in which readers and writers are interlocutors charged with 
the responsibility of ensuring that the text remains “suspended in the ongoing process of 
collaborative judgment” (Clark, 1990, p. 30).  More importantly, the aesthetic 
intersubjectivity characterizing literary transactions engenders “an increasing sense of 
empathy between psyches across space” (Hunt, 2004, p. 10).    
The Affective and Imaginative in Moral Experience 
 Dewey (1911/1978) believed that the disregard for aesthetic and affective factors 
in American schools was “the greatest deficiency in…education systems with respect to 
character building” (p. 386).  He maintained that the sympathetic imagination that grows 
out of having certain communal and intersubjective experiences is central to moral 
inquiry and the development of a good moral character.  Cultivating habits of social 
imagination, were in Dewey’s (1908/1978) opinion, (p. 284) fundamental to any 
classroom discussion of morals.  In other words, effective moral education can only occur 
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when students “happen to be already animated by a sympathetic and dignified regard for 
the sentiments of others” (Dewey, 1916/1980, p. 364).   
 To Dewey, moral blindness and narrowness of mind are the direct result of a lack 
of the affective and the imaginative in one’s educational life.  In his view, affective 
relations with others and with a variety of situations signify access to a landscape that 
would not otherwise be available.  I am of course, suggesting that literary works create a 
fertile landscape for cultivating a moral imagination.  Like Lodge (2003), Dewey 
(1932/1985), advocates for aesthetic opportunities that permit us to examine the qualia of 
our subjective experience.   
Unless there is a direct, mainly unreflective appreciation of persons and deeds, the 
data for subsequent thought will be lacking or distorted.  A person must feel the 
qualities of acts as one feels with the hands the qualities of roughness and 
smoothness (pp.268-269, emphasis in the original).   
Dewey’s conceptualization of the affective response relates to the act of 
perception described in Damasio’s neurobiology of consciousness.  There is an 
immediate affective reaction triggered by an emotionally competent stimulus that is 
mapped by the body and subsequently acted upon through reflection or reasoning 
strategies.  But before we can reason, we feel. 
Dewey contended that the ability to reach beyond the surface of things and 
understand others through sympathetic communication requires imagination and not the 
mere transformation of knowledge.  Accordingly, before we can educate the imagination, 
the reader must undergo the text.   From a Deweyan perspective, the richness of the 
literary experience and its potential for moral deliberation are realized as readers engage 
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in dramatic rehearsal.  Within the literary context, dramatic rehearsal entails placing 
readers in a morally problematic situation in which they seek possible resolutions by 
imaging alternative actions and projecting themselves into the situation as active 
participants.  As an act of cognitive appraisal grounded in perception, Dewey’s dramatic 
rehearsal is not enacted in moral certitude but remains subject to revision.  Nevertheless, 
as I will point out, there are undoubtedly, sociocultural and historical factors at work that 
shape the reader’s response and determine the extent to which a reader may undergo the 
text.    
The Civilizing Power of Literature 
Any discussion that begins by re-introducing the contested relationship between 
literature and morals causes us to address literature’s “transfer-value of humanism” 
(Bogdan, 1992, p. 50).  Postman and Weingartner (1961) have argued our faith in the 
civilizing power of literature is “[b]y far the most amusing of all our superstitions” (p. 38) 
when we consider that Joseph Goebbels had a Ph.D in Romantic Drama.  Poirier (1971) 
citing Steiner also noted, “[w]e now know that a man can read Goethe and Rilke in the 
evening—and go to his day’s work at Auschwitz in the morning” (p. 82).   
In The Life of the Mind, Arendt (1971) begins by tracing her preoccupation with 
mental activities to her attendance at the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem.  What struck her 
most profoundly was “the banality of evil” (p. 3) that went counter to any previous 
philosophical, literary, or theological conceptualization of evil as something demonic, 
acted out of envy, resentment, weakness, or hatred.  It was the sheer absence of thought 
that Arendt found most surprising, the fact that the uncontestable evil on trial was as 
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much a result of the sins of omission as it was the sins of commission.  Arendt (1971) 
observes: 
 …I was struck by the manifest shallowness in the doer that made it impossible to 
trace the uncontestable evil of his deeds to any deeper level of roots or motives.  
The deeds were monstrous, but the doer…was quite ordinary, commonplace, and 
neither demonic nor monstrous.  There was no sign in him of firm ideological 
convictions or of specific evil motives, and the only notable characteristic one 
could detect in his… behavior…was something entirely negative: it was not 
stupidity but thoughlessness. (p. 4, emphasis in the original)  
This thoughtlessness, Arendt proceeds to describe, seemed adequate in dealing with 
routine court and prison proceedings, much as one would imagine Eichmann functioned 
under the Nazi regime.  When questioned, however, Eichmann appeared helpless, 
resorting to “cliché-ridden language produced on the stand, as it had evidently done in his 
official life, a kind of macabre comedy” (p. 4).  Arendt explains: 
Clichés, stock phrases, adherence to conventional standardized codes of 
expression and conduct have the socially recognized function of protecting us 
against reality, that is against the claim on our thinking attention that all events 
and facts make by virtue of their existence.  If we were responsive to this claim all 
the time, we would soon be exhausted; Eichmann differed from the rest of us only 
in that he clearly knew of no such claim at all. (p. 4) 
In reading Arendt’s assessment of the absence of thinking as a necessary 
condition for evil, I am reminded of Mr. Keating in Peter Weir’s film “Dead Poets 
Society.”  Keating embraces Shelley’s Romantic idealism that poetry can light the way to 
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lead his students “from their inward sight the film of familiarity” (Shelley, 1821/1965, p. 
74).  Throughout the movie, we observe Keating’s continuous efforts to get students to 
“break step” and get them to look at the world differently, to pay attention to the claim 
the images and emotions in response to poetry make on their thinking.  The 
transformational power of literature is not to be found in the standard textbook 
interpretations, but rather, the awakening lies in thinking about what is read.  Keating 
wants to make poetry the focus of his students’ thinking attention.  Frye held a similar 
view, convinced of the social, moral, and educational value of literature and its civilizing 
power.  His entire opus might be considered a justification for fostering a literary 
imagination through an oscillation between engagement and detachment, that is to say, 
between a direct participatory response to the text and a critical response.  His theory of 
an educated imagination however, depended on separating criticism from reading—from 
seeking unity or coherence in the text prior to any aesthetic response to foster literary 
literacy. 
 Moffett (1988), on the other hand, adopts a more integrative approach to literature 
education advancing the idea that a text has to be both understood and undergone.  
Undergoing relates to the reader’s submission to the emotional impact of the text.  
Moffett saw the potential of fostering democratic ideals through a poetics of pluralism.  
Reminiscent of cultivating the habits of social imagination in Dewey’s moral 
communication, Moffett suggested that raising the consciousness of our students depends 
upon the chance to identify with a wide range of literary genres, authors, situations, and 
characters.  In the existentialist tradition of de Beauvoir (1948), Moffett saw the aim of 
literature education as creating an appreciation for moral ambiguity.  Despite their 
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philosophical differences, both Frye (1963) and Moffett (1988) fought against the allure 
of stock responses to literature and believed that the primary aim of literature education 
was to break down resistance to knowing. Whether through the unity of symbolic 
imagery and archetypes or through empathetic identification, breaking down the 
resistance to knowing depends upon first being able to form mental images. 
Centrifugal and Centripetal Forces at Work in Reading the Literary Text 
The heteroglossia in Bakhtin’s (1981) dialogism might prove helpful in 
understanding readers’ resistance to the text and their apparent inability to imagine and 
feel in order to reach beyond the surface of things.  According to Bakhtin, language is 
constantly subjected to the centralizing or centripetal forces and the decentralizing or 
centrifugal forces resulting from social interaction.  The locus where centripetal and 
centrifugal forces collide is conceptualized as heteroglossia or the condition that ensures 
the primacy of context over text for “[a]t any given time, in any given place, there will be 
a set of conditions—social, historical, meteorological, physiological—that will insure that 
a word uttered in that place and at that time will have a meaning different than it would 
have under any other condition” (Holquist, 1981, p. 428).  Accordingly, “all utterances 
are heteroglot in that they are functions of a matrix of forces practically impossible to 
recoup” (Holquist, 1981, p. 428).  As such, ambiguity is the hallmark of a dialogic 
consciousness, for language is neither static nor neutral.   
Multi-voiced and indeterminate, the text can create “dialogic spaces” (Kristeva, 
1980, p. 66) in which the reader engages in an act of self-realization and self-
determination in opposition to perceived “others.”  However, the rule-governing 
centripetal forces can easily destroy dialogism as discourse’s primordial condition and 
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render the reader a relatively passive participant in the construction of meaning.  Bakhtin 
(1981) attributes the existence of monologism to a philosophy of language and 
systemized linguistics in which traditional stylistics  
…locks every stylistic phenomenon into the monologic context of a given self-
sufficient and hermetic utterance, imprisoning it, as it were, in the dungeon of a 
single context; it is not able to exchange messages with other utterances, it is not 
able to realize its own stylistic implication in a relationship with them; it is 
obliged to exhaust itself in its own single hermetic context. (p. 274) 
Bakhtin/Volosinov (1929/1973) argues that monologism is pure abstraction, where the 
meaning of the text is already predetermined and the response to the text is calculated as 
“one link in a continuous chain of speech performances” (p. 72).  In this sense, 
monologism bears a striking resemblance to the description of amodal proposition 
building in computational theories of cognition and reading comprehension.     
Azar Nafisi: Reading Lolita in Tehran 
Resistance to knowing and the liberating power of literature are equally 
documented in Azar Nafisi’s (2003) recent bestseller, Reading Lolita in Tehran which 
exemplifies the inevitable dialectic between the centripetal and centrifugal forces at work 
shaping readers’ responses.  Early in her book, she illustrates how the empty rituals 
depicted in Nabokov’s Invitation to a Beheading epitomize the “banality of evil” (Arendt, 
1971, p. 3) and help readers identify the tragedy and the absurdity of the conditions under 
which people of the Islamic Republic were forced to live and die.  Once a week for two 
years, a group of young female students met clandestinely at Nafisi’s Tehran apartment 
and held their own “Dead Poets Society” to examine the claims forbidden Western 
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literary works—Jane Austen, F. Scott Fitzgerald, Henry James, and Vladimir Nabokov—
made on their thinking attention.  In the face of Islamic morality squads, widespread 
censorship of artistic expression, and fundamentalist control of universities, the story of 
the students in Nafisi’s classroom and of the women who met in secret demonstrated the 
value of the novel as a source of moral inquiry.   
At the University of Tehran, where Nafisi began her teaching career as the 
youngest member of the English Department at the Faculty of Persian and Foreign 
Languages she introduces students to Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby and the American 
obsession with the promise of the future.  In the spirit of undergoing the text, Nafisi 
(2003) implores them not to chase after “the grand theme…as if it is separate from the 
story itself.  The idea or ideas behind the story must come…through the experience of the 
novel and not as something tacked on to it” (p. 109).  In Gatsby, she tried to help students 
see beyond the surface of things—beyond the adultery and a capitalist love of money—
and rather, seek to disrupt the seemingly immutable traditions and expectations that form 
the “film of familiarity” (Shelley, 1821/1965, p. 74).  In those fleeting seconds at the end 
of class, in the midst of chants of “Marg bar Amrika!”—“Death to America!,” Nafisi 
(2003) adeptly conveys the emotional undergoing of the text and its potential for moral 
communication: 
 A novel is not an allegory, I said as the period was about to come to an end.  It is 
the sensual experience of another world.  If you don’t enter that world, hold your 
breath with the characters and become involved in their destiny, you won’t be 
able to empathize and empathy is at the heart of the novel.  This is how you read a 
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novel: you inhale the experience.  So start breathing, I just want you to remember 
this.  That is all; class dismissed. (p. 111)   
But Nafisi’s readers are often asphyxiated by fundamentalist indoctrination, 
political ideologies, and utilitarian efforts to mask ambiguity.  Her account makes it plain 
to see that authoritative discourse, defined as the “privileged language that approaches us 
from without” (Holquist, 1981, p. 424) operates at the expense of dialogue.  Animating 
the moral imagination through literature might begin by understanding  
…the fact that no behavior is ever authorized to begin with, and one of the 
concrete consequences of existentialist ethics is the rejection of all the previous 
justifications which might be drawn from the civilization, the age, and the culture; 
it is the rejection of every principle of authority.  (de Beauvoir, 1948, p. 140).  
Before Western readers become all too comfortable in their false consciousness about 
their freedom of expression, we might consider that for the most part, Canadian and 
American students have been fed the same literary canon for generations, indoctrinated 
into a cultural literacy (Hirsch, 1987) aimed at reproducing Judeo-Christian morals and 
values.  Canonization, or the effort to “elevate the existing norms to a model that resists 
change” (Holquist, 1981, p. 425) constitutes yet another form of authoritative discourse 
that determines readers’ responses to literature and any action associated with those 
responses.  In pursuit of Moffett’s (1980) poetics of plurality, I am left asking when was 
the last time one of us picked up a work of classic Persian literature with our students and 
made it the focus of our thinking attention?   
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Historical Agency and an Emerging Sense of Self 
 Literature’s potential for moral communication inheres in historian Lynn Hunt’s 
(2004) quest for a post-Foucauldian history of personhood.  Hunt argues that human 
rights are comprised of “a set of feelings about how bodies should be treated (and were 
experienced) and about how selves worked (and were experienced)” (p. 3).  A feminist, a 
dix-huitièmiste, and an expert on the French revolution, Hunt contends that the epistolary 
novel played a critical role in the development of human rights.  Her recent work also 
happens to benefit from the interdisciplinary field of consciousness studies and its 
emphasis on feelings.  She suggests that the current academic furor surrounding emotions 
relates to the fact that emotions are both bodily and mental, experienced as biological 
change and as a mental event.  Based in both Merleau-Ponty’s (1942) and Damasio’s 
(1999) “materialist understanding of the self in which…consciousness grows naturally 
out of sensation” (Hunt, 2004, pp. 6-7), Hunt rejects the idea that the self is either 
freestanding or completely socially constructed, but rather exists embedded in the body 
and is cognizant of its role as an agent of the body’s action.    
Hunt (2004) explains how moral autonomy and its corollary human rights depend 
on individuals experiencing a separateness of self associated with the body’s bounded 
space and at the same time, maintaining a conviction that others experience this same 
sense of self.  In other words, the affective energy associated with democracy and the 
development of human rights requires the belief that all people have the same kinds of 
inner experience including similar experiences of bodily pain.  Hunt notes that during the 
eighteenth century, something remarkable occurred to advance this understanding of 
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separateness or self possession and the empathy that comes with knowing that all others 
are equally self possessed. 
Without discounting other factors which invariably contributed to the emergence 
of human rights, for example, changes in natural law theory, the growing spread of 
consumerism, commercialism, and urbanization, and the Enlightenment, Hunt traces the 
development of human rights in part, to the appearance of the epistolary novel in the mid-
eighteenth century.  She points out that the three great psychological novels— 
Richardson’s (1740) Pamela and (1747-48) Clarissa and Rousseau’s (1761) Julie—more 
or less coincided with the appearance of the phrase “rights of man” in Rousseau’s (1762) 
Social Contract.  More importantly, the epistolary novel, Hunt argues, produces a “sense 
of interior likeness” (p. 14) whereby we are able to identify empathetically with 
individuals imagined to be fundamentally like ourselves.  Similarly, Watt (1957), in his 
study of realism in the novel pointed to Richardson’s “use of the letter form that induced 
in the reader a continual sense of actual participation in the action which was until then 
unparalleled in its completeness and intensensity” (p. 25). 
Hunt’s (2004) theory connecting the epistolary novel with the origins of human 
rights would appear to support my argument that that images and emotional responses 
emerging from the literary experience contribute to a developing sense of self and an 
expanding moral consciousness.  Basically, Hunt maintains that reading epistolary novels 
produced somatic effects that once mapped and stored in the brain came back out as new 
concepts about the organization of social and political life.  This reorganization entailed 
new ways of empathizing.  Ultimately, Hunt is arguing that social and political change 
occurs not just because people inhabit a particular social or cultural context, but more so, 
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because through their interactions with each other (and reading) they share similar 
experiences.  Many of these experiences alter individual minds that contribute to a 
changing social context. 
Not surprisingly, the recognition of the novel’s power to arouse bodily sensations 
and take possession of its readers resulted in its condemnation by both Catholic and 
Protestant clergy.  And perhaps their fears were well founded inasmuch as the novel 
began to provide a new form of religious experience.  The fiercest of criticisms however, 
only served to confirm the affective impact of the novel.  To my mind, the French abbé 
Jacquin’s (1755) exhaustive attack on the novel correctly assumed that “novels offer us 
all on their own, everything that is most seductive in love and at the same time everything 
that is most criminal” (p. 305). 
Empathy depends on the reader’s capacity to form the necessary images of a 
particular character and affectively project upon those images, common traits and 
experiences that promote feelings of interiority, that is to say, the feelings that suggest 
that this character is in possession of a sense of self equal to that of the reader.  In other 
words, empathy requires identification.  Hunt (2004) summarizes Diderot’s compelling 
description of empathy and identification evoked during reading that prefigures Dewey’s 
dramatic rehearsal: 
You recognize yourself in the characters, you imaginatively leap into the midst of 
the action, you feel the same feelings that the characters are feeling.  In short you 
learn to empathize with someone who is not yourself and can never be directly 
accessible to you and yet, who in some imaginative way also yourself. (p. 19)   
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Diderot was also one of the first to recognize how readers can be drawn into oblivion 
through identification with a novel’s characters and how this unconscious participation 
(Dewey’s and Moffett’s “undergoing”) could lead to moral inquiry without the 
didacticism associated with explicit moralizing.  In response to Richardson’s Pamela, 
Diderot commented: “One feels oneself drawn to the good with an impetuosity one does 
not recognize.  When faced with an injustice you experience a disgust you do not know 
how to explain to yourself” (cited in Hunt, 2004, p. 20).   
 In sum, Hunt’s account reflects the idea of pragmatist reciprocity and an 
epigenetic account of consciousness and the brain’s morphology.  She contends that 
important changes must take place in people’s brains before new social practices can 
begin.  The self is not, as we read in Foucault, simply a product of body disciplines 
imposed from without.  Historicity of personhood, Hunt (2004) claims, works in more 
than one direction.  Reading the epistolary novel in the eighteenth century led to new 
individual experiences.  The bodily sensations associated with these experiences 
translated into perceptions of individual personhood and subsequently to new social and 
cultural practices.  Such changes do not occur all at once, and historical change is bound 
to be a messy process but one in which narrative plays a critical role.  Hunt’s theory and a 
neurobiology of consciousness go a long way to providing a plausible explanation for 
Kearney’s (2002) following observation: 
It is, in short, only when haphazard happenings are transformed into story, and 
thus made memorable over time, that we become full agents of our history.  This 
becoming historical involves a transition from the flux of events into a meaningful 
social or political community – what Aristotle and the Greeks called a polis.  
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Without this transition from nature to narrative, from time suffered to time 
enacted and enunciated, it is debatable whether a merely biological life (zoe) 
could ever be considered a truly human one (bios) (Kearney, 2002, p. 3). 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have attempted to demonstrate that the moral value of literature 
exists in its potential to embody the paradox of the human condition.  In The Ethics of 
Ambiguity, de Beauvoir (1948) explains how ambiguity is the hallmark of human 
existence and that philosophical attempts to overcome or to eliminate our fundamental 
ambiguity have only aggravated feelings of helplessness, vulnerability, and isolation 
causing us “to treat one another as instruments or obstacles, or means” (p. 2). Dewey’s 
emphasis on the imaginative and the affective in moral deliberation suggests that 
literature provides fertile ground for exploring both good and evil and trying out solutions 
to morally problematic situations.   
Our ability to form images is critical to the human capacity to conduct ourselves 
according to an awareness of the consciousness of others and contributes to our emerging 
sense of self (Bakhtin, 1981; Mead, 1934; Hunt, 2004).   The imaginative formation of a 
“generalized other” (Mead, 1934) accounts for the ability of authors to maintain an 
imagined audience and the ability of readers to project themselves into the thoughts, 
feelings, and motives of characters.  Where the meaning of the text is constructed 
intersubjectively, that is to say, in the dialogic relationship among author, text, and 
reader, the literary transaction becomes a mode of moral communication.  The text’s 
potential for dialogue and moral communication is often impeded by authoritative 
discourse in which truths come already calculated.  Examples of authoritative discourse 
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include dominant political ideologies, fundamentalism, rationalism, and canonization.  A 
neurobiology of consciousness (Damasio, 1999, 2003; Edelman, 1992) described in 
earlier chapters suggests that literature provides a common experience for readers to 
cultivate habits of social imagination that may eventually lead to social and cultural 
change. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
The only laws of matter are those which our minds must fabricate and the only 
laws of mind are fabricated for it by matter.   
-Maxwell, cited in Edelman, Bright Air, Brilliant Fire 
This week, I decided to begin my Friday morning Models of Education class by 
showing what has become a National Film Board of Canada (1993) classic, “Spaghetti 
Story.”  This film short which originally aired on the BBC on a 1957 broadcast of the 
television news program “Panorama” is part of a NFB series titled “The Politics of Truth” 
and is widely used to introduce students to the idea of how reality is constructed.  
Distinguished BBC broadcaster, Richard Dimbleby narrates this documentary travelogue 
featuring a family from the Swiss town of Ticino carrying out their annual spaghetti 
harvest.  The scene opens onto the alpine countryside burgeoning into spring.  Flowers 
are in bloom and the air is thick with bees while women of the village are diligently at 
work plucking strands of spaghetti from the trees and then laying them down to dry under 
the warm alpine sun.  Viewers are informed of the precise climatic conditions that have 
made for a record harvest this year, the careful attention of generations of growers that 
have contributed to the uniform length of the spaghetti, and the scale of the Swiss harvest 
in comparison to the harvest carried out in neighboring Italy. 
 Early in my investigation into the structure and function of imagery and affect, I 
compared dual coding theory’s embodied view of cognition with rationalist theories 
based on abstract knowledge structures or schema.  In light of the recent developments in 
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neuroscience that facilitate a growing understanding of human consciousness, I remain 
convinced that the mind is indeed embodied and that imagery and affect play a critical 
role at every conceivable level of the reading process.  More importantly, Edelman’s 
(1992) demonstration that “[n]o relationship is necessary between this collection of 
algorithms [transformational grammar] and what goes on in a person’s head” (p. 245) 
supports the contention in Sadoski and Paivio’s (2001) dual coding theory of reading and 
writing that “[a]bstract entities are not theoretically necessary to explain reading 
phenomena” (p. 135).  In light of what we now know about the structure and function of 
imagery and affect within a neurobiological account of consciousness, the pervasive 
presence of schema theory in reading research and the reverence it continues to be 
accorded in instructional materials causes me to think that the reading field has been 
carrying out its own spaghetti harvest.   
For example, propositions grow into schemata that are the result of an elaboration 
of precise growing conditions we have come to describe as amodal propositional 
networks.  If, like the generations of spaghetti growers, teachers pay close attention to 
activating prior knowledge in just the right way, we are closer to ensuring that students 
will uniformly comprehend the text.  The spaghetti harvest is enhanced and extended by 
the authoritative voice of distinguished scholars who have maintained the illusion that we 
knew more about cognition in reading that we actually did (Sadoski, Paivio, & Goetz, 
1991).   
At this point, however, I feel it necessary to state that I believe in many ways, 
these theorists were guided quite rightly by the same desire to understand how readers’ 
experience contributes to their understanding of the text.  Neuroscience makes obvious a 
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problem that perhaps two decades ago was less definable in concrete terms.   It now 
seems apparent that any theoretical model of reading seeking to establish the critical role 
of prior knowledge by adopting the view that the brain is hard wired to contend with 
every possible contingency preempts the infinite diversity of human experience.  Such a 
theory, therefore, in application, effectively negates the underlying premise upon which 
that theory is based.  In others words, computational models of reading are incongruent 
with both the phenomenon they wish to investigate and the practice they wish to promote.  
In demonstrating my point, I have elected to once again highlight Kintsch’s (1998) 
comprehension-integration model because it has undergone considerable revision and 
Kintsch appears earnest in his attempt to account for multiple forms of mental 
representation.     
Kintsch (1998) proposes an architecture of cognition that relies on the proposition 
as the single form of representation to incorporate all other multiple codes of mental 
representation including imagery and emotions.  Kintsch’s decision to represent imagery 
and emotions propositionally is not based on any conviction that imagery and emotions 
are in any way propositional but because propositions are practical and easily 
programmed into computers.  Convenient single-code approaches to understanding 
cognition are designed to demonstrate and test the theory using artificial intelligence.  
Kintsch’s architecture of cognition is supposed to operate without the benefit of the raw 
data of experience.   Such theories make irrelevant the contribution of human interaction 
to the evolutionary development of the brain because the architecture of these theoretical 
models is constructed independently of the structure and function of the nervous system. 
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 Kintsch’s (1998) choice of propositions however, is rendered all the more 
perplexing by his proclaimed adherence to Aristotelian perception and experience.  To 
further confound matters, Kintsch briefly introduces Damasio’s (1994) theory of 
emotions to suggest that other factors beyond the text contribute to the construction of 
meaning.  It remains to be seen to what extent rationalist concepts can be stretched to 
reconcile the materialist view of the mind in Damasio’s (1994, 1999, 2003) neurobiology 
of consciousness with a propositional architecture of cognition.  I have identified in 
Kintsch’s theory what I see as a laudable attempt to account for the broad range of 
reading phenomena previously accounted for by dual coding theory.  I am left however, 
thinking that Kintsch’s (1998) model is not so much a paradigm for cognition but rather, 
a model struggling to be free of one.   
As Edelman (1992) explains, what scholars like Kintsch are still missing is “the 
idea that a description of the mind cannot proceed “liberally”—that is, in the absence of a 
biological description of the mind” (p. 14).  He adds, “that the entire structure on which 
the cognitivist enterprise is based is incoherent and not borne out of the facts” (p. 14).  As 
I have attempted to show, an embodied mind cannot reduce imagery and affect to a mere 
proposition without sacrificing the richness of experience and human intentionality.   
The idea that imagery and affect are integral to the reading process at every 
conceivable level suggests that response is built into the actual act of reading itself.  
Reading instruction that continues to assume a linear progression moving from literal to 
inferential to critical forms of comprehension has an unfortunate tendency to scorn 
seductive detail arguing that it distracts readers from what is important.  Approaching 
reading research and instruction from an embodied perspective might begin with the idea 
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that we read for reasons far more fundamental to our existence than to produce 
“scientifically based evidence” (National Research Council, 2001) and these reasons have 
not been adequately captured by the convenience of propositional accounts.  Succumbing 
to the “traps of language have made it difficult to tease out the connections between 
mental events and events in the nervous system” (Edelman, 1992, p. 7).  Sadoski (1999) 
expresses concern about the ephemeral nature of the proposition itself.  Propositions “are 
not seen as actual language; they have no form and are assumed to be in the abstract, 
mental meaning base of language.”  To this I add, that propositions can no more “be 
experienced directly” or have any “objective reality” (Sadoski, 1999, p. 495) than 
spaghetti can grow on trees. 
In closing, I return to the question of the relationship between the moral and 
aesthetic value of literature.  I believe that the power of the senses evoked during the act 
of reading endows literature with its potential for moral inquiry.  Literature provides us 
with a shared experience revealing to us some unknown, never before discovered part of 
ourselves and the world in which we live.  As for whether teachers of literature should 
first instruct students in the structural elements that contribute to the reader’s literary 
literacy or encourage them to assume critical perspectives associated with more 
poststructural attitudes, I find myself in agreement with Kundera (1995) who is adamant 
in his disdain for “those who look for a position (political, philosophical, religious, 
whatever) in a work of art rather than searching it for an effort to know, to understand, to 
grasp this or that aspect of reality” (p. 91).  First and foremost, the aesthetic brings forth 
“a mode of pleasure, satisfaction, comfort that is quite distinct from any utility.  But it 
nonetheless possesses a positive power for humanity, allowing us to share the same 
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emotion, to better understand each other” (Changeux, in Changeux & Ricoeur, 2000, p. 
308).  It is for this reason that I am advocating a poetics of pluralism whereby students 
undergo the affective impact of the text and a literature education that facilitates the 
necessary opportunities to make the images and emotions evoked by literary works the 
focus of their thinking attention.  In this manner, the positive value of literature is 
realized in confronting the fundamental ambiguity and diversity of human existence.   
Narrative consists of linking images together to make sense of an otherwise 
inchoate and episodic existence.  Through the imaginative projection into the 
consciousness of the characters, the narrator, and the poet, we are invited to explore our 
existential freedom.  As we have seen, the nature of human consciousness is such that no 
two persons are likely to ever experience a text in precisely the same way.  Imagery and 
affect however, do work to connect varying experiences to produce responses that might 
serve to unite us in our humanity. 
 158
 
REFERENCES 
 Alba, J., & Hasher, L.  (1983).  Is memory schematic?  Psychology Bulletin, 93, 
203-231.  
 Allen, G.  (2000).  Intertextuality.  London: Routledge. 
 Anderson, R. C., & Pearson, P. D.  (1984).  A schema-theoretic view of basic 
processes in reading comprehension.  In P.D. Pearson, R. Barr, M. Kamil, & P. 
Mosenthal (Eds.), Handbook of reading research (pp. 255-292).  New York: Longman. 
 Arendt, H.  (1971).  The life of the mind.  New York: Harcourt.   
 Aristotle.  (1968).  Aristotle’s De anima, Books II and III (D. Hamlyn, Trans.).  
Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Bakhtin, M. (1981).  The dialogic imagination: Four essays by M. M. Bakhtin (C. 
Emerson & M. Holquist, Trans.).  Austin: University of Texas Press. 
Bakhtin, M. (1986).  Speech genres and other essays (V. McGee, Trans.).  Austin: 
University of Texas Press.   
Bakhtin, M. (1990).  Art and answerability: Early philosophical essays by M. M. 
Bakhtin (V. Liapunov, Trans.).  Austin: University of Texas Press. 
Barsalou, L.  (1999).  Perceptual symbol system.  Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 
22, 577-660.  
Bartlett, F.  (1932).  Remembering.  Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Baylor, G.W. (1973). Modelling the mind's eye. In A. Elithorn & D. Jones (Eds.), 
Artificial and Human Thinking (pp. 283-297). Amsterdam: Elsevier.  
 159
Beauvois, M.  (1982).  Optic aphasia: A process of interaction between vision and 
language.  Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, 298, 35-47.   
Bizzell, P. (1986).  On the possibility of a unified theory of composition and 
literature.  Rhetoric Review, 4, 174-180.   
Bogdan, D.  (1992).  Re-education the imagination: Towards a poetics, politics 
and pedagogy of literary engagement.  Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann.   
Bogdan, D. & Straw, S. (1990).  Beyond communication: Reading comprehension 
and criticism.  Portsmouth, NH: Boynton/Cook Publishers.   
Bronowski, J.  (1978).  The origins of knowledge and imagination.  New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press.  
Bregman, A.  (1977).  Perception and behavior as compositions of ideals.  
Cognitive Psychology, 9, 250-292.   
Brown, A.  (1979).  Theories of memory and problems of development: Activity, 
growth, and knowledge.  In L. Cermak & F. Craik (Eds.), Levels of processing in human 
memory (pp. 225-258).  Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.   
Bryden, M.  (1982).  Laterality: Functional asymmetry in the intact brain.  New 
York:  Academic Press.   
Bryden, M., & Ley, R.  (1983).  Right-hemisphere involvement in the perception 
and expression of emotion in normal humans.  In K. Heilman & P. Satz (Eds.), 
Neruopsychology of human emotion (pp. 6-44).  New York: Guilford.   
Buber, M.  (1970).  I and thou, 2nd edition (W. Kaufman, Trans.).  New York: 
Charles Scribner’s Sons. 
 160
Carey, R., Harste, J., & Smith, S.  (1981).  Contextual constraints and discourse 
processes: A replication study.  Reading Research Quarterly, 16, 201-212. 
Cech, J.  (1995).  Angels and wild things: The archetypal poetics of Maurice 
Sendak.  University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.   
Changeux, J-P., & Ricoeur, P.  (2000).  What makes us think: A neuroscientist 
and a philosopher argue about ethics, human nature, and the brain (M. DeBevoise, 
Trans.).  Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.   
Chomsky, N.  (1957).  Syntactic structures.  The Hague: Mouton.   
Clark, G. (1990).  Dialogue, dialectic, and conversation: A social perspective on 
the function of writing. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press. 
Clay, M., & Cazden, C.  (1990).  A Vygotskian interpretation of reading recovery.  
In L. Moll (Ed.), Vygotsky and education: Instructional implications and applications of 
sociohistorical psychology (pp. 206-222).  Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.   
Coleridge, S. T.  (1954).  Biographia litteraria, vols. 1 and 2, (J. Shawcross, Ed.), 
Toronto: Oxford University Press. 
Colette.  (1953).  The vagabond, (E. McLeod, Trans.).  New York: Farrar, Straus 
and Giroux. 
Cotterill, R.  (1989).  No ghost in the machine: Modern science and the brain, the 
mind, and the soul.  Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann. 
Cunard, J.  (1983).  Context, background, ambiguity and reading.  Unpublished 
doctoral dissertation, University of Connecticut, Storrs.   
Curry, F.  (1967).  A comparison of left-handed and right-handed subject on 
verbal and non-verbal dichotic listening tasks.  Cortex, 3, 343-352.   
 161
Damasio, A.  (1994).  Descarte’s error: Emotion, reason, and the human brain.  
New York: Putnam.   
Damasio, A.  (1999).  The feeling of what happens: Body and emotion in the 
making of consciousness.  New York: Harcourt.   
Damasio, A.  (2003).  Looking for Spinoza: Joy, sorrow, and the feeling brain.  
New York: Harcourt. 
Danto, A. (1985).  Philosophy as/and/of literature.  In J. Rajchman and C. West 
(Eds.), Post-analytic philosophy (pp. 63-83).  New York: Columbia University Press. 
de  Beauvoir, S.  (1948).  The ethics of ambiguity (B. Frechtman, Trans.).  New 
York: Citadel Press. 
Derrida, J.  (1974).  Of grammatology (G. C. Spivak, Trans.).  Baltimore, MA: 
Johns Hopkins University Press.     
Descartes, R.  (1978).  The passions of the soul.  In E. Haldane and G. Ross 
(Eds.), The philosophical works of Descartes, vol. 1 (pp. 329-427).  Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.    
Dewey, J.  (1905/1977).  The middle works of John Dewey, 1899-1924, Vol.3 (J. 
Boydston, Ed.).  Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press.     
Dewey, J.  (1908/1978).  The middle works of John Dewey, 1899-1924, Vol. 4 (J. 
Boydston, Ed.).  Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press. 
Dewey, J.  (1911/1978).  The middle works of John Dewey, 1899-1924, Vol. 6 (J. 
Boydston, Ed.).  Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press. 
 162
Dewey, J.  (1916/1980).  Democracy and education.  In J. Boydston (Ed.), The 
middle works of John Dewey, 1899-1924, Vol. 9.  Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois 
University Press. 
Dewey, J.  (1922/1983).  The middle works of John Dewey, 1899-1924, Vol. 14 
(J. Boydston, Ed.).  Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press. 
Dewey, J.  (1932/1985).  Ethics.  In The later works of John Dewey, 1925-1953, 
Vol. 7 (J. Boydston, Ed.).  Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press. 
Dewey, J.  (1934/1987).  Art as experience.  In The later works of John Dewey, 
1925-1953, Vol. 10 (J. Boydston, Ed.).  Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University 
Press.   
Eagleton, T. (1990).  The ideology of the aesthetic.  Oxford: Blackwell. 
Edelman, G.  (1992).  Bright air, brilliant fire: On the matter of the mind.  New 
York: Basic Books.   
Fesmire, S.  (1999).  Morality as art: Dewey, metaphor, and moral imagination.  
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, XXXV, (3), 527-550. 
Fisanick, S.  (2003).  The embodied pedagogue: Teaching and writing with the 
body.  Unpublished doctoral dissertation.  Ohio State University, Columbus.   
Fish, S. (1980).  Is there a text in this class?: The authority of interpretive 
communities.  Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Fishbeyn, A.  (2003).  Evil in the novel and its implications for moral education 
(Martha Nussbaum, William Styron, Henry James).  Unpublished doctoral dissertation.  
Columbia University, New York.   
 163
Frye, N.  (1957).  Anatomy of criticism: Four essays.  Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press.   
Frye, N.  (1963).  The educated imagination.  The Massey Lectures.  Toronto: 
CBC Publications.   
Gambrell, L. (1982).  Induced mental imagery and the text prediction 
performance of first and third graders.  In J. Niles & L. Harris (Eds.), New inquiries in 
reading research and instruction (31st yearbook of the National Reading Conference, pp. 
131-135).  Rochester, NY: National Reading Conference. 
Gambrell, L., & Jawitz, B.  (1993).  Mental imagery, text illustration, and 
children’s story comprehension and recall.  Reading Research Quarterly, 28, 264-276.  
Geschwind, N.  (1965).  Disconnexion syndrome in animals and man.  Brain, 88, 
237-294, 585-644.   
Gilligan, C.  (2002).  The birth of pleasure.  New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 
Goodman, K.  (1969).  Analysis of reading miscues: Applied psycholinguistics.  
Reading Research Quarterly, 5, 9-13.   
Goodman, Y., & Goodman, K.  (1990).  Vygotsky in a whole-language 
perspective.  In L. Moll (Ed.), Vygotsky and education: Instructional implications and 
applications of sociohistorical psychology (pp. 223-250).  Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Gough, P.  (1972).  One second of reading.  In J. Kavanagh & I. Mattingly (Eds.), 
Language by ear and by eye (pp. 331-358).  Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
Greene, M.  (1978).  Landscapes for learning.  New York: Teachers College 
Press.   
 164
Greene, M.  (1995).  Releasing the imagination: Essays on education, the arts, 
and social change.  San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. 
Grumet, M.  (1988).  Bitter milk.  Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts 
Press.   
Harris, T., & Hedges, R.  (1995).  The literacy dictionary.  Newark, DE: 
International Reading Association. 
Hidi, S., & Baird, W.  (1988).  Strategies for increasing text-based interest and 
student’s recall of expository texts.  Reading Research Quarterly, 23, 465-483.             
Holquist, M. (1981).  Glossary.  In M. Holquist (Ed.), The dialogic imagination: 
Four essays by M. M. Bakhtin (pp. 423-434).  Austin, TX: University of Texas Press. 
Holquist, M.  (1990).  Dialogism: Bakhtin and his world.  London: Routledge. 
Hunt, L.  (2004).  The origins of human rights in the eighteenth century: Toward 
as post-Foucaultian history of personhood.  Available online: 
http://www.international.ucla.edu/cms/files/global1.pdf. 
Iser, W. (1978).  The act of reading: A theory of aesthetic response.  Baltimore, 
MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Iser, W. (1980).  The reading process: A phenomenological approach.  In J. 
Tompkins (Ed.), Reader-response criticism: From formalism to post-structuralism (pp. 
50-69).  Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Iser, W. (2000).  The range of interpretation.  New York: Columbia University 
Press. 
 165
James, W.  (1890/1981).  The stream of thought.  In F. Burkhardt (Ed.) The 
principles of psychology, Vol. 1, pp. 219-240.  Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
James, W.  (1904/1976).  Essays in radical empiricism.  In F. Burkhardt (Ed.), 
The works of William James, pp. 21-44.  Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.   
Johnson, M.  (1993).  Moral imagination: Implications of cognitive science for 
ethics.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Jung, C.  (1964).  Man and his symbols.  New York: Bantam Doubleday. 
Kearney, R.  (2002).  On stories.  New York: Routledge.   
Kimura, D.  (1978).  Left-hemisphere control of oral and brachial movements and 
their relation to communication.  Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of 
London, 298, 135-149.   
Kintsch, W.  (1988).  The role of knowledge in discourse comprehension: A 
construction-integration model.  Psychological Review, 95, 163-182.   
Kintsch, W.  (1998).  Comprehension: A paradigm for cognition.  Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press.   
Kinstsch, W., & van Dijk, T.  (1978).  Toward a model of text comprehension and 
production.  Psychological Reports, 33, 403-411.   
Kosslyn, S  (1980).  Image and mind.  Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Kosslyn, S.  (1994).  Image and mind: The resolution of the imagery debate.  
Cambridge,MA: Harvard University Press. 
 166
Krasny, K.  (2002).  Dialogic spaces: Bakhtin’s social theory of utterance in 
reader response.  Unpublished Master’s thesis.  University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, 
Canada. 
Krasny, K., & Sadoski, M.  (2004).  Mental imagery and affect in English/French 
bilingual readers: A cross-linguistic perspective.  In review. 
Kristeva, J. (1980).  Desire in language (T. Gora, A Jardine & L. Roudiez, 
Trans.).  New York: Columbia University Press. 
Kundera, M.  (1988).  The art of the novel (L. Asher, Trans.).  New York: 
HarperCollins.   
Kundera, M.  (1995).  Testaments betrayed, (L. Asher, Trans.).  New York: 
Harper Collins.   
LaBerge, D., & Samuels, S.  (1974).  Toward a theory of automatic information 
processing in reading.  Cognitive Psychology, 6, 293-323.   
Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M.  (1999).  Philosophy in the flesh: The embodied mind 
and its challenge to western thought.  New York: Basic Books. 
Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M.  (1980).  Metaphors we live by.  Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press.   
Lanes, S. (1980).  The Art of Maurice Sendak.  New York: Harry N. Abrams. 
Langer, S.  (1957).  Philosophy in a new key: A study in the symbolism of reason, 
rite, and art.  Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Langer, S.  (1962).  Speculations on the origins of speech and its communicative 
function.  In Philosophical sketches, (pp. 26-53).  Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University Press.   
 167
Lazarus, R.  (1991).  Emotion and adaptation.  New York: Oxford University 
Press.   
Ley, R.  (1983).  Cerebral laterality and imagery.  In A. Sheikh (Ed.), Imagery: 
Current theory, research, and application (pp. 252-287).  New York: Wiley. 
Lobel, A.  (1981).  On market street.  New York: Greenwillow.     
Lodge, D.  (2002).  Consciousness and the novel.  London: Seeker & Warburg. 
Luria, A.  (1973).  The working brain: An introduction to neuropsychology.  New 
York: Penguin. 
Martin, B.  (1970).  Brown bear, brown bear, what do you see?  New York: 
Henry Holt.   
Martin, B., & Archambault, J.  (1989).  Chicka chicka boom boom.  New York: 
Scholastic.     
Maslow, A. (1954).  Motivation and personality.  New York: Harper. 
McKellar, P.  (1957).  Imagination and thinking.  New York: Basic Books.   
Mead, G.  (1934).  Mind, self, and society.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Mead, G.  (1964).  The objective reality of perspectives.  In A. Reck (Ed.) 
Selected writings (pp. 312-314).  Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Menand, L.  (1999).  Pragmatism.  New York: Vintage.   
Merleau-Ponty, M.  (1942).  La structure du comportement.  Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France.   
Merleau-Ponty, M.  (1962).  Phenomenology of perception (C. Smith, Trans.).  
New York: Routledge. 
 168
Mills, L., & Rollman, G.  (1979).  Left hemisphere selectivity for processing 
duration in normal subjects.  Brain and Language, 7, 320-335. 
Milne, A. A.  (1957).  The world of Pooh.  Toronto: McClelland & Stewart.     
Minsky, M.  (1975).  A framework for representing knowledge.  In P. Winston 
(Ed.). The psychology of computer vision, (pp. 211-277).  New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Minsky, M.  (1986).  The society of mind.  New York: Simon & Schuster. 
Moffett, J.  (1988).  Storm in the mountains: A case study of censorship, conflict, 
and consciousness.  Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois Press.   
Moll, L. (1990).  Vygotsky and education: Instructional implications and 
applications of sociohistorical psychology.  Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press.   
Nafisi, A.  (2003).  Reading Lolita in Tehran.  New York: Random House. 
 Narayanan, N. H. (1993).  Imagery: Computational and cognitive perspectives.  
Computational Intelligence, 9, 303-308.   
Narayanan, S.  (1997).  Embodiment in language understanding: Sensory-motor 
representations for metaphoric reasoning about event descriptions.  Ph.D. dissertation, 
Department of Computer Science, University of California, Berkeley. 
Nussbaum, M.  (2001).  Upheavals of thought: The intelligence of emotions.  
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Oatley, K.  (1992).  Best laid schemes: The psychology of emotions.  Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
O’Connor, (2002).  Introduction.  In D. O’Connor (Ed.), The Symposium of Plato: 
The Shelley translation, (pp. xi-xliv). South Bend, IN: St. Ausgustine’s Press.      
 169
Ortony, A., Clore, G., & Collins, A.  (1988).  The cognitive structure of emotions.  
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Paivio, A.  (1971).  Imagery and verbal processes.  New York: Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston.    
Paivio, A.  (1986).  Mental representations: A dual coding approach.  New York: 
Oxford University Press.   
Paivio, A.  (1991).  Images in mind: The evolution of a theory.  New York: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
Paivio, A., & Begg, I.  (1981).  Psychology of language.  Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall.   
Paivio, A., & teLinde, T.  (1982).  Imagery, memory, and the brain.  Canadian 
Journal of Psychology, 36, 243-272. 
Pearson, P. D.  (2000).  Reading in the twentieth century.  In T. Good  & D. 
Phillips (Eds.), Ninety-ninth yearbook of the National Society for Study of Education, 
99:2, 152-208. 
Piaget, J.  (1926).  The language and thought of the child.  New York: Harcourt, 
Brace, Jovanovich.     
Plato.  (1961/1980).  Republic.  In E. Hamilton & H. Cairns (Eds. and Trans.), 
Plato: The collected dialogues (pp. 575-844).  Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Poirier, R.  (1971).  The performing self: Compositions and decompositions in the 
languages of contemporary life. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Postman, N., & Weingartner, C.  (1961).  The soft revolution: A student handbook 
for turning schools around.  New York: Dell Publishing.   
 170
Pressley, G. (1976).  Mental imagery helps eight-year-olds remember what they 
read.  Journal of Educational Psychology, 68, 355-359. 
Pylyshyn, Z.W. (1978). Imagery and artificial intelligence.  In W. Savage (Ed.), 
Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science, vol. 9 (pp 19-55).  Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press. 
Rosenblatt, L. (1978).  The reader, the text, the poem.  Carbondale, IL: Southern 
Illinois University Press. 
Rosenblatt, L. (1985).  The transactional theory of the literary work: Implications 
for research.  In C. Cooper (Ed.), Researching response to literature and the teaching of 
literature.  Norwood, MA: Ablex. 
Rumelhart, D.  (1977).  Toward an interactive model of reading.  In S. Dornie 
(Ed.), Attention and performance VI, pp. 573-603.  New York: Academic Press.   
Rumelhart, D.  (1980).  Schemata: The building blocks of cognition.  In R. Spiro, 
B. Bruce, & W. Brewer (Eds.), Theoretical issues in reading comprehension.  (pp. 33-
58).  Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.   
Rumelhart, D., & Ortony, A.  (1977).  The representation of knowledge in 
memory.  In R. C. Anderson, R. Spiro, & W. Montague (Eds.), Schooling and the 
acquisition of knowledge.  Hillsdale, NJ:  Lawrence Erlbaum.   
Sadoski, M. (1983).  An exploratory study of the relationships between reported 
imagery and the comprehension and recall of a story.  Reading Research Quarterly, 19, 
110-123. 
Sadoski, M. (1985).  The natural use of imagery in story comprehension and 
recall:  Replication and extension.  Reading Research Quarterly, 30, 278-288. 
 171
Sadoski, M. (1992).  Imagination, cognition, and persona.  Rhetoric Review, 10, 2, 
266-278. 
Sadoski, M.  (1999).  Comprehending comprehension.  Reading Research 
Quarterly, 34, 493-500. 
Sadoski, M., Goetz, E., & Kangiser, S.  (1988).  Imagination in story response: 
Relationships between imagery, affect, and structural importance.  Reading Research 
Quarterly, 23, 320-336. 
Sadoski, M., Goetz, E., Olivarez, A., Lee, S., & Roberts, N.  (1990).  Imagination 
in story reading: The role of imagery, verbal recall, story analysis, and processing levels.  
Journal of Reading Behavior, 22, 55-70.   
Sadoski, M., & Paivio, A.  (2001).  Imagery and text: A dual coding theory of 
reading and writing.  Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.   
Sadoski, M. & Paivio, A.  (1991).  Critique of schema theory.  Reading Research 
Quarterly, 26, 424-484.    
Sadoski, M., & Quast, Z.  (1990).  Reader recall and long term recall for 
journalistic text:  The roles of imagery, affect, and importance.  Reading Research 
Quarterly, 25, 256-272. 
Sartre, J.-P.  (1940/2004).  The imaginary (J. Webber, Trans.).  New York: 
Routledge.   
Schank, R.  (1982).  Dynamic memory.  Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press.   
Schank , R., & Abelson,  (1977).  Scripts, plans goals, and understanding.  
Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.   
 172
Sendak, M.  (1963).  Where the wild things are.  New York: Harper and Row. 
Sendak, M.  (1970).  In the night kitchen.  New York: Harper and Row, 
Sendak, M.  (1981).  Outside over there.  New York:  Harper and Row.   
Shelley, P. B. (1821/1965).  A defence of poetry.  In J. E. Jordan (Ed), The four 
ages of poetry: Shelley and Peacock (pp. 25-80).  Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill. 
Slattery, P.  (1989).  Toward an eschatological curriculum theory.  Unpublished 
doctoral dissertation. Lousiana State University, Baton Rouge.   
Slattery, P.  (1995).  Curriculum development in the postmodern era.  New York: 
Garland. 
Slattery, P., & Morris, M.  (1995).  Simone de Beauvoir’s ethics and postmodern 
ambiguity:  The assertion of freedom in the face of the absurd.  Educational Theory, vol 
39, 21-36.     
Spencer, M. M.  (2002, July 29). What more needs saying about imagination?  
Address at the 19th International Reading Association World Congress on Reading, 
Edinburgh, Scotland. 
Spurgeon, C.  (1935).  Shakespeare’s imagery and what it tells us.  New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Styron, W.  (1976).  Sophie’s choice.  New York: Random House.     
Turner, M.  (1996).  The literary mind.  New York: Oxford University Press.   
van Dijk, T., & Kintsch, W.  (1983).  Strategies of discourse comprehension.  
New York: Academic Press.   
van  Oostendorp, H., & Goldman, S.  (1999).  The construction of mental 
representations during reading.  Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
 173
Volosinov, V. (1929/1973).  Marxism and the philosophy of language, (L. 
Matejka & I. Titunik, Trans.).  Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.         
Vygotsky, L. (1962). Thought and language, (E. Hanfmann and G. Vakar, Eds. 
and Trans.).  Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Vygotsky, L. (1978).  Mind in society.  Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
Watson, J. B.  (1913).  Psychology as the behaviorist views it.  Psychological 
Review, 20, 158-177.   
Watson, J. B.  (1928).  The ways of behaviorism.  New York: Harper.   
Watson, J. B.  (1930).  Behaviorism (2nd ed.).  Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Watt, I.  (1957).  The rise of the novel: Studies in Defoe, Richardson and Fielding.  
London: Chatto & Windus. 
West, W., O’Rourke, T., & Holcomb, P.  (1996).  Event related brain potentials 
and language comprehension: A cognitive neuroscience approach to the study of 
intellectual functioning.  In S. Soraci and W. McIlvane (Eds.), Perspectives on 
fundamental processes in intellectual functioning (pp. 131-168).  Stamford, CT: Ablex. 
 174
 
VITA 
Karen A. Krasny 
770 Wellington Crescent 
Winnipeg, MB 
Canada   R3M 0C3 
 
Education: 
 
Doctor of Philosophy Department of Teaching, Learning, and Culture,           
Texas A&M University (2004) 
 
Master of Education Department of Curriculum, Teaching, and Learning, 
University of Manitoba (2002) 
 Program Area: Curriculum (Language and Literacy) 
 Faculty Advisor: Dr. Stanley B. Straw 
 Thesis: Dialogic Spaces: Bakhtin’s Social Theory of 
Utterance in Theories of Reader Response 
 
Bachelor of Education Department of Curriculum, Teaching, and Learning, 
University of Manitoba (1983) 
 Major Subject: English 
 
Current Position: 
 
Assistant Professor 
York University 
Faculty of Education 
N822 Ross Building 
4700 Keele Street 
Toronto, ON 
Canada   M3J 1P3 
